


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Soviet Union

Military Affairs



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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-91-030

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All-Army Committee's Surkov Interviewed

92UM0077A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 91
p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Mikhail Surkov, former secretary of the All-Army Party Committee, by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Tkachenko: "I Cannot Forgive Myself"]

[Text] There were lengthy talks about the departyization of the army but they ended abruptly: scarcely had the roar of the tanks in the streets of the capital ceased when, on 29 August, the president of the country signed a ukase on the cessation of the activities of political and party structures in the armed forces. Our correspondent asked Lieutenant-General Mikhail Surkov, until recently secretary of the All-Army Party Committee, to tell how it is being implemented.

[Surkov] I will begin by saying that departyization or, let us put it this way, the tendency toward this first became apparent a year and a half ago. The democratization of the life of the troops contributed to its development and the general understanding of the danger of multiple parties in the army gave it legitimacy. The inclusion of the one and the other in a legislative framework is also completely logical from this point of view and does not evoke any doubts. Alas, the events in August gave rise to a new logic and sequence of actions. Therein is the entire drama of the situation.

In purely human terms, one can understand the president, who reinforced his renunciation of the post of general secretary through a ukase that he was previously in no hurry to issue. But how can one accept or agree with the idea behind the decision made in accordance with the situation? With that shadow of suspicion that—whether or not M.S. Gorbachev wanted this—fell on the last page of the history of army party structures?

[Tkachenko] Mikhail Semenovich, besides the underlying idea, there is also the text, the appeals by a number of councils and political bodies for support of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]...

[Surkov] Yes, there were such appeals for support. By the way, to be fair it would not hurt to determine in each case where the fault is and where people signing them were harmed. But this is another subject and we are now talking about something else. You mention the "political bodies" but nevertheless you address your question to a representative of the party committee. And there are so many. Some do this by virtue of existing stereotypes, associating political sections and party organizations in the old way, whereas others cast a shadow consciously, pursuing their own political objectives. It is useless to remind the latter of this but not the former: our party organizations became organizationally independent in March and, I dare say, made use of this independence in the days of the crisis. Most officials who expressed feelings of loyalty had to get along without the former party "approval" for this reason above all.

Beginning on the morning of 19 August, the telephones in my office were practically jumping off the desk. I received dozens of calls from districts, armies, and divisions. Even the secretaries of regiment party committees were getting through who theoretically could not do this because of the rigid hierarchal military communications. With minor variations, the question that they all had was: "What happened? The communists are demanding additional information!" Look here: they are demanding! Where and when could one hear such a thing from army party members who in the past had meekly contented themselves with whatever came down from the political sections?

I will be frank: few officers in the army and navy, including communists, are happy with their present situation. But they are linking their hopes for better things with tomorrow and not with yesterday. And it seems to me that the members of the GKChP realized this very well. Otherwise there is no explanation for the fact that the party structures, including in the All-Army Party Committee, were "cheated out of" involvement in the coup. I want to be understood correctly: I am not idealizing the situation. If there were such involvement, some of the leaders would have raised their arms to salute. But these isolated individuals, even if there were dozens of them, could not determine the success of an action requiring the support of thousands. Rather the opposite is true. I think that it is primarily because of this that the organizers of the putsch counted only on the unreasoning force of the military command.

[Tkachenko] Mikhail Semenovich, you, after all, are not only secretary of the party committee but also a lieutenant general...

[Surkov] Because of my "uselessness as a mere general," I obviously was not at that moment in contact with Marshal Yazov—one of the few whose information permitted a true appraisal of the situation and hence allowed him to take a correct position. At first I, just as many others, took what was happening to be real. And not because I was so naive. Other than the imposing make-up of the State Committee—those immediately around Mikhail Sergeyevich—conversations about the coup, including with the "participation of the CPSU," were swept away in the consciousness by the counterargument: if it were so, they would not have left me alone. Alarming doubts arose by the end of the 19th.

[Tkachenko] And did you yourself take no initiative to obtain the necessary information?

[Surkov] I tried several times without success to reach the defense minister. Nor could I reach the first deputies. Despairing, I got in touch with the secretary of the ministry board and I asked that he personally tell Marshal Yazov of my need to meet with him for even 5 minutes. I got no invitation on the 19th, 20th, or 21st.

I also called the Supreme Soviet, the Committee on Defense and Security, where I was a member. The answer was not pleasing: "The situation is unclear. The deputies are meeting tomorrow." The only place where I

got to on the first day, again at my own request, was the partial meeting of the Central Committee Secretariat. Although even before I did not have the best attitude toward this "vanguard" hanging on the legs of the party, I was once again convinced that it is so. Can one seriously determine his own position without an analysis and with no knowledge of the specific situation? It now became apparent that Shenin and some other person there knew. What kind of a party conspiracy is it when even the Secretariat had not heard anything definite from the conspirators?

I cannot forgive myself for trying to understand the situation by going to these addresses. But there were others as well.... All of this was very costly. And if it were just to me. The malevolence about involvement of army party bodies in the putsch is easy to refute. But how can one refute what really did take place: the prolonged silence of the party committees and party organization.

[Tkachenko] What you say involuntarily causes one to think about the clearly tardy democratization of life in the troops. Do you think that the presidential ukase will give it a boost?

[Surkov] Certainly. The democratic plans of the new leadership of the armed forces are already getting the green light today. But this is movement from the top. And it can really get bogged down if one overlooks the circumstance that there is no good democratic counterweight to one-man rule in the middle and lower troop structures.

[Tkachenko] Nevertheless a decision has been made on the removal of party control. How is it being implemented?

[Surkov] Fully in accordance with the order of the defense minister specifying the ukase of the president. It was announced to communists that party organizations would cease their activities and registration cards were issued to those desiring them. As ordered, most of the party documents were turned over to the ministry archives even before 15 September. The commission established by order of the chief of the General Staff deals with the All-Army Party Committee. We have been given until 15 November to resolve all of these questions. That is a tight schedule and we will have to hurry. And there are questions upon questions here. And all because of a lack of thought. Take those same papers—we stored, after all, not just party but also Komsomol registration cards. We did not know until the last minute what to do with them. And not just with them. The party committees have a large number of blank forms for party membership cards. Who will issue an order for their destruction or transfer? We ourselves make the decisions. But it should not be that way if we are serious when we talk about law and order. The activities of the party have only been suspended. They were stopped only in the armed forces, whereby communist servicemen retain the right to membership at their place of residence.

[Tkachenko] What is your attitude toward this right?

[Surkov] Unequivocally negative. The removal of the army from party control must suspend membership in any party for the entire period of the person's service with shoulder straps.

[Tkachenko] Which of the problems that have arisen during the course of the implementation of the presidential ukase has turned out to be most difficult?

[Surkov] The financial problem. In many positions here, not only the law and common sense but also elementary fairness is being trampled upon. You probably now know that the party's financial accounts have been frozen. The argument: unjust accumulations. That may be. But what kind of injustice can one be talking about with respect to army party organizations whose finances were also locked up? Everything down to the last ruble was party dues. And we cannot use any of that even to pay the wages of the workers and employees of our structures.

[Tkachenko] How is the question of the officers in charge of army party committees being resolved?

[Surkov] There are about 4,000 freed secretaries in the party committees. About 10 percent have served their set term of service and may be discharged. The rest, just as all political workers in general, will be retrained and will continue their service in a new capacity.

[Tkachenko] How do you see the future course of General Surkov?

[Surkov] I am 45 years old. And of course I am able and want to continue to serve. But if I see that the leadership is bothered by a former member of the now disgraced Politburo and Central Committee, I will not hesitate to request a discharge.

Longer Report on Kobets 22 Oct Remarks to Journalists

*PM2410150991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Oct 91 First Edition p 1*

[TASS correspondents R. Zadunayskiy and A. Naryshkin report under "Direct Line" rubric: "On the Army and Defense"]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Oct—Unless we want to wreck everything, we must not set up a Russian Army and Ministry of Defense. For the time being the existing structures can be considered entirely effective. That is how Army General Konstantin Kobets replied to your TASS correspondents' question at a meeting with representatives of the mass media. The meeting took place 22 October in the Central House of Journalists under the working title "The Army in a Changing World: Lessons of the Putsch."

Army General K. Kobets set out his concept of a security system, which, in his opinion, should be structured on three levels: a national level, a Soviet-European level, and a Soviet-Euro-American level. We believe, he went on to say, that in the civilized world today there are no enemies or adversaries. Armed forces are needed to react

appropriately to the degree of risk which each of the participants in collective security structures and also third countries might potentially present. Such an approach presupposes a review of the existing Soviet defensive military doctrine and the adoption of a new doctrine which might provisionally be called a doctrine for the prevention of war, he indicated.

Konstantin Kobets acquainted journalists with the basic theses for the reform of the country's Armed Forces for which the committee he heads is elaborating the concept. In particular, he noted that the concept includes the conclusion of a defensive Union of Sovereign States, sets out the conditions and framework for interpublic military-economic cooperation, ensures social and legal guarantees for all servicemen, and proposes direct reform of the Armed Forces.

The major brake on military reform was the military-political organs, and with their abolition, in the military chief's words, "the show is getting on the road." However, we cannot cope with the process of cardinally reforming the Soviet Armed Forces alone, K. Kobets noted. This must be the task of society and the state as a whole. The best minds of the academic world must be enlisted in this work, and everything rational in experience of military reforms abroad must be carefully considered.

Representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the RSFSR State Committee for Defense Questions who took part in the meeting also answered journalists' questions.

DOSAAF Plenum Reorganizes, Renames Group

Report on Central Committee Plenum

92UM0091A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 44, Nov 91 (Signed to press 29 Oct 91)
p 2

[Unattributed article: "7th USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] The 7th All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy Central Committee Plenum took place on October 23, 1991.

USSR Ministry of Defense officials, representatives of a number of other departments and social organizations, members of the USSR DOSAAF Central Auditing Commission, and RSFSR OSTO [Defense Sports-Technical Organizations] kraykom and obkom chairmen who are not USSR DOSAAF Central Committee members participated in the plenum's work.

The following issues were examined at the plenum:

- Reorganization of the Defense Society; and,
- Changes to the USSR DOSAAF Charter.

USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Chairman Colonel-General N.N. Kotlovtshev delivered a report on the first issue. USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Deputy

Chairman and RSFSR OSTO Soviet Chairman Major-General A.I. Anokhin delivered an information report on the second issue.

A.S. Abdrakhmanov, B.R. Khaydarov, Yu.F. Novikov, F.I. Akchurin, A.G. Vypriyazhkin, V.S. Orlov, V.V. Osyko, Ye.S. Korobchinskiy, V.S. Brusov, and V.K. Astapenko discussed the reports.

Appropriate resolutions were adopted on the issues discussed.

The plenum transformed the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee into the USSR Central Defense Sports-Technical Organizations (Societies) Union Central Soviet.

The plenum also examined organizational issues.

As a result of a personal statement and his impending release from active military service, the plenum relieved Colonel-General N.N. Kotlovtshev from his duties as USSR OSTO Union Central Soviet chairman.

The plenum elected Colonel-General Ye.I. Krylov chairman of the USSR of Defense Sports-Technical Organizations (Societies) Union Central Soviet and member of the USSR OSTO Union Central Soviet, its presidium, and its bureau.

The plenum elected Colonel A.Ya. Shcherbakov USSR OSTO Union Central Soviet first deputy chairman.

The plenum relieved Major-General A.I. Anokhin from his duties as USSR OSTO Union Central Soviet deputy chairman as a result of his election as RSFSR OSTO Union Central Soviet chairman.

As a result of his release from active military service, the plenum relieved Lieutenant-General V.T. Kanastratov from his duties as deputy chairman of the USSR OSTO Union Central Soviet and presidium member. As a result of his release from active military service, the plenum relieved Lieutenant-General of Aviation S.N. Maslov from his duties as USSR OSTO Union Central Soviet deputy chairman and presidium member.

The plenum relieved M.V. Bashkatov, V.I. Grebenyuk, S.N. Yepifantsev, V.M. Mishin, Yu.V. Petrov, Yu.S. Pivnev, and V.F. Popov from their duties as USSR OSTO Union Central Soviet presidium members; M.T. Abzhandadze, O.V. Anisimov, T.P. Antonov, M.V. Bashkatov, I.A. Belolapotkin, N.G. Belous, V.I. Grebenyuk, A.K. Gripevich, Ye.I. Gritskiy, S.N. Yepifantsev, A.S. Zheltov, V.N. Krasilnikov, S.B. Krechetov, T.S. Krutov, V.S. Kuzmichev, O.A. Kulyakov, V.M. Lebedev, V.S. Ligash, V.V. Marushchak, S.N. Maslov, V.M. Mishin, V.S. Nechayev, V.S. Oktyabrskiy, Yu.V. Orlov, B.S. Perfilyev, Yu.V. Petrov, Yu.S. Pivnev, V.F. Popov, T.I. Romanov, F.G. Sidorov, V.V. Suvorov, Yu.I. Utenkov, A.M. Khodzhibayev, L.L. Tsukerman, I.K. Tsiprush, and F.Ye. Shtykal from their duties as USSR OSTO Union Central Soviet members.

The plenum appointed I.N. Burmistrov, V.V. Voronin, V.M. Davydov, A.P. Dudkin, G.V. Kuznetsov, V.S.

Orlov, Ye.N. Chigvintsev, S.M. Chupris, and V.L. Yakovlev to the USSR OSTO Union Central Soviet.

The plenum elected I.N. Burmistrov, V.V. Voronin, V.M. Davydov, G.V. Kuznetsov, and V.L. Yakovlev USSR OSTO Union Central Soviet presidium members.

The USSR OSTO Union Central Soviet presidium session occurred on that same day. The presidium confirmed V.M. Davydov in the position of head of the organization-mass work and military-patriotic propaganda directorate and appointed him to the presidium bureau.

A detailed report on the plenum will be published in the next issue of SOVETSKIY PATRIOT.

New President Profiled

92UM0091B Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 44, Nov 91 (Signed to press 29 Oct 91)
p 2

[Unattributed article: "Yevgeniy Ivanovich Krylov"]

[Text] Yevgeniy Ivanovich Krylov was born to the family of a serviceman on September 16, 1935 in the city of Pushkin in Leningrad Oblast. He graduated from the Armored Troops Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy and from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy.

He has been in the Armed Forces since 1954. After completing middle school, he entered Orlovskoye Tank School which he completed in 1957. He has served in various command positions while traveling the path from tank platoon commander to military district first deputy commander. For the last four years, he has held the position of first deputy chief of the Ground Forces main directorate for combat training and deputy commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces for military educational institutions—head of the military educational institution directorate.

First Deputy President Profiled

92UM0091C Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 44, Nov 91 (Signed to press 29 Oct 91)
p 2

[Unattributed, article: "Aleksandr Yakovlevich Shcherbakov"]

[Text] Aleksandr Yakovlevich Shcherbakov was born to a peasant family on September 14, 1947 in the village of Razdolnoye in Penzenskiy Oblast. He graduated from the Military-Engineering Academy imeni V.V. Kuybyshev.

He has served in the Armed Services since 1967. He has served in military construction units in various command positions and has occupied leading positions in USSR Ministry of Defense military construction institutions.

He has been assigned to DOSAAF since 1989. At the 5th USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum, which

occurred in December 1989, Aleksandr Yakovlevich Shcherbakov was elected USSR DOSAAF Central Committee deputy chairman—head of the capital construction and material-technical supply directorate and a member of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, its presidium, and bureau.

Central Committee Presidium Meets

92UM0091D Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 44, Nov 91 (Signed to press 29 Oct 91)
p 2

[Unattributed, untitled article]

[Text] The latest USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium session occurred on October 22, 1991.

Issues associated with the conduct of the 7th USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum were discussed.

A resolution was adopted on the reorganization of the course curriculum to increase the skills of the Defense Society's leading cadres and specialists.

The presidium approved certain changes and supplements to the provision on the prize and gold medal for the "Best Trainer on Technical and Military-Applied Types of Sport."

A Society resolution has awarded a large group of the Society's activists and staff workers the USSR DOSAAF Badge of Honor for service in defense-mass and sports work of a number of organizations.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Auditing Commission [TsRK] reviewed the results of work and tasks for its future improvement for 1991 at its session. TsRK Chairman A.V. Khankov delivered the report.

The commission released V.M. Davydov as a result of his election as USSR OSTO Union Central Soviet member.

The commission also relieved I.A. Antman, A.N. Bazeley, L.A. Gaveyka, Z.M. Zhalpene, L.N. Zaytseva, I.G. Lomsadze, V.V. Magina, V.M. Panteleyev, V.A. Tikhonova, and A.D. Fadeyeva from their duties as TsRK members.

O.V. Sholmov was appointed to the Central Auditing Commission Staff.

Swedish Questions on 'Whiskey on Rocks' Incident Continue

92UM0105A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Nov 91 First edition p 3

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank V. Marekha: "So Just What Happened Near the Swedish Coast"]

[Text] Ten years after a Soviet submarine accidentally went aground near the Karlskrona naval base, the officials who conducted the investigation are stating in the Swedish press that only the Navy's archives can shed light on the real causes of the accident ("A Drama Which Shook Sweden," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 October of this year). If an inquiry is received from the Swedish government, what can be learned from the documents,

which are still classified to this day? Our correspondent directed this question to the Main Staff of the Navy. The documents and statements he received confirmed Commodore K. Andersson's opinion that the crew of the submarine involved in the accident were not on a secret intelligence mission.

Throughout the 10 years since the Baltic Fleet's U-137 submarine went aground near the Swedish island of Turumskär, Stockholm has conducted a persistent campaign "to prevent the threat of an invasion" by Soviet submarines. This propaganda "knight's move" has achieved its purpose. The government has received additional allocations for defense, and many politicians have "sought" successfully and made careers for themselves as fantastic as the submarine threat to Sweden was mythical. If there was a drama, it was certainly not that which, according to the newspapers, "shook Sweden." The "reconnaissance" grounding was a personal drama for the submarine commander, other officials and members of the crew, who received severe punishment for neglecting the rules of good maritime practices.

"A commission headed by Fleet Adm N. Smirnov, established to investigate the causes of the submarine's navigational accident, established the causes fairly rapidly," recalls Rear Adm V. Aleksey, the Navy's chief navigator, who was charged with reporting evidence on the accident acquired by the commission during that period. "And I have to admit that there has never been another such disgraceful incident in the entire history of the submarine fleet. Capt 3rd Rank A. Gushchin, commander and chief of staff of the submarine brigade was on board during that entirely routine combat training cruise. Out of a fear of receiving a poor evaluation for the cruise, he put secrecy ahead of navigational safety. As a result, when the antenna for the radio direction finder was put out of action by an underwater encounter with a fishing trawl and the echo sounder began emitting unreliable information, no one at the primary control station (GKP) took steps to pinpoint the location with radar (the crew was unprepared to use other means, and the navigating officer could not prepare the sextant for use and mistook a visible buoy for a fishing spar-buoy). The identification error alone set off a chain of subsequent errors which ultimately resulted in the submarine's running aground.

The Swedish press carried reports, including some written with the help of Soviet journalists, that something like other-worldly forces or forces from outer space led the submarine into the accident, "inserting" its route through the narrow, twisting passage near the Karlskrona naval base. The only fortuity, however, was the fact that the submarine did not break up on a reef. It surfaced ahead of the designated time literally a few cables from

the reef. All the other fortuitous events resulted from incompetent actions and an attempt to bypass "oil slicks" for which the crew at the main control station mistook tiny islets rising above the surface near the coastline in the night. The idea of some kind of reconnaissance mission is out of the question. The crew had only an average level of training, and the submarine was of a fairly obsolete design. Furthermore, the grounding in the shallows took place with diesel engines running, the noise from which was heard by numerous witnesses in villages near the shore. This certainly would not indicate any secret scenario. Commodore K. Andersson, who personally inspected the submarine during the first few hours following the accident, read the ship's documents and interviewed the submarine commander and navigator.

Many officials who were at least indirectly to blame for the navigational accident were punished under orders issued by the Minister of Defense and the commander in chief of the Navy. On the other hand, however, this accident helped to accelerate the provision of the Baltic theater with new geographic navigational aids. Among other things, new navigational equipment was installed on all the Baltic Fleet's ships and submarines, satellite-signal receivers and new land-based radio navigation system were set up. The command element was also able to take steps to enhance the organization of the navigation service and the prevention of navigational accidents. As a result of these measures there have been no navigational accidents involving submarines in the Baltic Fleet since 1984. Much credit goes to Capt 2nd Rank A. Katser and Capt 2nd Rank V. Palenik, squadron submarine navigating officers. The former was promoted to the next higher position, and the latter was recently awarded the Order of the Red Star.

With respect to the fact that some members of the Swedish administration are still not "certain" of the cause of the accident suffered by our submarine, I believe that this stems from a desire to justify in the eyes of the public those additional allocations for defense requested in connection with the "hunt" for Russian submarines and the "failure" of the services securing Sweden's maritime borders. The submarine was detected not by coastal defense forces, after all, but by an ordinary fisherman.

All the documents confirming the real causes of the 10-year-old navigational accident are in the Navy's archives, Rear Adm V. Aleksey said in conclusion. It is therefore my opinion that all the independent investigations into the causes of the accident being revived in the Swedish press in connection with its "anniversary" have nothing in common with abandoning the premises underlying the cold war. If something needs to be cleared up, there is nothing to prevent renewing talks at the level of our governments.

Belorussian DOSAAF Reformed

92UM0098A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 44, Nov 91 pp 6-7

[Article by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT staff correspondent Stanislav Aslezov: "Toward Independence. What Lies Ahead? Notes on the Extraordinary Congress of the Belorussian SSR DOSAAF"]

[Text] It has happened! The Belorussian SSR DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] has been transformed into the OSTO [Defense Athletic and Technical Society] of the Republic of Belarus. This has been resolved by the Eighth Extraordinary Congress of the Belorussian SSR DOSAAF which was held in Minsk. A statute of the defense society has been adopted. The central committee has been transformed into the republic council. It has been instructed to manage defense work until the First OSTO Congress. An autonomous path and independence lie ahead.

Therefore, changes have been made. I will say frankly that this has been done out of necessity. To put it graphically, P. Maksimov, chairman of the Belorussian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee, who made the report, has never quite told it as it is, and to everybody's face, to the degree he did at this congress.

It is easy to understand his mood. Transformations are not an easy matter at present, when the republic organization is not exactly enjoying the best of times, and when it is proposed that it be liquidated altogether.

To the credit of DOSAAF functionaries, they did not give up. They made efforts in the commissions of the republic Supreme Soviet in advance. At the session itself, P. Maksimov and USSR DOSAAF People's Deputy A. Kozik discussed what the defense society does, what issues it resolves, and how it generates money for itself.

The DOSAAF functionaries were heard; moreover, they gained support. Belorussia People's Deputy L. Kozik (the same last name as our A. Kozik) just said that: "I graduated from a driver education class at the Borisov DOSAAF motor vehicle school. This is a strong organization and, most importantly, a useful one, the one that the people need. The DOSAAF should exist!"

Common sense won out. The republic Supreme Soviet voted to preserve the defense society. To be sure, it was recommended that the DOSAAF bring all of its affairs into compliance with the republic's Declaration of Independence and Sovereignty, which is actually what caused this congress to be held. The presenter of the report, as well as B. Zhukov, I. Filipovich, and other delegates who took the floor in the debate, attempted to analyze the path traveled and to decide which heritage is to be given up and which is to be subscribed to. They tried to see and understand the prospects.

I will note that DOSAAF members in Belorussia have nothing to be ashamed of; they can be proud of their past. Please recall that quite recently it was precisely Belorussia which was called a "testing ground" where

new "forms and methods" of defense work and military-patriotic education are tested (may the readers forgive me for my "official" style). People came here to learn from all over the Soviet Union.

I would like to stress that these "forms and methods" were not "sent down" from on high; they were born at the grassroots. This was like the breath of the Earth, the will of the people, and, if you will, the sign of God. There were reasons for this. For ages, enemies have marched on Moscow through the lands of Belorussia. A lot of blood was spilled here in the years of the Great Patriotic War! Compassion for our fellow humans is in the hearts and minds of the people of Belorussia.

The movement of red pathfinders, work with teenagers at their places of residence—there were a great many wonderful endeavors! What degree of strength does one have to have in order to thrice win the challenge Red Banner of the USSR Ministry of Defense for preparing cadres for the army and the navy even in our tough and troubled times! Production enterprises of the DOSAAF of Belorussia did not bring up the rear on the stormy seas of a market economy either.

Indeed, it is no accident that the OSTO considers itself a legal successor of the DOSAAF of Belorussia.

Having proclaimed sovereignty, the Republic of Belarus proclaimed its right to have its own Armed Forces. What will the Belorussian army be? What specialists does it need and how many? You would agree that these are not idle questions. The future of the schools and clubs of the defense society and their collectives largely depends on answers to these questions.

As you can see, it is not difficult to pass a decree. It is much more difficult to implement it. Moreover, all those who tried to discredit military service are now reaping the fruit of their own short-sightedness. If things go the way they have been, few will be eager to be called to the white and pink colors of the Belorussian army.

P. Maksimov announced publicly some quite depressing facts. The number of refusals to serve in the army has been growing catastrophically. In 1988, there were only two cases whereas in 1989, there were 40, and last year, this number increased by as much as a factor of 20. One hundred and fifty soldiers who were drafted in Belorussia have deserted. Our republic has never known such shame!

Where are draftee-cadets to live? As early as July 1986, at the dawn of perestroika, the government of the republic resolved to erect 15 dormitories for DOSAAF schools. To date, only one has been commissioned at the Slutsk Motor Vehicle School, hence less than full enrollment in the DOSAAF schools, notwithstanding the fact that this is the age of technology and engines!

Assignments for training specialists for the Armed Forces are not being fulfilled. Meanwhile, quite recently there was no dearth of those wishing to enroll in parachute classes at the aviation clubs of the DOSAAF. The

results of training naval specialists and signal personnel are even worse. The future of aviation organizations is very much up in the air.

Even a lay person would tell you how important technical and applied military sports are for instructing and educating young people. However, there is no end of problems for sports as well.

All republic STK's [Athletic and Technical Complexes] are subsidized, with the exception of the service dog training club. The threat of closure is looming for the Athletic and Technical Schools for Children and Young People. Work with teenagers at their places of residence, which began so successfully, is being wound down. What is the reason? Inability to operate in a market environment.

The report abounded in other facts which were no less alarming. This was a cold shower indeed, and on the very eve of winter.

The approach of most delegates to discussing the report was sober and balanced; they made many interesting suggestions. However, some gave in to euphoria: The main point, they said, is to secure independence and get rid of "dictation" by the notorious center, and then...

Apparently, such attitudes were reflected by the draft Statute of the Republic of Belarus OSTO, on which P. Lebedev, deputy chairman of the Central Committee of the Belorussian SSR DOSAAF, reported. The draft said virtually nothing about whether the All-Union Defense Society and its leading organs are needed, or how mutual relations with them will be structured.

USSR People's Deputy A. Kozik, chief of the Brest General Technical School, was the first one to begin bringing the delegates "down" to earth from the heavens:

"It is necessary to clearly set forth in the draft statute the nature of mutual relations with the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee or an organ which will perhaps replace it. Otherwise, we will split off at an opportune moment, obtain complete 'sovereignty,' but the republic will not allocate us anything—neither cars nor gasoline... How are we going to live and work then? We should perfect our operations rather than self-destruct..."

G. Kozlov, people's deputy of Belorussia and acting chief of the Directorate for the Issues of Civil Rights, Public Security, and Defense Work of the Council of Ministers of the republic, poured oil on the fire:

"Undoubtedly, independence is a good thing. At the same time, I would like to warn you: It is going to be difficult. However, there is nobody to complain to anyone except to ourselves. You make decisions yourselves, you execute them yourselves. The government does not have either vehicles or fuel. Do not be in a hurry to sever links to the center. An agreement must be worked out..."

To be sure, G. Kozlov's colleague, deputy chairman of the commission of the Supreme Soviet of the republic for national security, defense, and combating crime L.

Privalov, sweetened "the pill" somewhat by promising that the Supreme Soviet would strive to continue giving feasible support and assistance to the republic OSTO in the future.

Those were the views of people's deputies. What did a representative of the center think? Deputy Chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee A. Shcherbakov played this role:

"I believe that the role of your congress is not to just change your sign. The main point is to create a workable structure... Unfortunately, the draft statute actually side-steps the issues of cooperation with the center. This is a pity! One cannot survive on his own. It is necessary to set forth conditions and establish relations. All of our plans will go down the drain unless we ensure welcome changes, and no sovereignty will help us."

There are more questions than there are answers. Indeed, for example, the radio and electronic industries are well developed in the republic. However, where are we to get planes, race cars, sporting weapons, and many other things? Will infamous barter help us out? However, the republic OSTO has nothing to give to its neighbors. Apparently, there was a reason why one of the delegates told me in an unguarded moment:

"We have put our head in the 'noose' ourselves with this 'independence.' This is when you put a stone around your neck, and jump into the water—splash!"

Indeed, decisions have been made, and the boat has been missed. The defense organization of the Republic of Belarus has acquired freedom and independence, and became autonomous. Life itself, and only life itself, will tell how justified the transformations are.

I would like to finish my discourse, which is far from uncontroversial, with words that sound upbeat. While ending the work of the congress, A. Kharlamov, chairman of the Minsk Oblast DOSAAF Committee, currently the oblast OSTO council, addressed the delegates with parting words of sorts:

"Indeed, we are embarking on a new period in the history of our defense society. However, let us not forget our past, to say nothing of casting slurs upon it. The republic organization has many glorious, remarkable accomplishments to its credit. Extensive experience has been accumulated. Let us move forward, toward our independence and autonomy, by using this experience creatively..."

Unit 5460 To Withdraw By January

*92UN0227A Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian
29 Sep 91 p 1*

[Article by Enn Uus (ETA): "Unit 5460 To Withdraw By January"]

[Text] **Military Unit 5460 Should Withdraw From Estonia By January, 1992**

Per the Estonian government's 3x3 Program, the Soviet military forces stationed in Estonia will be under the Estonian Ministry of the Interior. The Estonian Minister of the Interior told the ETA that the situation changed after Edgar Savisaar signed the agreement with Viktor Baranikov, Soviet Minister of the Interior. The Soviets accepted the decision to withdraw their forces and consequently there is no point in discussing any questions of jurisdiction.

According to the agreement, military unit 5460 is set to withdraw by January 1, 1992. "It was reported to me on Thursday that as far as the northwestern forces go, the proxy for the leader of the forces along the northern border has already issued orders to begin dismantling, packing and shipping technical equipment. We put an end to this activity via Moscow because, presumably we should plan on getting some of this weaponry and equipment, either paying for part of it or purchasing it for the set price of the agreement." [quotation marks as published]

Convoys have been guarding our checkpoints for 49 years. Per the ministry's evaluations, we are not yet prepared to take over these functions. The agreement included a more or less realistic deadline to cover this: July 1, 1992. "The agreement clearly specifies deadlines, yet in reality military forces are allowed to fulfill their duties as long as they are physically able to do so. Consequently we must speed up preparations to ensure a smooth transition," stated the minister. Laanjärv gave the example of official border duties where our men work side by side with Soviet border guards to enable them to fully take over these duties later.

According to the minister's statements, there are officers in both forces that have lived in Estonia for a long time and do not wish to withdraw with the troops. They want to take off their Soviet uniforms and enter the service of the Republic of Estonia. He assured that such requests would be evaluated on an individual basis. At the same time these people also want to receive social guarantees and at this point, we cannot provide them with a definite response. "Employing specialists like these, however, is absolutely necessary," said the minister.

Estonia-USSR Sign Defense Agreement

92UN0418A Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian
13 Oct 91 p 1

[Document signed by E. Savisaar and J. Shaposhnikov: "Text of the Agreement Reached Between the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Government of the Republic of Estonia"]

[Text] For purposes of maintaining peace in the Baltic area:

CONSIDERING that both parties to this agreement understand the circumstances developed around the presence of the USSR armed forces contingent within the territory of the Republic of Estonia in the context of the resolution on Estonia's Independent Statehood

passed on August 20 by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia, and the subsequent recognition of Estonia's independence by the USSR State Council on September 6, 1991,

PROCEEDING from the assumption that an agreement and other state-level legal commitments will be entered between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Estonia,

IT IS AGREED by the parties hereto to sign the following agreement.

ARTICLE 1

The parties agreed that the said USSR armed forces contingent should be removed from the territory of the Republic of Estonia.

The logistics and target dates for the removal of Soviet forces shall be determined in a supplementary protocol yet to be compiled. The stay of Soviet forces within the territory of the Republic of Estonia will be determined by a state-level agreement to be entered between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Estonia.

ARTICLE 2

The parties agreed to form a joint commission for the purpose of working out the status of the Soviet armed forces contingent temporarily stationed within the territory of the Republic of Estonia.

The joint commission to be charged with the task of submitting, within one month of the signing of this agreement, the following to be signed by the parties:

An agreement about the status of the Soviet armed forces temporarily stationed in the Republic of Estonia; along with its proposals containing logistics and deadlines for pulling out motorized shooter units, air defense and air force aviation units, and units relocated from Eastern Europe after January 1, 1989.

ARTICLE 3

The parties agreed that, from the time this agreement is signed, no additional units of Soviet armed forces will be brought into or located within the territory of the Republic of Estonia, and that no new military bases will be built, nor will the number of military personnel be increased beyond the September 1, 1991 levels. The joint commission is also to prepare proposals about the feasibility of completing construction on projects sponsored by the USSR Ministry of Defense.

ARTICLE 4

The USSR Ministry of Defense will not interfere with the functional discharge of duties to be carried out by the border defense, customs, police or other state organs of the Republic of Estonia, as needed, in areas where it has special authority.

ARTICLE 5

Until a state-level agreement is reached, the USSR Defense Ministry agrees to significantly curb plans for

tactical and combat training exercises within the territory of the Republic of Estonia, to have all such activity coordinated with the government of the Republic of Estonia, and to prohibit combat bombing. As the USSR Ministry of Defense removes its forces, and dismantles its training centers, the lands used for these are to be turned over to the government of the Republic of Estonia.

ARTICLE 6

The USSR Ministry of Defense will give orders to all military units stationed within the territory of the Republic of Estonia prohibiting all activity that will harm the environment or cause it to be harmed.

ARTICLE 7

The parties to this agreement deem it necessary to use all means, based on the options generated by the joint commission, to return to the possession of the Republic of Estonia, all areas at the disposal of the military that have not been transferred legally, and tracts of land that are not being used. The size of the land being used by the USSR armed forces contingent, and the corresponding rental fees will be based on government-level agreements.

ARTICLE 8

The USSR Ministry of Defense is considering the possibility of turning over, on terms acceptable to both sides, certain amounts of weapons and ammunition, military uniforms, equipment and means of transportation, to the government of the Republic of Estonia for purposes of law enforcement and formation of a national defense force.

The government of the Republic of Estonia guarantees that the military equipment and weapons will be used according to the laws of the Republic of Estonia.

ARTICLE 9

The government of the Republic of Estonia guarantees to all military personnel and their families within the territory of the Republic of Estonia all social and civil rights along with protection under international human rights conventions.

For that purpose, the government of the Republic of Estonia will form joint commissions, dealing with the rights of military personnel, in all cities and districts where Soviet military units are stationed.

ARTICLE 10

This agreement will go into effect from the moment of its signing.

ARTICLE 11

This agreement will stay in effect as long as the contingent of Soviet military forces stays within the territory of the Republic of Estonia, and until such time when it is removed completely.

ARTICLE 12

Two originals of this agreement were prepared, in Russian.

The agreement was prepared on October 3, 1991 in Moscow.

Withdrawing Forces Issue Warning

92UN0418H Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian
15 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by Jüri Liim: "Military: When Forced To Leave, We Will Blow Up Everything!"]

[Text] There has been talk in the media about the Soviet army's partial departure from Estonia (at this stage). There have also been news items about some units that are reluctant to leave despite orders from the Soviet military, and despite their agreements with the government of Estonia. Mentioned, among those, should be the paratrooper units of Viljandi and Võru, who are not showing any signs of departure. Right now, however, let's talk of Tapa, known to be an extremely strong military center.

Tapa's population consists of 34 percent Estonians, and their numbers are decreasing steadily. If there are 600 children in the Estonian school, their Russian counterparts number 1,200 and growing. There are two reasons for this: A higher birth rate and one little "trick." As we know, Red Army officers and members of their families have not been able to get their registration lately, which also means no coupons for merchandise etc. Not that it matters, really, because the wives of the brass just come to Tapa to give birth. A child born in Estonia guarantees the parents all rights, social welfare among them, and the same goes for grandparents, of course. Families are supposed to stay together! People in the know have told me that there are hundreds of such cases, and that the method is being used with extra vigor in recent times.

People are asking if the Soviet army is bringing more of its personnel to Estonia. The brass assures us that this is not the case. However, this is not true. They keep coming from Hungary, Poland and Germany, especially officers.

At Tapa, officers quarters take up a complex of more than 20 buildings of different sizes. These are basically three- to four story buildings with three stairways. Besides this complex, there are also settlements consisting of barracks.

These buildings are crammed full of officers' families. Many apartments are turned into communal living quarters with a shared kitchen. Now there are plans for building numerous new dwellings—all supposedly for the influx of officers of the "limited force contingent." All of this only goes to show that these people have no intention of going anywhere.

The military airfield near Pärnu is supposedly being "liquidated." Word has it, however, that the peace eagles from there are going to be brought to Tapa. The armored vehicles and tanks located in Tallinn will be taken to the polygon at Aegviidu. So, instead of moving out, all of the

deadly technology is going to be concentrated in the Kõrvemaa region. And not only technology, but also manpower. The impact of this kind of relocation on the area and the native residents of Tapa is clear beyond explanation.

The officers and their families are full of defiance. "Build us decent housing in Russia, provide us with all necessities, pay us compensation—then we'll go. If not—the Republic of Estonia is violating our human rights." Should they have to leave without anything, they threaten to blow up the houses. Especially belligerent are the wives of officers. These ladies are of the same ilk as those who brought culture to Estonia by going to the ball in nightgowns bought from the stores of Tallinn.

To this, I would like to add a fresh example from the council session of Harjumaa, where a delegate from Paldiski threatened to torch the houses when leaving Estonia. Not at all surprising. Ever since the days of death-battalions, these people have become masters of burning and destruction techniques.

The dangers are many. One of them is that large numbers of officers and servicemen leaving the Soviet army want to stay in Estonia. A few exceptions are understandable, but en masse?

Thus, all these blowing up and burning threats, as well as the tricks of those wanting to stay in Estonia, represent a serious threat of anarchy, a problem to our nation.

Strela Rockets Stolen

92UN0418K Tallinn OHTULEHT in Estonian
26 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant J. Dmitriyev: "Strela Rockets Stolen From Military Unit"]

[Text]

Who is responsible for carelessness?

There is nothing new about plundering weapons from military units. Cartridges, firing weapons and explosives have been disappearing. The reasons for these thefts are being investigated, violators will be prosecuted.

While earlier plundering was limited primarily to handguns (not considering last year's tank scandal), then now we hear about the Tallinn garrison looking for 44 air defense rocket assemblies, eight ignition devices, and eight Strela 2M and Strela 3M rockets issued at the artillery base.

The theft of combat equipment was brought about by the carelessness of persons responsible for it. The equipment was kept without guard, without formulating the necessary documents, and nobody had checked it out since spring. The theft was not discovered until October.

I think that this equipment should be traced to the black market of Tallinn, where brisk business is done in weapons. The extent of profits awaiting those dealing in

rockets and ignition devices can only be fathomed when you consider that shadow traders will pay 4,500 rubles for 1,000 cartridges.

In the matter of rocket theft, charges have been brought against responsible parties. Investigation is under way.

Comment from the Editorial Office: J. Dmitriyev's references to the Tallinn black market can, putting it mildly, raise some doubts. Maybe the search should be taken a little further out. References to the Tallinn black market and traders of the shadow economy seem more like feeble attempts to shift the blame for carelessness in the military onto the "locals."

But, on the other hand ... let's look around, maybe some of us will indeed spot a column of rockets at our Central- or Nõmme market. With those shadow characters you never know. Even the KGB no longer bothers with them.

RSFSR DOSAAF Created

Conference Marred by Controversy

92UM0097A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 41 Oct 91 p 6-7

[Article by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT special correspondents Anatoliy Akishin and Nikolay Zhichkin: "Russian Defense Born..."]

[Text] The DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] barometer has fallen. Its needle has pointed toward a storm. The ship named "Organizing Committee for the Creation of a Defense Organization of the RSFSR," having barely weighed anchor, inexorably floated in the direction of the most severe storm. Danger threatened from a compass point from which nobody expected it...

It Began With a No Confidence...

"I made an appeal to Russian leaders and members of the defense society to halt the work of the organizing committee and I protested its decision to conduct a founding conference for Russia on 25 September of this year. I think that a large share of its members have forfeited their moral right to resolve this vitally important issue for us. The proposed structure of the Central Committee of the DOSAAF of Russia does not affect the interests of the large detachment of the defense society and it is deliberately being turned into another bureaucratic apparatus, which makes it possible for the old nomenklatura to retain their leadership positions. I ask that you discuss this issue and support the proposal for a vote of no confidence in the presently existing organizing committee, which was created two years ago under completely different political conditions."

The only thing lacking in this telegram were the words "Everyone, everyone, everyone!..." But even without them all the oblast and kray DOSAAF committees—from Kaliningrad to Yuzhno-Sakhalin—received it. Right on the eve of the convocation of the founding

conference this dispatch, as we can see, called for it to be buried. A lack of confidence in the organizing committee and its members who were legally elected at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF would lead to an indefinite postponement of the time periods for conducting the conference. Under current conditions this would be tantamount to an interruption of the creation of the independent Russian defense organization, and its inclusion in the system of emerging state and social structures of the Russian Federation.

Who was the author of such a radical epistle. A person with arch-revolutionary views who professes the principle "...down to the bottom, and then..."? Nothing of the sort! The author is Lieutenant General of Aviation Sergey Nikolayevich Maslov, deputy chairman of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF, who has attained a high military rank and a considerable position "...under quite different political conditions" from today's. He had the opportunity to question the correctness of the decision of the fifth plenum before as well but...apparently it was the wrong moment.

Along with the telegram, S. Maslov's prolix appeal "To the Leaders of Russia and the Committees and Workers of DOSAAF Organizations on the Territory of the RSFSR" became public property. In it the author "expands" and "deepens" his idea, attempting—true, without arguments—to accuse a number of DOSAAF leaders of nothing more or less than that "some of them openly took a position of support for the putsch..." And he even gave some names.

Of course, such an appeal cannot be called a denunciation but still...

How were these "decisive steps" of the esteemed deputy chairman of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF received? "The telegram sent to you by S.N. Maslov is to be considered a provocation against the DOSAAF organizations of the Union and the Russian Federation as well as their leaders. His egoistic ambitions are directed toward illegally taking over a leading position in the republic DOSAAF organization that has been created..." Chairman of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF Colonel General N. KOTLOVTSSEV.

S. Maslov's actions were resolutely condemned at the meeting of the organizing committee held on the eve of the opening of the conference from the mouths of the leaders of the defense organizations of a number of republics and oblasts. True, for the sake of fairness it must be said that S. Maslov received support from the chairman of the Sakhalin DOSAAF obkom [oblast committee] I. Lysak (his telegram went to the editorial office of the newspaper SOVETSKIY PATRIOT). In it he says, in particular: "...we demand...we support the candidacy of Comrade Sergey Nikolayevich Maslov...for the position of chairman of the Russian DOSAAF organization..."

Well, the explanation is quite simple!

There was also support from certain workers of DOSAAF aviation training organizations. But that, as they say, was not all there was to it. An opinion regarding this issue was also expressed by the organizational congress which was held anyway (during the course of the work of the conference it was transformed into a congress). But S. Maslov remained silent, nor were the voices of his numerous supporters heard either.

All that has been said might be considered a particular episode. But we are informing the public about it in detail so that the reader may have an idea of the difficult atmosphere in which the Russian Defense originated. We managed to safely escape the storm that threatened to destroy the conference. Members of the organizing committee and all delegates to the congress unquestionably deserve credit for this. Obviously, the times and the situation in the country are not only teaching figures of a high state rank but they are also providing useful lessons to workers of the defense society. Behind the catchy phrases and sensational exposes the people are learning to see personal ambitions and to separate them from truly social and state interests of Russia. This is ultimately what determined the creative nature of the founding congress. Of course, many sharp corners appeared during the course of it, but all of them were brought about by the desire of the delegates to lay the most durable and reliable possible foundation for the edifice of the Russian defense organization that was being built.

Three issues were suggested for discussion at the congress: "On the Creation of the Russian Defense Organization" (the speaker was acting first deputy chairman of the DOSAAF, A. ANOKHIN), "Approval of the Regulations of the Russian Defense Organization" (speaker—head of the editorial commission, chairman of the Penza DOSAAF Obkom G. KOMAR), and "Elections of the Council of the Russian Defense Organization, Chairman of the Council, and His First Deputy."

The Course Toward Democracy

The most heated debates arose during the discussion of the organization's regulations. This document was prepared by a special commission almost two years ago. The draft was subsequently worked out in detail by the department for legal protection and defense work, the legal group of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and the Russian Ministry of Justice.

The draft of the regulations takes into account the circumstance that the country is experiencing a difficult period, during whose course new and confusing processes are taking place in the society. Fundamentally new legislative acts have been adopted, which directly or indirectly affect the republic defense organization and are reflected in the prospects for its further development. When preparing the draft of the regulations the commission proceeded from the idea that all provisions of this document must meet the present needs of the defense collectives and provide guarantees of all-around democratization of their activity in the interests of a radical

improvement of defense and sports work. To this end they clearly delimit the authority of the center and the republic (within the RSFSR), kray, and oblast organizations. In particular, they are granted the right to create united defense organizations on the territory of several urban or rural rayons and also on the scale of the city or rayon.

The desire for greater democratization is shown also by these two essential provisions. First. The regulations now give a minority the opportunity to protect its interests by appealing to public opinion, right up to the point of conducting referendums in the corresponding organizations. And second. Decisions of higher organs are compulsory for the lower defense organizations only if they are adopted within the authority granted to these organs by the lower organizations themselves. One would think that such a requirement of the regulations would help to straighten out people who have become accustomed to making decisions according to this principle: "That is the way I like it!"

It would seem that the draft regulations have taken everything into account. But with the reading of its first page there began a stream of questions, additions, and changes, whose discussion took up a good half of all the work time at the congress. And this is not surprising. The delegates had a keen sense of the spirit of the times. The majority of the amendments were directed toward allowing as much space as possible to rayon and city organizations for actions under the conditions of the market economy. This could be heard in particular in the speech by the chairman of the DOSAAF gorkom [city committee] of Elista I. Maguyev and a number of other participants in the congress. Why, they asked, can the obkom create production or joint enterprises and open up stores while the gorkom cannot? They must be given this right.

This opinion was supported by a majority of votes.

Congress delegates did not agree with the wording which said that the defense organization of Russia "may enter the USSR DOSAAF on a contractual basis." "May not" instead of "on a contractual basis" "enter the USSR DOSAAF." That is the way it is now finally worded in the regulations.

This is a crucial amendment which, as the chairman of the Central Committee of the DOSAAF of Turkmenia, B. Khaydarov, stated in his speech, provides a direct point of reference for defense organizations of other republics as well.

Another amendment made by the delegates seemed no less significant to us. It says in the draft regulations that the main task of the defense organization of Russia is "...preparing workers and youth for work and defense of the homeland and developing technical kinds of sports and technical creativity." Only two words were added right at the beginning: "patriotic education." But how significant these words are! Frankly, when we looked over the draft regulations we were surprised: Why was such an extremely important area not included among

the tasks of the defense organization? A slip of the pen, negligence? That is hard to believe. Apparently there are certain circles which would have us reduce the activity of the defense organization to mere technical exercise. But the maturity of the participants in the Russian congress was shown by the fact that they resolutely rejected this approach.

Under What Name?

A considerable number of proposals and polemics as well pertained to the future name of the defense organization. Some people advised keeping the previous acronym. But a considerable majority of the delegate saw the inconsistency of that name with the tasks which the new organization will have to carry out. It initially narrowed the range of duties and areas of work of the defense society. And it must be admitted that this acronym DOSAAF already rubbed some people the wrong way and had acquired a militaristic flavor.

OSTO RSFSR... From now on this will be the name of the Russian Defense Athletic and Technical Society, which was formed on a voluntary basis from the DOSAAF organizations of the republics, krays, and oblasts on the territory of the Russian Federation. This name assigns a worthy place to sports, technical training, and, naturally, tasks of a defense nature. The organization is independent, it is a mass organization, and, the main thing, it is patriotic.

The regulations were adopted by a majority of votes. Of course, life is life. The situation may demand that partial changes be made in them. The regulations grant this right to the OSTO RSFSR Council. A decision was also made to declare a competition for the development of sketches of an emblem and flag for the Russian defense organization.

The process of electing the RSFSR council did not proceed smoothly either. The initial list of candidates for it, which originated inside the apparatus of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF, was rejected at the last meeting of the organizing committee before the congress. There was just one reason: The council elected from this list would have been a conscientiously copied register of a considerable number of obkom and kraykom leaders. There would have been no room for sportsmen, workers of scientific and aviation organizations, or representatives of rayon and city councils. That, of course, could not have failed to arouse dissatisfaction. On the one hand, the draft regulations declared that it had a broadly democratic orientation and, on the other, from a practical viewpoint, this democratic orientation would have been abandoned... But that did not happen. This shows the sober, mature approach to the essence of the matter on the part of members of the organizing committee, whose composition was so annoying to the deputy chairman of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF Lieutenant General of Aviation S. Maslov. The list of candidate members of the OSTO council was augmented by 24 more names, which made it more

representative. The council, which was elected by an open vote at the congress, now includes 101 members.

The congress unanimously elected A.I. ANOKHIN as chairman of the council of the OSTO RSFSR. N.B. POLYAKOV, who previously worked as the chairman of the Moscow DOSAAF obkom, was elected first deputy chairman of the council, also unanimously.

The OSTO council elected a board of 21 people.

Delegates to the constituent congress adopted an appeal to RSFSR President B.N. Yeltsin.

And so the birth of the Russian defense organization has finally taken place. The ship by the unusual name of OSTO RSFSR is afloat. Life will show us what it will become, what awaits it in the future.

Delegates' Letter to Yeltsin

92UM0097B Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 41 Oct 91 p 6

[Letter from delegates of the First Congress of the Russian Defense Athletic and Technical Society: "Appeal to the RSFSR President"]

[Text] Esteemed Boris Nikolayevich!

On 25 September in Penza there was a congress of representatives of republic, kray, and oblast DOSAAF organizations operating on the territory of the RSFSR. The delegates unanimously adopted a decision to create the Russian Defense Athletic and Technical Society, formed its council and board, and adopted its regulations. For the first time in the history of our state the Russian defense organization is being given a completed organizational form and an independent status.

We were motivated to make such a decision by the patriotic desire to make the largest contribution we could to the very difficult and truly great cause of the restoration of Russia. In the interests of strengthening the sovereign Russian state, the republic defense organization sees as its main task to prepare the workers of the next generation for protecting the homeland and working creatively for its good.

The Russian Defense Athletic and Technical Society is filled with resolve to do as much as possible to train qualified personnel for the army and navy, the Russian national guard, and specialists needed for the national economy, the development of the technical creativity of youth, and the multiplication of the achievements of the republic's sportsmen in technical kinds of sports. It has at its disposal for this an equipped training-material base and an experienced management and teaching staff.

As we inform you of our adoption of this decision we are counting on support from you as the president of Russia, the Supreme Soviet, and the republic government and on practical assistance for the Russian Defense Athletic and Technical Society in the performance of its established tasks.

Regulations on RSFSR Defense Counselor

PM2410131091 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Oct 91 First Edition p 2

[From the "Official Section" column: "Regulations on the RSFSR State Counselor for Defense and His Service"]

[Text]

1. General Provisions

The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] state counselor for defense is appointed by decree of the RSFSR president and is a member of the RSFSR president's State Council.

The RSFSR state counselor for defense:

- formulates proposals on conceptual questions of RSFSR military policy and defense provision, and coordinates measures to put them into practice;
- adopts measures to ensure cooperation between the RSFSR president and the supreme commander in chief of the USSR Armed Forces, the USSR Defense Ministry, other USSR ministries and departments, and the relevant organs of union republics and republics within the RSFSR in order to resolve questions of ensuring the RSFSR's defense;
- coordinates measures to ensure compliance with defense legislation on RSFSR territory, and also to ensure the social and legal protection of servicemen, persons discharged from active military service, and members of their families.

2. Powers of the RSFSR State Counselor for Defense

The RSFSR state counselor for defense, in the exercise of his functions, is authorized:

- to take charge of the drawing up of military policy programs and to this end to enlist the help of relevant state and other organizations and subunits, expert collectives, and specialists, including foreigners;
- to receive from state and other organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations information relevant to ensuring the defense of the RSFSR;
- to study the experience of foreign and international practice in the sphere of ensuring the defense of the state;
- to submit proposals for examination by the RSFSR president, the RSFSR president's State Council, the RSFSR Council for Affairs of the Federation and Territories, the RSFSR Security Council, and also the RSFSR Council of Ministers;
- to participate in sessions of the RSFSR president's State Council, the RSFSR Council for Affairs of the Federation and Territories, the RSFSR Security Council, other organs set up by the RSFSR president, and also the RSFSR Council of Ministers;

- to represent the interests of the RSFSR president in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, its Presidium, and commissions of the chambers and committees of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in the exercise of their functions in the sphere of ensuring the defense of the RSFSR;
- to organize cooperation with the highest organs of state power and administration of the USSR and the corresponding organs of union republics, republics within the RSFSR, krais, and oblasts on questions of ensuring the defense of the RSFSR;
- to cooperate with units, formations, and large formations of the Armed Forces and border, internal, railroad, and other forces stationed on RSFSR territory, and to oversee the activity of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense Questions;
- to submit requests and applications to state and other organs and officials;
- to hear reports from leaders of RSFSR ministries and departments, the Councils of Ministers of republics within the RSFSR, organs of executive power of krais, oblasts, and national formations, institutions, and organizations on questions relating to ensuring the defense of the RSFSR, and to enlist the help of the said organs and organizations in drawing up corresponding proposals; to exercise other powers on the instructions of the RSFSR president.

Within the limits of his competence the RSFSR state counselor for defense and his Service ensure the fulfillment of the instructions of the RSFSR president, the RSFSR vice president, and the RSFSR secretary of state.

3. Formation and Activity of the Service of the RSFSR State Counselor for Defense

The Service of the RSFSR state counselor for defense is called upon to ensure the exercise of the powers of the RSFSR state counselor, and operates in accordance with the present Regulations and regulations on the structural subunits of the Service approved by the RSFSR state counselor for defense by agreement with the leader of the RSFSR president's administration. The Service's permanent employees operate in accordance with official instructions approved by the RSFSR state counselor for defense.

The RSFSR state counselor for defense is entitled to delegate individual functions and powers to leaders of subunits within the structure of the Service.

Leaders of subunits and other employees of the Service are appointed by the RSFSR state counselor for defense. In its activity the Service is directly subordinate to the RSFSR state counselor for defense.

The structure and staffing levels of the Service are approved by the RSFSR state counselor for defense within the limits of the staffing levels and wage fund for Service employees laid down by the RSFSR president.

The RSFSR state counselor for defense forms the Service autonomously, on a contractual basis; determines the wage of each specialist within the limits of the wage fund approved by the RSFSR president; and issues instructions concerning the Service.

The RSFSR state counselor for defense and servicemen employed in his Service and their families retain all the rights, benefits, and privileges stipulated by legislation for servicemen on active military service in the USSR Armed Forces and their families. Apart from their salaries, servicemen are paid the rate of pay appropriate to their military rank, a percentage supplement for length of service, and a salary supplement in lieu of food rations on the scale stipulated by legislation for USSR Armed Forces servicemen. Bonuses are paid to servicemen in accordance with the bonus system that applies within the RSFSR president's administration, and are calculated according to salary.

Funds saved out of the wage fund may be used by the RSFSR state counselor for defense to provide incentives for the work of leaders of subunits and specialists in the Service.

The maintenance [obespecheniye] of the Service is carried out by the Administration of Affairs and other subunits of the RSFSR president's administration.

The financing of the Service's activity, including hard currency finance, is covered by a separate item in the estimate of expenditure of the RSFSR president's administration approved by the RSFSR president. The RSFSR state counselor is the manager of credits in sums approved by the RSFSR president and is entitled to sign financial documents.

The RSFSR state counselor for defense is entitled to use financial resources to conclude contracts with scientific and research organizations and with specialists with a view to paying for the fulfillment of necessary work and the compilation of expert reports in the sphere of the preparation and implementation of military policy, and also to provide incentives for efficient activity by leaders and specialists in the Service. The annual volume of such resources is approved by the RSFSR president.

Ukraine Military Draft Law Viewed

92UM0099A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
9 Oct 91 p 3

[Article by Major-General K. Morozov, Ukrainian minister of defense: "The Ukraine's Defense Shield: About the Draft Law of the Ukrainian Armed Forces"]

[Text] The act of declaration of the independence of the Ukraine, recently adopted by the Supreme Soviet, predetermined the necessity for our republic to create its own army. The resolution "On Military Formations in the Ukraine" envisages the subordination of all army units stationed on the territory of the republic to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. The main purpose of this resolution is to prevent the use of the Armed Forces

against the Ukrainian people, against its national sovereignty. The absence of legislation on the military made it necessary for the Supreme Soviet to fill this gap. It was also taken into account that, as an independent state and a subject of international law, the Ukraine has a right to create its own Armed Forces. The legal foundation for their creation then will be the Law on the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The creation of our own Armed Forces is a rather complex process that requires understanding, trust, and the concerted work of all interested parties. It requires appropriate agreements, treaties, and consultations, and the adoption of necessary legislation. This process should go through certain stages and have a smooth mechanism for well-defined implementation and comprehensive economic support. It is also necessary to take into account that the road to our own Armed Forces goes through substantial cuts in existing organs of military command and control and in the numerical strength of military personnel. This means the fate of hundreds of thousands of people, their material condition and morale. It is a difficult sociopolitical and economic period in the life of the Ukrainian people.

It is clear that without full and comprehensive information on the Armed Forces the Government of the Ukraine is unable to calculate and implement the program of social security for the military. This is possible only if the entire group of Armed Forces stationed on the territory of the republic is subordinated to a unified command and the president of the Ukraine. The reduction, reorganization, and reformation of this group of forces represent the stages of creating qualitatively new professional Armed Forces for the Ukraine. But the people and Government of the Ukraine have to go all the way on this road in a persistent and civilized manner, on a solid legal base.

I must note that we have already started moving along this road. The first step is to develop a draft law on the Armed Forces, together with a package of other draft laws on defense matters. The next step is for the Supreme Soviet to deliberate on and adopt all documents of military legislation. This will provide the legal basis for the work of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense in the area of developing military organization during the difficult transitional period.

Because the Ukraine lacks its own military legislation, the authors of the draft laws found themselves in a difficult situation. They had to start literally from scratch. The difficulty lay in the fact that Soviet military legislation is oriented toward the unlimited supremacy of the state in the economy and society, while the military legislation of Western countries is oriented toward the historic military traditions of their people and the economies of their countries as components of the world economy. So the draft laws take into account first and foremost the reality of the existing military-political situation, as well as the requirements laid out in the documents on military matters adopted by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, which define the defense of

the Ukraine as an exclusive prerogative of the people of the Ukraine, which creates its own Armed Forces. Their task is an armed defense of the independence, rights, and freedoms of the citizens of the Ukraine, its territorial integrity, and the interests of the state.

In my opinion, a very important part of the draft law is Article 2: "The use of the Armed Forces for tasks not related to the defense of the Ukraine is decided upon exclusively by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet." A simple ban in this case would have played a negative role for the Ukrainian people, since life is diverse and unforeseen instances may arise when the potential and mobility of the army may be vitally needed to prevent human casualties and human suffering. On the other hand, in order to not allow the use of the army in the political struggle, the Supreme Soviet must exercise control over the Armed Forces.

The draft law lays down the basic principles for the development of military organization in the Ukraine, which take into account the experience of state activities of other countries in this respect. It is envisaged that during the transitional stage the manning of the army will be accomplished on a mixed principle—volunteer and based on a general military draft. In the future, emphasis will shift toward volunteer forces. It is proposed that the Ukraine will have ground forces (ground defense troops), the air force (air space defense troops), the navy (sea shore defense troops), units and formations of special troops and rear services, and military training institutions.

The general leadership of the Armed Forces will be provided by the president of the Ukraine as its commander in chief.

The immediate leadership is the task of the Ministry of Defense, whose organs of military command and control will have responsibility for the combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces, their comprehensive maintenance, training, and personnel assignments. There will also be created a committee for social and legal protection of the interests of the military personnel, which is being set up of the basis of proposals by officer assemblies and the union of Ukrainian officers. This is logical, since the people of the Ukraine need to have an officer corps that will consist of its best sons, who hold dear the honor and dignity of an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and who are raised on the best military-historic examples of their people.

An important point, not only for the Ukraine, but also for the entire world community, is the fate of nuclear arms and carriers. It is understandable that the Ukraine, having declared itself a nuclear-free power, will still have strategic forces on its territory for some time. These forces should be used in the interests of defense. But since they are dispersed over the territory of four sovereign powers, the plans for their use, development, and control should be implemented collectively in the interests of the strategic defense of each sovereign state, with its proportional contribution to their maintenance. In

our view, the physical impossibility of a rapid liquidation of nuclear arms and their carriers on the territory of the Ukraine during the transition stage will play a substantial role in establishing the Ukraine as a truly independent state on the international arena, and provides its government with an opportunity to define its priorities in the development of own Armed Forces. Therefore, the draft law on the Armed Forces makes provisions for the forces of collective strategic defense of sovereign states. It defines their status, and their subordination to the Supreme Soviet and the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine. The collective strategic defense forces stationed on our territory will be manned by Ukrainian citizens.

The use of the Ukrainian language as the state language in the Armed forces will be fixed by law; its introduction will be conducted in accordance with the Ukraine Law on the Language. All restrictions in regard to freedom of conscience are being removed.

The activities of any political parties or movements is prohibited in the Ukraine Armed Forces.

In conclusion, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the officers who had participated in the development of the package of documents on military issues.

Career Training for Reserve Officers Discussed

92UM0004A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Sep 91 First edition p 3

[Article by B. Mikhaylov, head of the Working Group for the Establishment of the All-Russian Reserve Officer Retraining Center: "Russia—for Reserve Officers: RSFSR President B.N. Yeltsin Has Decided To Establish the All-Russian Reserve Officer Retraining Center"]

[Text] Assertion of the Russian Federation's state sovereignty is unthinkable without increasing the unity of its people and army. The victory of the democratic forces on August 19-21 reinforced even more the multifaceted ties between them. The RSFSR leadership is manifesting special concern about military cadres: their social protection, material well-being, military and vocational training, and the rational utilization of their potential capabilities. The RSFSR President's decision to establish the All-Russian Reserve Officer Retraining Center serves as an example of that concern.

A large number of officers, including those less than 45 years of age, are being separated from the Armed Forces each year. They are physically strong people who are disciplined and bursting with strength and creative energy. Almost all of them have a higher education and a lot of practical experience in organizational work in the troops and at headquarters. The shift, as they say, "to a peaceful course" for this category of officers for the most part does not come easy. Many of them cannot find proper application for their talents, abilities, and practical experience. As a result, the Russian Federation's national economy is losing valuable cadres. Entry into the economy is a most difficult matter for a person. Entrepreneurship is a real creative activity. In our country, politicians have always been in first place but throughout the world, the most respected person has been the entrepreneur and manager since his job requires a great deal of skill. You cannot improve the economy without training and knowledge of the profession.

The Russian leadership regards reserve officers as one of the most important reserves in solving the multifaceted problems of the Federation's economic and social development. This approach is closely tied to issues of the social protection of servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves, and primarily with their retraining and future job placement. The task consists of accelerating the adaptation of officers and warrant officers to the conditions of civilian life and their entry into the sphere of Russia's physical production.

I would like to note once again that RSFSR President B.N. Yeltsin is personally manifesting a special concern in this matter. His decision on the organization of the All-Russian Retraining Center for officers who have been discharged into the reserves provides for the creation of a training system for managers-organizers and leaders of major and small enterprises in the physical production and services spheres. They plan to develop new training-method and commercial structures with the involvement of foreign capital. These structures must

ensure fulfillment of a training program for highly-skilled international level experts in a scientific-method and financial-material context for work under conditions of the use of various forms of property and in the general system of market relations. All of this will permit us to resolve the issues of social protection of servicemen, to reduce reserve officers' adaptation periods to the new social conditions of life, and to utilize to the maximum extent possible their army training, organizational abilities, and extensive practical work experience in large collectives in the interests of the Russian Federation's national economy.

A working group has been created to realize the RSFSR President's decision. Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin has tasked me to head this group. The working group is composed of USSR Ministry of Defense representatives, scholars and higher school experts, and entrepreneurs. The working group has conducted definite organizational work jointly with the USSR Ministry of Defense, the RSFSR Scientific and Higher School Affairs Committee, the Moscow government, MATI [Moscow Aviation Technological Institute] imeni K.E. Tsiolkovskiy university administration, and the leadership of a number of commercial enterprises. In our opinion, understanding and support has been achieved on all reserve officer retraining program issues and problems. Furthermore, the working group has elaborated and obtained the approval of concerned organizations on: the structure of the All-Russian Managers Training Center, the curricula, and also the procedure for retraining reserve officers.

The All-Russian Managers Training Center is the organizational basis of all training-method work and we propose tasking it with coordinating functions on issues to realize the curricula and investor program for scientific-method support and social infrastructure development in the interests of the students.

This Center plans to have the following primary subdivisions: a Coordinating Council; a Science, and Technology, and Business Center; an International Scientific-Technological Center; a Student Practical Work Center; the Konversiya [Conversion] Exchange (arbitrary designation); and other commercial subdivisions. Moscow Aviation Technological Institute imeni K.E. Tsiolkovskiy, Progress NPP [Scientific Production Enterprise], Rosstroyimpeks VEA [translation unknown], Amerustroy SP [Construction Enterprise], and other commercial subdivisions. Negotiations are being conducted with the leadership of the FRG's Bundeswehr University and the German Kognos AO [translation unknown] on participation in the Center's work.

The curricula have been developed for a four month training course. Their content meets the demands of the world market economy and corresponds to the level of international managers training.

The curricula will contain courses on the market economy, problems of privatization, finance and credit,

conversion of defense enterprises, marketing, management, foreign economic activities, etc.

A two stage procedure has been established for reserve officer retraining. In the first stage from October 1991 to January 1992, 35 to 40 people will study in courses under the Science, Technology, and Business Center and, during the second stage from April 1992, up to 400 people per year, with 1,200-1,800 people in the future, will study under several RSFSR VUZ's [higher educational institutions]. This has been done in order to initially acquire a certain amount of experience in this sphere of activity, to conduct scientific analysis, and to develop organizational-practical and method recommendations. Then, having established the All-Russian Managers Training Center and having worked out the system as a whole, we will begin large-scale retraining.

Having successfully completed the course of study, we propose issuing diplomas that have been certified in foreign countries.

At the present time, work is being completed on the formation of the All-Russian Reserve Officer Retraining Center. Establishing ties with the concerned organizations is one of the especially complicated tasks. My Deputy—MATI Pro-Rector for Foreign Economic Activity N.N. Beklemishev, a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Technical Sciences and a highly aggressive man with a broad perspective and business skill, is actively and productively participating in the solution of this problem. MATI Rector Academician B.S. Mitin is making an enormous contribution to the formation of the All-Russian Center and to the development of the training program.

The RSFSR Council of Ministers is rendering substantial assistance in solving organizational tasks. Premier I.S. Silayev effectively reacted to the report on the establishment of the All-Russian Center. "The work underway must find the required support of state structures and we need to render maximum assistance...", notes his resolution on this report. RSFSR Council of Ministers First Deputy Chairman O.I. Lobov relates with understanding to this solution of the tasks of retraining reserve officers. State Committee on Scientific Matters and the RSFSR Higher School Chairman N.G. Malyshev and RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Science and Public Education Chairman V.P. Shorin are rendering definite assistance to the working group.

I would especially like to note the position of the USSR Ministry of Defense's new leadership on the solution of this problem. Marshal of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov has totally supported B.N. Yeltsin's idea on the creation of the All-Russian Reserve Officer Retraining Center and immediately issued the order to the appropriate authorities to render the required assistance to the working group to form the Center and to directly participate in its operation. Right now we have established and we are maintaining close business contacts with the

USSR Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate which is promoting the acceleration of the Center's formation.

The working group is establishing ties with foreign partners. V. Nelling, president of Hamburg Central Land Bank and member of the board of directors of the German Federal Bank, is expressing his readiness to provide the Center with needed investments from the German side. H.M. Becker, a representative of business circles, is ready to support the project which supports the Center's cooperation with the Bundeswehr's Technical University in Hamburg and with Hamburg Technical Center. All of this promises to obtain the opening in the future of a Center branch directly in Germany for retraining reserve officers from the troops deployed there.

And in conclusion, I must note that for now we plan to conduct the first enrollment for reserve officer training courses through local military commissariats only for individuals who live in the city of Moscow. We will make an additional announcement on the time and operating procedures for the Center's admission commission. Selection of candidates for the courses will be carried out based on interview results. The primary condition for future candidates and students is: up to 45 years of age, a higher education (military or civilian), and practical work experience in the troops and headquarters.

We are certain that those people who complete our courses will make a substantial contribution to the development of the long-suffering Russian economy and will play an important role in establishing genuine market relations in the federation. Many of them will become the world's prominent businessmen.

The telephone number for information is 932-69-13. Call between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.

Welcome, dear friends!

Ensuring Right To Refuse Illegal Orders Assessed *92UM0036A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian* *17 Oct 91 First Edition p 2*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major S. Popov: "The Order and the Law: Why Servicemen Are So Frequently Caught Between Them as if Between a Rock and a Hard Place"]

[Text] This is paradoxical: Despite the fact that our present-day Army, from privates to the minister of defense, has been conditioned to unquestioningly obey orders, a serviceman can hardly be found who has not been prompted at least once to doubt the immovably categorical nature of the wording from regulations: "An order by a superior is law to his subordinates." At any rate, in 1989, during the discussion of the draft new general military regulations, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA received many letters in which the Army had very strong collective doubts about the invulnerability of the principle of absolute obedience (the order is law) which had

been tarnished by the arbitrary rule and stupid willfulness of some commanders. The examples given were more than just convincing.

I have kept to this day a document of outstanding idiocy—"A Solemn Pledge" which was coerced by order from the officers of a garrison in the Volga-Urals Military District: All owners of private cars were forced to pledge, in writing, to the commander that they would never sit behind the wheel after drinking. Officers of another unit who were confined to barracks, once again by an order, until "fully establishing the prescribed order, asserting firm military discipline, and carrying out planning for combat and political training," reported another marvelous example of tyrannical rule by superiors... In a word, the Army persistently sent a message to the effect that not everything was that simple and unambiguous in the dialectics of the notions "order" and "law," that the tumor was growing, and that it was malignant. However, they did not heed this alarm signal (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carried a set of letters which, despite being neutrally headlined "On the Principle of Absolute Obedience," in essence raised the issue of introducing a legal category such as "a criminal order"). I believe that the fact that General V. Varennikov was chairman of the commission for preparing new regulations was not the only reason. At the time, there was no dearth of people in the supreme echelons of military power who immediately branded the mere touching upon this topic in passing an infringement on the unity of command which, in essence, was a sentence to those "infringing." This is why the very well known Article 6 of the Disciplinary Regulations in effect has survived in the draft new regulations—despite the military procuracy protesting, both before and after, thousands of orders by commanders at all levels as being contrary to the law, despite dozens of servicemen, both before and after, having to face party commissions only because they unquestioningly followed someone's orders which later turned out to be illegal. Later came 19 August 1991. The servicemen, from soldiers to marshals, had to make tormenting and tragic choices between the order and the law, some in the streets of Moscow, next to the White House, and some far away, mentally placing themselves under these circumstances.

It is known what choice the Army made. A lot has already been said about it. Less has been said about the fact that to this day a member of the military who receives a criminal order is bound to carry it out "unquestioningly, precisely, and on time" because to this day the notion "criminal order" exists only in theory and has not materialized in a single administrative or legal document. Even less is known about the fact that, so-called rules for handling criminal orders were struck out of our army ABC relatively recently by the introduction of the Red Army Disciplinary Regulations in 1940 and the Interior Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces in 1946.

Actually, what was struck out? Technically, articles which bound servicemen to carry out all orders, except

clearly criminal ones, and warned about penalties for those who give or carry out such orders disappeared from the regulations. In essence, the members of the military were deprived of the right to choose in such situations, of what makes a soldier different from an unthinking machine, and conscious obedience from absolute and blind obedience. Why the "loss" occurred in specifically these years is a separate, special topic. Let me stress only the fact that the existence of the right to such a choice is quite easily discernible in the history of the Russian Army.

As early as 1724, Peter I instructed his subordinates by a special ukase "to be obedient to their commanders in all that does not run counter to the ukase. If it runs counter it should not be done at all... However, they...should state to their commander...that this runs counter to ukases, and if he gives no heed, protest and report to his superior commanders." Other autocrats of Russia who gave their august endorsement to army regulations did not find that this undermined the foundations either. The 1869 military penal regulations referred to the responsibility of subordinates for carrying out criminal orders. The 1911 regulations for internal service (by privates, Cossacks, and cannoneers) directly prohibited carrying out orders which made one violate the oath or loyalty to the sovereign or the motherland.

Similar provisions existed in Russian military legislation not only until 1917, but also in the first military regulations of the Soviet period, those of 1919 and 1925. Curiously, this norm, which for the last time "slipped" into the 1937 RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army] Internal Service Regulations (repealed in 1946), technically applied even after the introduction of the 1940 Disciplinary Regulations. The latter is known not only as the originator of the "order is law" formula but also for being without precedent in terms of severity. It has already been said what happened later (I will once again qualify this by saying that the historic context of all these metamorphoses is a topic for a separate discussion). For a long time, the Army was denied the right to have doubts about criminal instructions, and retained only the right to carry them out blindly, being kept hostage by alternating political ambitions, ventures, and passions. The Army cleaned up without fail the mess that was not made by its generals at all. Examples are common knowledge.

However, no matter how securely the problem of criminal, illegal orders appeared to be buried, it did not die. That the norm so well known in the Russian and Soviet armies "provocatively" survived in the Bundeswehr, and the armies of Greece, Portugal, and Italy was not the only reason... Common sense and life itself rebelled. For example, the very combination of words "the order is law" grated on the ears of lawyers like the scraping of an amateur on the ears of a virtuoso: The lawyers were taught that the law is the supreme will of state authorities elevated to a comprehensively binding norm, and nothing else. No man with common sense could reconcile himself to the fact that, in keeping with the logic of

the above formula, any private first class turns into a potential legislator and may practice his own small-scale arbitrary rule proceeding precisely from the firmness of orders.

It was no accident that "doubts" were voiced even at the very apex of the army pyramid. Doctor of Legal Sciences Professor Khasan Mubarakovich Akhmetshin familiarized me with a presentation by Judicial Service Colonel-General A. Gornyy at an event for military lawyers; at the time, in 1972, A. Gornyy was chief military prosecutor. While referring to the need for firm discipline, the general made one reservation in principle, to which he later returned many times. Specifically: For orders to have a great moral and legal force and to be categorically binding for execution, they should always be legal, comply with regulations, and be given only in the interests of service; it should be possible to carry them out by authorized and permissible ways and means. If at least one of these requirements is not met, the orders are subject to cancellation. General Gornyy stressed: The law commands the military prosecutor to protest such orders and raise the issue of penalties for those who are guilty. It is obvious that he who has given an illegitimate and illegal order, not issued through service procedures or in the interest of the service, is primarily responsible for giving and carrying out such an order. ...It appears that it has become necessary to study this issue comprehensively. This is necessitated by the need to make the practice of command strictly legal."

Alas, "a comprehensive study of the issue" was not done either at the time or later, despite the fact that attempts to introduce into legislation norms applying to criminal orders were made virtually until August of this year, as Judicial Service Colonel A. Ter-Akopov, chief of the chair of criminal law and procedure of the Military Institute told me. For example, this concept was present in the unsolicited draft USSR Law on the Status of Servicemen developed by Professor N. Artamonov and Associate Professor G. Orlov senior instructors of the Military Institute. Relevant proposals by Ter-Akopov and the already mentioned Professor Akhmetshin were rejected by the commission for preparing Basic Criminal Legislation as an issue which was too narrow and "of an utterly military nature." Subsequently, they were truncated in the draft Law on Criminal Penalties for Military Crimes. The system resisted to the end...

Fine, perhaps only now, only after the extraordinary events which indicated how "an utterly military" issue may acquire nationwide significance, the time has come when not only nothing stands in the way of codifying the right of servicemen not to carry out criminal orders and the responsibility for carrying out such orders, but when everything prompts us to do so. Public opinion whose eyes have been opened to the Army in many respects is demanding that people carrying guns be protected against criminal orders not only by their consciousness but also by the law. The position of the supreme military leadership is even more active: As Judicial Service Colonel V. Volkov, chief of the department of military

legislation of the Ministry of Defense Administration of Affairs, stated, the chief of the General Staff has already familiarized himself with proposals prepared in this matter, and they are being revised now. That is to say, it is obvious that the new (or rather thoroughly forgotten old) legal norm is not far away.

This is where quite a number of questions arise. I am not even touching on such very complex nuances as the attributes and contents of criminal orders, the difference between ill will and honest mistakes, and so on and so forth which this issue abounds in. There are specialists who will sort this out. To my mind, the main issues for the Army are different. Actually, how far can the "destruction" of the formula "order is law" which soldiers, officers, and generals are guided by on a daily basis, proceed? Is there a guarantee that the reasonable and long overdue correction of the principle of absolute obedience, which in other times could have been implemented without much pain, will not bring about all orders by commanders being questioned at present, when the Army is in search of its new identity?

Military lawyers are proposing two clear-cut moves which in part eliminate the grounds for such "doubts." First, it is to be established that orders given strictly in the line of duty must be carried out. Second, clearly illegal orders are not to be carried out. Well, this is already clearer and easier to understand. But what about an order given ostensibly in the line of duty (in the Army they substantiate anything at all by the interests of combat readiness!) which prompts the executor to commit impermissible acts, is an affront to his dignity, is not backed by material resources, or altogether runs counter to common sense? What to do then? Is one to start an ordeal in military procuracies, or to proceed from the notorious two points, the first of which says "the boss is always right," and the second which says that if the boss is wrong after all, one needs to refer to point one? This means that, once again, here is hoping for a "good" boss rather than what the Army has been waiting for for a long time: a reliable arrangement protecting against any illegal order, any order—from an openly scoffing order which humiliates people, to the one the Army could have received on 19 August. How are soldiers, officers, and generals to defend themselves against such orders?..

In a recent interview, the minister of defense said that in general it should be ensured that all orders in the Army are legal. Of course it should. However, when we look the truth in the eye, we understand that, given the extremely common legal nihilism, we are still far from this condition. Even if illegal orders are outlawed tomorrow, either by revising the regulations in a hurry or by a presidential ukase, this will hardly solve this truly festering problem once and for all. You cut off all of the hydra's heads, or otherwise it comes back to life. This is precisely how criminal orders will "come back to life" as long as their younger brother, the unrighteous order, is safe and sound, as long as we do not move from narrow issues on to military-legal reform. After all, if we are really striving

to create an army which acts on orders but is pure as far as ethics and the law are concerned, all of our army life should be brought into compliance with the law.

Indeed, it is known that work is now being accelerated in the Ministry of Defense on an entire package of such documents (I mean the Defense Law, the Law on the Status of Servicemen, and so on). It is known that major changes dictated by life are made in previously existing drafts. Still, we would like the laws to be adopted, and therefore the legal foundation for the life of the Armed Forces be laid, as soon as possible.

This just is not a case when we can wait for a long time.

Article Advises Soldiers on Handling Illegal Orders

92UM0074A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Oct 91 First edition p 2

[Article by Major E. Gams, people's deputy of the USSR, under the rubric "Point of View": "If the Order Is Criminal..."]

[Text] Since the coup attempt KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, IZVESTIYA and other means of mass media have discussed the need to introduce into legal praxis a statute on criminal orders and to define the extent of liability for those who issue them and those who carry them out. The article submitted for your attention here continues the discussion on this subject.

Yu. Feofanov raised an important and, in my opinion, urgent matter in IZVESTIYA. Is one of the currently definitive principles in army life lawful: "The commander's (superior's) order is law for subordinates." In his article Yuriy Vasilyevich, a prominent authority on our laws and legal praxis, dealt with the contradiction between our combined-arms regulations and a number of articles in the Criminal Code, on the one hand, and international legal standards, on the other. After all, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which tried, among others, the Hitlerite top brass and other military men of the Reich, states the following: "The fact that the accused was acting at the directions of a government or the order of a superior does not relieve him of liability."

Is the existing contradiction acceptable, one asks. And how do we answer that? I am not a legal expert and am therefore not sufficiently familiar with the special legal literature which might contain the explanation of the Supreme Court or an easy-to-read interpretation of articles of the Criminal Code which apply to this problem. It is perfectly clear even to me, however, that we do not now have exhaustive, clearly spelled out laws without "fake bottoms" on this matter.

There would appear to be an extremely simple way to resolve the problem: state both in the law and in the military regulations that only those laws which are not criminal are subject to execution. Yu. Feofanov correctly reminds us that this was done in the prewar regulations.

But what sometimes came of this? A battalion commander would refuse to carry out an order from the division commander sending the entire battalion to certain death for the sake of the overall operation.... This was an echo of the civil war, when Red Army men did not trust their commanders, former officers of the czarist army. Or an echo of 1937, when the threat of being branded "enemies of the people" hung over the command personnel like the sword of Damocles. This is also the explanation for the criminal order issued by Gen Panfilov, sending his Guardsmen to Dubosekovo with practically no chance of survival.... And for many, many orders issued by the stern Zhukov, the sensitive Shaposhnikov, the thorough Tolbukhin, the stubborn Chuykov and (not a single front-line fighter will question this) the other victors over fascism.

Like it or not, war is war, and it has its own laws. And since we shall soon decide to give the military the right to refuse to carry out orders from commanders, I believe there is only one way out: entirely to rule out the possibility of a double interpretation of the concept "criminal order," and state in the law specifically what a private or a commander should understand this to be. I repeat: in the law, not in instructions, not in commentary, not in a sub-legal act in general. The nature of the army and its purpose are such that it requires complete specificity always and in all things, and clearly defined missions, both for every serviceman and for every civilian who enters into contact with the army.

I fully understand, of course, just how difficult and labor-consuming this task is. Can you include everything in a "list of criminal aspects of an order"? Will you not omit something? Since I have already referred to Panfilov's order, I shall also mention a rarely recalled circumstance of the battle at Dubosekovo. There were 29 people involved, you know, and not 28. And when an avalanche of enemy tanks advanced toward them with a rumble and a roar, one of them lost his nerve. Just one! He threw down his weapon, raised his hands and rushed off to surrender. And he was shot down by his own comrades, the Panfilov soldiers. Whose bullet cut him down? How can one determine that? Mob law is "sub-tribunal." But there was no tribunal. There was a feat by the 28.

And was this the only such incident in the war? The deserter, the coward, the "objector," the bully.... How did the officers, the NCOs and the privates behave? Particularly in encirclement, when there was not a tribunal to be found, so to speak, for thousands of versts? I spoke with many veterans, and practically everyone of them answered: "We acted according to the situation. And according to the combat orders from command." Some of them added: "The situation was special, extreme. There was no time for a court with a procurator and lawyers. There was a battle underway."

But are extreme circumstances a valid justification? I do not rule out the possibility that many of our contemporaries, witnesses to the coup of 19-23 August, will consider this normal. Because the victors in the extreme

circumstances of August operated precisely in accordance with the situation, without referring to the Constitution or the laws they themselves had passed. This was confirmed by the President of the USSR at a meeting with members of the Russian parliament, when he promised publicly to legalize post factum all the ukases and orders issued by the Russian leadership. It would follow from this, however, that they had previously been (how can I put it?) not entirely legitimate. Take just the matter of the CPSU's property. The president directed the soviets to see that it was secured. Until what? Until when? One would assume until a court ruling is handed down, because this is under the jurisdiction of the court. And it is already being "taken over," confiscated, divided up, nationalized, each soviet acting in its own way, "in accordance with the situation." Is the motivation that the Extraordinary Committee for the State of Emergency and the CPSU are one and the same devil? Is that it? It is the property of the entire party, after all, and not that of its Central Committee nor of the Politburo nor the Secretariat, not the personal dacha of Dzasokhov or Shenin. Every CPSU member is entitled to his share of the common party property. He has paid dues into the party budget for many years, and with respect to party property, he could and even should enjoy all the rights of a shareholder.

We can see, however, that in the extreme circumstances of the 3 days of the "putsch" and the weeks following it, the advocates of a law-based government were forced to act not according to the law but in accordance with the situation, according to the circumstances. And so what can we say about the actions of commanders and their subordinates in a war situation: at the front, in combat, in encirclement? I therefore have to agree with Yu. Feofanov's conclusion: "Discipline, even military discipline, discredits itself when interpreted as blind obedience to any word from the commander (this and subsequent text underscored by me—E.G.). Particularly in peacetime. As we can see from recent events, however, it is not all so simple. And it is not enough to rely entirely on conscience, on inner moral law, on God's commandments and common human values. Legal standards and their interpretation must provide the answers to both commanders and their subordinates concerning their duty, their authority and responsibility."

Steps To Safeguard Military Research Viewed

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in Russian 16 Oct 91 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Major General V. Dementyev, USSR Defense Ministry armaments deputy chief for research and development, professor, and doctor of technical sciences, by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Dolgikh; place and date not given: "Science Must Not Perish—Taking a Look at the Problem"]

[Text] Our correspondent talks to Major General V. Dementyev, USSR Defense Ministry armaments deputy chief for research and development, professor, and doctor of technical sciences.

[Dolgikh] With the improvement in the world situation, many countries which in the past regarded each other as probable adversaries have embarked on a significant reduction in their Armed Forces. However, to prevent a decrease in the own Army and Navy's combat power, the United States, for example, has increased its appropriations for scientific research and the development of equipment and arms with improved qualitative parameters. As far as I know, our appropriations are only being reduced. Valeriy Aleksandrovich, will this not affect the quality of our combat equipment?

[Dementyev] Yes, it will. Quality is expensive. The money currently at our disposal is insufficient to complete the full range of previously planned programs. So we are forced to constantly review our plans and abandon something each time.

[Dolgikh] But how then did you compile programs if it was clear from the outset that the money allocated was insufficient?

[Dementyev] Here is the USSR Law on the Country's State Budget for the current year. It was signed in January. Let's look at the second item in the section on "Military Expenditure": "Payment for Scientific and Technical Products in the Defense Field." It is stated that 12.403 billion rubles [R] were allocated for these aims. Proceeding from this sum, we composed a research plan. Do you remember what happened in April? Prices rose. And in July? They "relaxed" prices on component parts. Add to this the R60 which is paid to each citizen by way of compensation. These are all classed as overheads. Enterprises were forced to increase prices for their goods in order to offset the cost of this compensation. Incidentally, prices are still going up. But nobody has given us any additional money—on the contrary, it is constantly being cut back. That is why we are constantly having to abandon something in order to complete the things that we cannot do without.

[Dolgikh] Valeriy Aleksandrovich, what can you say about the following story—it was told to us by one of our readers, Yevgeniy Stepanovich Senokosov. He is the manager of a small enterprise in St. Petersburg. In line with a recent decision by the Military Industrial Commission, he was allocated a specific sum of money for research into promising new technology of significance to defense. By the way, the Military Industrial Commission's choice was no accident: The enterprise in question has already done extensive research on this theme. But it is often the case that the job of chief executor is given to a "big" enterprise rather than a "small" enterprise, even if the former has had no real success in the stated subject. In this case, the "Mashinostroitel" Science and Production Association, headed by A. Kallistov, had been designated as the "chief" enterprise. And it was Kallistov himself, ignoring the Military Industrial Commission's decision, who refused to conclude a contract with the small enterprise for the aforementioned sum: Obviously he considered it shameful to be on an equal footing with it (in terms of the sum allocated to both enterprises). It is like the well worn notion: "If I can't have it, you're not

having it either." You know, without permission from above, Kallistov cannot redistribute funds. Meanwhile, Senokosov was literally forced to gild church cupolas and agree to Finnish and Swedish proposals—even at the risk of damaging our country's interests—to acquire the money for scientific research.

[Dementyev] Unfortunately I did not hear this story and I do not know the details. Although I hear of similar things maybe 10 times a day. What can I say? If this was a defense topic and had gone through our department, then let Senokosov appeal to me personally. We will form an expert group and set everything to rights.

The economy is in crisis. It is necessary to introduce all "defense sector" achievements (and we have quite a few) into production without delay everywhere thereby making our product competitive. It is also necessary to alter the system of interrelations between administrators and producers. The vertical links have already been destroyed, and the horizontal links are not yet formed. The ruble is worthless. To survive, producers are forced to exchange goods with each other as in primordial society. This process is in no way regulated by the state. Everybody thinks only about today, so meager funds are allocated for research—especially basic research.

[Dolgikh] Who exactly is handling this research?

[Dementyev] As a rule, Academy of Sciences institutes or universities deal with basic research. Applied research is done by sectorial scientific research institutes.

[Dolgikh] So what is the point of financing all these things separately, or even bothering about the results of basic research? Would it not be easier finance work which is already completed—that is, say, equipment specimens?

[Dementyev] Eventually this is what will happen. The Pentagon, for example, structures its relations with industry in just that way, and on this score we have something to learn here. At the same time, the U.S. Defense Department also has a special subdivision—the "Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency" [DARP]. Its purpose is to define a list of "critical" technology—that is, technology which will shape the future development not only of armaments but also of the country's industry as a whole. In each different year, different quantities of "critical" technology are selected. At present the list comprises 22 items. The belief is that the United States exclusively should have superiority in these technologies, so no expense is spared. And this is precisely because the future development of all mankind lies in this technology. That aside, DARP has the function of identifying highly significant results of scientific research which is still at the experimental stage, using it later on to create promising weapon specimens.

[Dolgikh] As far as I know, we also have a similar subdivision...

[Dementyev] Yes. The USSR Academy of Sciences Applied Problems Section—our very own DARP. This section is tasked with gathering, collating, describing,

and presenting all the scientific achievements that are the most important from a defense viewpoint. It must also evaluate problems of interest in developing the Armed Forces and find possible solutions.

[Dolgikh] Nevertheless, what do you think can be done in the existing situation to prevent the demise of our defense sciences—indeed, our major sciences in general?

[Dementyev] I do have concrete proposals. First, all funds earmarked in the state budget for defense-oriented research and development must be concentrated in one pair of hands—the ministry of defense. Then we will set up expert groups, define priority areas, conclude contracts, and control the distribution and use of funds... If an order is fulfilled ahead of schedule, the successful workers will be given a bonus. If not, they will have to pay a fine. In other words, everything must be put on a normal economic footing. At the moment, as in the case of your reader, money does not always reach its designated beneficiary...

[Dolgikh] That incident also testifies to what seems to me to be yet another wanton current practice. Instead of concentrating the rather modest budget appropriations in the hands of a few scientific and production establishments with a proven record, this money is "scattered" among many. Hence, this small enterprise is offered a mere R20,000 instead of the R350,000 proposed by the Military Industrial Commission.

[Dementyev] That is why I suggest that all funds are concentrated in one pair of hands. I also propose to create an institute for dual purpose technology. Part of the "military" R12 billion and part of the "civilian" R14.5 billion will be invested in this institute. Radio electronics, aviation, space, plasma... Are these things really only of interest to the military? No. These very same problems are dealt with in civilian sciences and often without due account of achievements already attained in the "defense sphere." And vice versa. Who needs such wasteful duplicated work? One thing is certain, the people certainly don't need it. Incidentally, joint research significantly reduces the expense and time needed to develop the necessary equipment and hardware. Such an institute would bring many experts together. There will be no "failures" when purchasing licenses abroad. And we ourselves could trade in our own licenses at tremendous profit.

It is very important to save our extremely rich scientific establishment, our scholars. This must be the concern of the state above all. It is the state which is called upon to show concern for basic research, the fruits of which will be of use if not to us then to our children and grandchildren. It is necessary to create normal working conditions for scientists. Do not demand immediate returns. Discoveries cannot be made according to some timetable.

Today we are indeed in crisis. But this is a passing phase. Remember history—for three centuries Russia was under the Mongol-Tatar yoke, but it was resurrected and prospered. Neither do I believe that science will perish. Especially as the entire civilized world is prepared to

help us. The main thing in the existing situation is not to squander credit, but to use at least part of it to develop our own production, for the economic revival. And we for our part will guarantee the inviolability of our borders. In any case, the defense sciences for their part can still guarantee this, for the time being.

Reporter Visits General Staff Command Center

92UM0078A Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Oct 91
pp 1-2

[Article by V. Badurkin: "On Codes, Missiles, and the 'Little Black Suitcase': A Report from the Central Command Post of the General Staff"]

[Text] Each of us has his little secrets and we do not like it very much when some outsider finds out about them. There are departmental secrets vigilantly kept by devoted people. Upon examination, to be sure, these secrets often turn out to be known to everyone. But there are also those upon which depends the security of the state and sometimes of all mankind. They are state secrets. One of them is the system for the command and control of strategic nuclear forces.

This has recently become a very popular subject. Practically all of our and many foreign publications, in accordance with their competence and the fantasy of their authors, have described the "journey of the little black suitcase" taken from Foros on 18 August and without fail asked themselves: Was it not possible for one of the conspirators to make use of it and unleash a nuclear war? In public statements, both the president and the minister of defense categorically denied this possibility. But their laconic answers could not satisfy the curiosity of the writing fraternity or completely calm the alarmed people. For this reason, we asked truly competent comrades to remove at least one of the "seven seals" concealing the "secret of the nuclear button." Thus, our correspondent got into the holy of holies of the General Staff—its Central Command Post.

The armored door opened rather easily. The officer who met me pointed silently to the next door. The television camera moved slightly as it followed me. And finally the Central Command Post itself. Before coming here, I imagined it in the form of a huge hall with a feature inherent in any command post—maps, charts, electronic panels, and the stands of the automatic system for control and communications. In principle, that is how it was but this was only the tip of the iceberg. We went from one hall to another, to the premises for on-duty services and special and interstate communications, posts for the reception and analysis of information, and rooms for emotional and psychological relaxation and medical monitoring and help. All of this is also the Central Command Post. Here everything is their own, autonomous, and specific. Beginning with the power supply, fire extinguishing equipment, and communications and ending with the atmosphere of brotherhood among the personnel on duty.

The duty general is a czar and god (by the way, his military rank may not be that of general). Everything depends upon his authority and his authority on his professionalism. All of the alert-duty personnel—liaison officers for all branches of the armed forces, operators of the automated command system, and communications specialists—are professionals of the highest order but nevertheless the duty general is a head taller than any of them.

He has special powers and hence special responsibility. All of the information from the troops, Defense Ministry institutions, and civilian departments flows to him. He knows where on the planet a missile or combat aircraft has gone into the air and for what purpose. The slightest vibrations of the earth's crust, preparations for the launch of space vehicles (including weather rockets), a dangerous approach of a foreign aircraft or ship to our borders, or a change in the situation at "hot spots" of the country and planet are all reported at once to the duty general. He is obligated to assess everything, to select what is most significant and important, to make a decision immediately, and to report "upwards," even to the president. And he does this day and night with minimal breaks for food and sleep (if the situation allows), a compulsory visit to the physician and a short session of psychotherapy.

Not everyone can handle such tension. I remember a few years ago when I first observed alert duty at an underground command post of a missile regiment. Two officers, a captain and a first lieutenant, "were working" in the usual manner: they received and carried out orders, checked the reliability of systems for missiles and launchers, and took action on scenario instructions. Within an hour I could no longer understand what was happening and an hour and a half after that I asked to be "freed." They continued to work at this pace for another 4 hours.

You can imagine the load on the duty shift of the Central Command Post that has responsibility for the security of the country for 24 hours. And these are not just words. To a considerable extent, the lives of millions of people do indeed depend upon these people. Yes, they are screened through special psychological and professional tests. And they are monitored regularly by physicians. They study continually and are tested for admission to alert duty. But they too are ordinary people with problems, worries, and a personal life.

They have to eat well but they dine in an ordinary dining hall or bring modest provisions from home. They have to rest well before duty but more than one-third of them do not have an apartment. They do not even receive a monetary supplement for alert duty, although practically all those whom they command have such bonuses.

Having created systems to guarantee the security of the country, we have once again forgotten about people and those commanding them. Having spent tens of millions

for premises, equipment, computers, arms, and technology, we save kopecks on people. How familiar and customary this is in our country....

But let us return to the Central Command Post and let us try to answer the question that for almost two months has been torturing not only us but all of humanity: Could a nuclear war have started accidentally (or by someone's evil design) during the confused days of the coup d'etat? To find out, it will be necessary to go through the entire chain from the making of the decision to the start of practical measures.

As everyone knows, we have a system for warning against nuclear attack (SPRN). Its basic elements are a network of powerful radar stations located along the perimeter of the state border and orbiting space satellites. This system detects the moment of the take-off of a missile at any point on the globe and determines the trajectory of its flight and the coordinates of the final point of impact of its warhead. These data are immediately transmitted to the Central Command Post. In a matter of minutes, the duty general through his assistants checks the objectivity of this information through several independent channels and transfers the entire system for the command of the country's strategic nuclear forces from the alert to the operating mode. And he does this only when the fact of a nuclear attack has been determined with absolute certainty. Otherwise the system does not work. The Soviet Union cannot start a nuclear war first even if someone (including the president) gets such an idea. For this there is an entire chain of technical "barriers" developed back during the time of the creation of nuclear weapons and subsequently greatly improved.

From a conversation with Major-General Ye. Razinkov, first deputy chief of the Central Command Post:

[Badurkin] Yevgeniy Vladimirovich, let us suppose that the fact of an attack has been confirmed. How will the events unfold after that?

[Razinkov] In this event, the duty general turns on the so-called conference communications and through them immediately reports to the president. And here the infamous "little black suitcase" enters the arena. As a matter of fact, it is just an element of these communications. Three persons have it—the president, the minister of defense, and the chief of the General Staff (the chief of the General Staff is included in the conference communications in the absence of the minister of defense of the USSR). With the help of the conference communications, the president is linked with the necessary people in a matter of seconds wherever they may be, consults with them, makes a decision, and gives the duty general the order to use strategic nuclear forces. For this there is a system of codes and ciphers known only to the president and no one else. In the case at hand, the duty general is subordinate only to him and carries out only his commands.

[Badurkin] Many are asking the question of whether in those August days Yanayev, Yazov, Moiseyev, or anyone else could have made use of the president's exclusive right.

[Razinkov] Briefly, that is precluded. In the first place, and this is perhaps the main thing, the conference communications system is turned on only after confirmation of the trustworthiness of the fact of an aggression. Secondly, as I already said, the duty general is subordinate only to the legal head of state. There is also a special system of confirmation to determine this legality. It is not enough to declare yourself president in words. To become president in fact, it is necessary to have real rather than declared powers. Apparently in Foros they were trying to convince Gorbachev to transfer these powers. It is natural that none of the persons whom you enumerated could use the exclusive rights of the president.

[Badurkin] There were no communications with the president for 3 days. But what if something irreparable had suddenly occurred during this time?

[Razinkov] As for the possibility of a premeditated nuclear aggression, I as a human being and specialist rule it out. In the final analysis, nuclear weapons are too serious a thing to deal with arbitrarily. They are under dependable control here and beyond the ocean. By the way, in not a single nuclear country during those days was there even the slightest sign of an increased level of combat readiness of nuclear weapons themselves or of their delivery systems.

[Badurkin] Nevertheless....

[Razinkov] I am certain that in this case even the declared leadership of the country would have had enough sense to return to the state its legal president with all of his powers. They had taken on their shoulders too serious a responsibility for all of mankind. And they could not fail to recognize this.

[Badurkin] Gorbachev's isolation could not help but reflect on the work of the Central Command Post....

[Razinkov] Of course. The reason for all of our work is to guarantee the security of the country. But this requires constant contact with the president. He was not there during these days. We had to take supplemental measures. I would not want to state them in detail. I will say only that a whole series of organizational and technical measures were taken to preclude the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons.

According to instructions, the deputy of the duty general must convince himself that the order comes from the president. He has his own system of coded communications with the head of state that is independent of the duty general. Only when both supervisors of the alert-duty shift—the duty general and his deputy—perform all necessary actions does the signal go to the command posts of the lower-level alert-duty shifts (or, by-passing them, directly to the launchers).

The supervisors of the Central Command Post patiently explained to me for a long time the numerous "little tricks" of a technical and organizational nature that preclude the possibility of the illegal use of nuclear weapons. To be honest, I did not understand half of what they said. I think that this is forgivable for a person familiar only with the technology at the level of the internal combustion engine. Something else is important. They convinced me that only a legal president having his full authority can employ strategic forces and only in response to a reliably confirmed fact of aggression. Whatever "tricky" questions I asked, I could not stump them. It turns out that there had been "smart guys" even before me and possible variants of the development of events had already been examined and reflected in the official instructions.

For example, can an alert-duty shift of a missile regiment or a submarine launch a missile without the corresponding order? For this, it turns out, both "numbers" need, at a minimum, to agree. In addition, they must separately transmit the coded signals to the launcher and to the missile itself. They cannot know them, of course, but, having a great deal of experience, they may try to select them. After the first attempt, the technology takes control of their actions and blocks the entire system after the third attempt. So that, as they say, will not work here.

Still.... We have many nuclear weapons. Even too many. They sail on submarines, travel on mobile ground-based complexes, and fly on strategic bombers. Technology is technology however "smart" it may be. I believe that no general designer can completely preclude the possibility of a spontaneous launch. Although it may be "one in ten million," there is still a fractional risk here. Cannot this randomness lead to a worldwide apocalypse?

Taking this aspect into account, the governments of the United States and USSR agreed in 1976 to organize a direct line of communications. It is now sufficient for the duty general of our Central Command Post to use the apparatus and "talk it over" with his colleague in the Pentagon. (Other nuclear powers, unfortunately, are in no hurry to take part in these communications.) The "hot" line works from time to time. At first, after detection of an accidental launch, there is an exchange of the briefest information in the form of certain previously stipulated symbols meaning some "nonstandard" situation or other. Then, when the initial agitation quiets down, one can come to an understanding in more detail. In the event of a spontaneous launch, by the way, an explosion of the missile warheads is completely ruled out, as the specialists assert. Of course a missile even with an unexploded nuclear warhead is not a pleasant "gift" but is still better than thousands upon thousands of dead.

From the narrative of Major-General Ye. Razinkov:

On one of the days of the Persian Gulf crisis, we at the Central Command Post received a report of the launch of a missile from the region of the conflict. Judging by the data of the trajectory, it was clear that this missile

was not Iraqi. The first thought was: Had the Americans really decided to use ballistic weapons? We immediately linked up with the system for the collection and analysis of information, a service of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other departments. At the same time, we prepared an inquiry to the Pentagon. But we did not follow up on it: the SPRN (warning system) gave us all of the necessary information. It turned out that it was a practice launch from the territory of Israel in the direction of the Mediterranean Sea. Everything was over quickly but there was cause for concern....

At the end of September, the American President George Bush declared to the entire world his initiatives to reduce nuclear weapons. The Soviet side approved of them. Who knows, perhaps we will really be witness to the elimination of the last atomic bomb. God will it, as they say, only I fear that this will not be soon, for too many of them have been stockpiled in the world. And as long as they exist, we must deal with them very seriously, constantly remembering our tremendous responsibility to humanity.

It would seem that these are truisms. But you involuntarily think about them every time when in the republics you occasionally hear: let us divide everything, including nuclear weapons. I saw with my one eyes the entire system for the command and control of strategic forces—from the submarine and missile regiment to the Central Command Post of the General Staff. Subordinate to a unified center, it is so complex and interwoven with subsystems for monitoring, verification, and reverification that it is practically impossible to separate out any particular link.

The opinion of Major-General Razinkov:

I do not want to get into the political aspects of this problem. I think that the consequences of this step may be so unpredictable that one can hardly imagine them fully at this time. As a specialist, I can say that the fracturing of the integrated and unified system of command and control of strategic forces will inevitably lead to a reduction of its effectiveness and reliability. Each new link in the chain of command increases the possibility of a fatal accident.

The republics need to establish their own systems for notification, control, and command and this requires the expenditure of billions. I think that today, when each of us senses the consequences of the collapse of the economy of the union, not one of the republics can afford such expenditures.

And the world community will hardly be pleased with such a decision. For new nuclear states will appear on the political map of the world and this will inevitably lead to diplomatic and political complications.

It may be that it is better for us to work together to achieve a situation in which not a single delivery system or nuclear charge will remain on the earth. Until then, however, I am certain that our common nuclear shield

must remain under the control and command of a unified center, however it may be called.

This entire report, from the first to the last word, was written, printed, and first read within the walls of the Central Command Post. This was the condition of the keeper of a state secret. And the editor's office, which usually reacts very strongly to any attempt to restrict freedom of information, agreed to this. Because we understand that there always has been, is, and will be information not subject to being divulged. We hope that our readers will also understand this, not finding in the article answers to some of their questions.

It is long since nighttime in Moscow. The duty general received the report of the guard: the minister and the chief of the General Staff left for home. The light in the white building on Arbat has been extinguished. And only at the Central Command Post is it never extinguished, although you cannot tell this from the street. There are no days and nights here. Here is always "time for operations."

Ussuriysk Official Links Explosion to Grass Burning

*OW2910181891 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1710 GMT 29 Oct 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] An explosion of three aviation bombs at a military unit's warehouse near the city of Ussuriysk October 28th may have been caused by the burning of the grass to clean up the lot, said the chief of the Ussuriysk garrison, commander of the unit, Major General Rodionov.

Other sources say that it could be a subversive act: three days before the explosion a stranger was detained in the unit's territory.

The military decline to provide data on casualties and damage. In the nearby villages the explosion smashed windows in houses. More than 60 residents have asked medical help at clinics and hospitals of Ussuriysk. Five people were hospitalized.

Servicemen Grievances on Pay, Living Conditions Outlined

*92UM0072A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Oct 91 First edition p 1*

[Article by Aleksandr Pimenov under the rubric "The View From the Editorial Office": "Will the Voice of the Trade Unions Be Heard?"]

[Text] Recently, while on a detached duty assignment, I heard about the following occurrence at one of the military scientific research institutes. A scientific associate, a conscientious worker, capable scientist and candidate of sciences, quit his job and went to work as... a janitor. This surprised me, and I naturally enquired into the reason. Had there had been a so-called conflict at work? Had he not gotten along with his boss and responded by taking this demonstrative step?

"No," the trade-union chairman explained. "It as all much more prosaic. He has a family, and it is extremely difficult for a scientist without epaulets to maintain a family in these lean times. A degreed scientist, working as a janitor.... A paradox produced not just by the economic situation which has developed in the nation, but also by the fact that the scientist was employed by a military establishment. The pay is somewhat better in similar civilian organizations.

But then it is not just at scientific establishment but at all military units, establishments and organizations that the pay for civilian workers is considerably lower than for their colleagues in civilian organizations. The editor's mail convincingly confirms this fact. Here are a few excerpts.

"Speaking for the group of chauffeurs at the Sevastopol Naval Officers' Club," write V.D. Drobyazko, V. Utkin and I. Klochko, "we ask you to rectify this glaring injustice in pay rates at our establishment (this applies to all the officers' clubs in the Armed Forces, of course). The driver of a PAZ-672 bus receives 198 rubles, while drivers in similar positions in civilian organizations earn 500-600 rubles.

Also from a group letter:

"We urge you to direct attention to the impoverished situation of employees of the Soviet Army employed as members of military delegations of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Soviet Army employees earn half what workers in corresponding jobs earn at a plant...."

Letters come in from all over. From military units, military academies and schools, enterprises, medical facilities, military commissariats.... They appeal to the editors for help. And the editorial board is in the same situation. It needs to appeal for help itself. (One could not make this up, as they say. While the author of this article was looking over a pile of letters on the subject, two proofreaders handed him their resignations. For the same reason: They would earn two or three times as much at the newspapers for which they were departing).

There is probably no one today who could explain why blue- and white-collar workers of the Soviet Army find themselves in the category of "second class people," as they often refer to themselves in their letters. Their social situation is indeed striking. The wages of all categories of workers, as already mentioned, are far lower than those of the same specialists in other departments. Under an order issued by the USSR minister of defense in 1975 they practically lost the right to receive housing where they work. They were directed to register on the waiting list with the local soviets, and this, as we know, is a hopeless cause.

Blue- and white-collar workers of the Soviet Army are members of a trade union. Relations between the trade union organizations and the command element have become a chronic sore spot. An agreement now concluded for the first time between the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Blue- and White-Collar

Workers of the Armed Forces of the USSR states that all issues will be decided on the basis of collaborative relations, mutual trust, mutual understanding and openness....“ This means not just at the top but at all levels. But this is just a declaration. In reality, however—and the further down one goes, the more this stands out—the commander is still “czar,” God and military chief for the trade union organizations, just as in the past. His word is law, even if it contrary to the law.

In the not so distant past, if there was a conflict between the commander and a civilian worker, the latter frequently submitted a complaint to a higher authority—no, not to the trade union committee but to the political organ. If the latter could not help the member of the trade union, the officer could be issued a reprimand. And the individual did not want to “be on the record” because there could be no certification or references or any advancement in the service without the political section. I do not want anyone to take these words as nostalgia for past structures. They are about something else. We must have an effective system of social protection for blue- and white-collar workers of the army and navy.

I can already hear the objections. Why pound on an open door? This is the purpose of the trade union organizations, after all. In addition, there is the military procuracy and the protection of the law and justice, capable of putting in his place any commander who oversteps the bounds. That is all true. On paper. But what about the reality? Each year thousands of orders issued by commanders and chiefs at various levels are protested, and agencies of the military procuracy are declared unlawful and replaced. Each such order has usually infringed upon someone's rights, caused someone material or emotional harm. Just what responsibility is born by the chief who issued the illegal law? Does this affect his career? No.

There is rampant inflation in the nation, universal shortages, an unbridled rise in prices.... In this situation Russia's independent trade unions decided to conduct a “fall offensive,” and the days from 21 to 26 October were proclaimed as days of unified action for trade unions of the RSFSR. Mass-meetings were held in many cities, and warning strikes were held in some. Russia's Council of Ministers considered all the demands of the trade unions and recommended that the ministries and departments and kray, oblast and republic officials hold talks on the demands set forth by the trade unions. There were frequent reports in the mass media during those days that here and there the agencies of power were looking for ways to meet the demands of the trade unions.

This was the prompt and efficient response. The steps taken did not achieve the main demands, of course, that market wages correspondent to market prices and that a clear and precisely defined government platform be worked out for directing the nation and the economy for the next 6-7 months.

Blue- and white-collar workers of the Armed Forces understand that strikes and other such actions are unacceptable methods for resolving problems in the military. So what are they to do if those at the very top stubbornly refuse to hear their angry voices? The Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions long ago sent proposals to the “authorities” for increasing the wages of blue- and white-collar workers of the Armed Forces and other measures for improving their standard of living. These became lost somewhere on the way to the president, however. Just how long are they to remain “second-class people”?

USSR Law on Amnesty for Deserters

92UM0106A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Nov 91
Union Edition p 2

[[“Document—USSR Law: On Amnesty for Military Servicemen Who Have Evaded Military Service”]]

[Text] Because of the numerous appeals from military servicemen and their families as well as proposals from the All-Union Council of Parents of Military Servicemen, and also taking into account the conclusions of the Special Commission for verifying the objectivity and completeness of the investigation of causes of death and injury of military servicemen and military construction workers during peace time, and guided by the principle of humanism, the USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

Article 1. To release from punishment individuals convicted under Articles 9 (absence without leave), 10 (leaving unit or place of service without permission), 11 (desertion), or 13 (evading military service by self-mutilation or other means) of the USSR law “On Criminal Liability for Military Crimes.”

Article 2. To close all investigations and cases not examined by the courts regarding individuals who have committed the crimes indicated in Article 1 of the law before the present law goes into force.

Article 3. To expunge convictions from the records of individuals released from punishment on the basis of the present amnesty and also individuals who have served their sentence for crimes indicated in Article 1 of the law.

Article 4. Individuals included under the amnesty are released from both primary and additional punishment if it has not been served before the present law goes into force.

Article 5. The amnesty does not apply to individuals who, during the period of evasion of military duty, committed, in addition to the crimes listed in Article 1 of the present law, other crimes for which legislation in effect envisions a punishment of more than two years of incarceration.

Article 6. To assign responsibility for execution of the present law to:

1) organs in charge of carrying out the punishment—for convicts in places of incarceration and also individuals

conditionally assigned to loss of freedom with mandatory enlistment in labor and conditionally released from places of incarceration with mandatory enlistment in labor (execution of the present law is carried out by a decision of the chief of the corresponding corrective labor institution or special commander's office);

2) inquiry and preliminary investigation organs—for individuals and crimes being processed by these organs;

3) the courts:

—for individuals whose cases are being processed by the courts and have not been examined before the present law goes into force and also individuals whose cases have been examined but the sentences have not gone into legal force;

—for convicts whose sentences have been postponed in cases and according to the procedure envisioned by the law and those conditionally convicted in keeping with Article 38 of the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics;

—for individuals conditionally released from punishment early and individuals for whom the unserved part of the punishment has been replaced by a lesser punishment before the present law goes into force (the question of the application of the amnesty is decided by the court that made the determination about the application of conditional-early release or replacement of the unserved part of the punishment with a lesser one);

4) internal affairs organs—for individuals whose sentences have gone into legal force and who have been sentenced to loss of freedom who are not under guard or those who have been conventionally sentenced to loss of freedom with mandatory enlistment in labor who have not been sent to their place of work;

5) the command of disciplinary battalions—for individuals serving their punishment in disciplinary battalions (companies);

6) commanders of military units and chiefs of military institutions—for individuals serving their punishment in guard houses.

Article 7. Organs responsible for execution of the present law are granted the right to requisition from the corresponding institutions court files and other materials necessary for resolving issues related to the application of the amnesty. These requisitions must be acted on immediately.

Article 8. Decrees concerning application of the amnesty adopted by inquiry and preliminary investigation organs, internal affairs organs, chiefs of corrective labor institutions, special commandants' offices, the command headquarters of disciplinary battalions, commanders of military units, and chiefs of military institutions are approved by the procurator.

Article 9. To establish that the amnesty applies to military servicemen who have committed the crimes listed in Article 1 of the present law who did not report

to their duty stations if no later than one month after the present law goes into effect they report to the nearest military administration organs for further military service (recruiting offices of the USSR Ministry of Defense and military districts, fleets, military commissariats, and commandants' offices), to the USSR presidential committee for affairs of military servicemen and members of their families, similar committees of the republics, military affairs organs, or military units where they have performed active military service.

The present law does not apply to military servicemen who have evaded military service after this law goes into force.

Because of the fact that a considerable number of evasions of military service have been caused by the unstable relations in the place of service, the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and leaders of local departments which include military formations are to take measures to assign military servicemen and military construction workers to places where they can continue their military service under conditions that eliminate circumstances contributing to further illegal actions.

The time of evasion of military service may be credited to military servicemen as active military service under the condition that they subsequently perform irreproachable military service for no less than six months according to the procedure established by the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the leaders of other departments that include military formations, respectively.

Article 10. The present law goes into force from the time of its publication and is subject to execution within three months.

[signed] **M. GORBACHEV**, president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Moscow, the Kremlin, 1 November 1991.

'Editorial View' of Costs of Soviet Armed Forces

92UM0148A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

[Editorial by Aleksandr Tkachev under the rubric "The View From the Editorial Office": "The Most Unpaid in the World"]

[Text] When I picked up KRASNAYA ZVEZDA recently, and I read, I literally went mad. One smart individual, a deputy, says that in September alone 42 percent of the Union budget was spent on the maintenance of the armed forces. And another person, who is no fool, our correspondent, swallows this stuff as if it were nothing, and he does not ask any questions regarding this wild figure. Well, for example, he could have gotten curious as to why, the devil take it, I personally (he also), two weeks after payday, observe an extremely free movement of molecules in my pockets, called a Brownian movement, at a time when based on

the calculation of the billions that the percentage figure represents (42 percent), it follows with a mathematical certitude that there should be tens of thousands of rubles lying there.

But then, afterwards, a little arithmetic came to mind, and I put things in a column, as they taught in school. But, at first, everything in me, a Soviet person, began to boil with hatred, my fists automatically clenched themselves, curses poured out of my mouth: "The people are growing numb from hunger and cold, and they are gobbling up 42 percent! How long will we suffer, Messrs Comrades?" Overall, this figure worked on the mind the way it was supposed to. The misfire occurred somewhat later, at the level of the personal pocket, where the aforementioned "42 percent" never even thought about dropping in. Moreover, as is the case with the pocket of any military person.

The ideological factories of the regime, whose products were fed to our "Soviet man" psychology, were successful in many branches of myth production. One of them—the military—was mythologized all the way, absolutely, and 100 percent. No one in the world could understand in what way the Soviet Union, which spent (officially) 17-18 billion rubles [R] on defense, maintained parity with the United States, which spent \$300 billion for the same needs. But this absurdity went under the rubric of the "advantages of the socialist system," and we were assured day and night that this is the way it is...

Several years ago, entirely different figures were suddenly tossed at us. The shocking impression from them in the social conscience was total, although, according to the law of compensation, no one any longer believes that the final true figures indeed were given. Many insist on an accounting of not only direct, but also of indirect expenditures for defense, and for the declassification of all budget items. Then the total balance absolutely will be prodigious. And the military-industrial complex will truly represent an all-devouring monster, which, in fact, has to be shown to the people at this political stage.

Personally, I am not satisfied with one sole fact in this procedure: One myth is knocked out with another. Even the deputies still support talk about the same "Soviet man" principle: Throw everything into the bag, then we will sort it out. Missiles are added to puttees, tanks to basic pay and allowances, outer space expenditures to rations... As a result, staggering sums and percentages are created, but who will enjoy digesting them?

The question, of course, is interesting.

Especially for servicemen and their families, a majority of whom live, even according to official statistics, below the poverty line. Not to mention the tragic index of those without apartments, and the like.

Therefore, in my opinion, it still would be advisable to liquidate "streetcars" separately, and "melons" separately. But in a separate examination, it becomes clear very quickly, that the real money that the army and the

navy receive is by no means those phantasmagoric hundreds of billions around which passions are piling up. The Ministry of Defense was always only the fictional possessor of these sums, a state screen behind which these hundreds of billions flowed from the treasury (read—taxpayer's pockets) to the accounts of ministries and plants that produce defense products. As for the armed forces, it was those very same R17-18 billion, which constituted a rather small percentage of the total "defense" sums, which were expenditures for their maintenance, the provision of personnel with various kinds of allowances, for servicemen's pensions, and for the payment of workers and employees who work in organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Of course, inflationary adjustment to today even enlarged this figure, but if a recalculation is conducted according to an inflation index to the level of 1985, then it turns out that not one kopek was added to the personnel of the army and navy.

"Well, perhaps the billions of rubles are not money?" The statesman asks threateningly, "Not money?" That is how distressful things are with the budget, and, as for next year, there is no point at all in trying to guess... I will answer what I think: It is not only the money, but the state did not even pay it and does not pay it to its own armed forces. Our army and navy are the most unpaid in the world. They (in the part for personnel upkeep) do not cost the leaders and the people even one kopek of real expenses. What is more, profit is even fleeced out of them, covering many billions of the state budget deficit at the expense of super exploitation of regular personnel and compulsory service soldiers.

There is an incalculable amount of evidence for this. I will cite several facts, and almost anyone can extend this number. For example, the figure appeared in the press that not less than a billion rubles was saved by the Moscow mayor's office from the city budget owing to the work in the fields and vegetable bases by soldiers of the Moscow Military District this autumn. But throughout the country? Hundreds of thousands of people and tens of thousands of military vehicles worked. This is not just a billion, but many billions, first, of state resources that were saved from the hiring of seasonal workers, and, second, the agricultural products that were saved and which can now be gotten only at the SKB [agricultural bases]. And the above-mentioned all-army "harvest battle" occurs annually—so figure it out. But the contribution to the budget of the military construction units and the railroad troops? Just the Baykonur, Plesetsk, and Kapustin Yar cosmodromes, and the legendary eastern sector of BAM [Baykal-Amur main rail line] would have cost the state tens of billions more, if it did not have at hand the reliable and almost unpaid militarized work forces. (The railroad troops were recently removed from the armed forces, but you cannot, as the saying goes, erase words from history.) And such a daily and all-encompassing thing as the construction of military facilities by means of the "scrounging method" and "seasonal work," which are practiced everywhere for payment in kind? If these activities of the "troops" that

are not taken into account by any statistical administration are converted into budgetary terms, absolutely phenomenal figures will be derived. Well, and so on: The maintenance of communications systems in the Arctic by military forces, the Chernobyl epic, emergency situations and catastrophes to which troops are the first to be sent to eliminate the aftereffects, and the self-construction by units that are deployed to new locations...

I do not think that anyone is capable of listing all of the cases and situations and to calculate all of the sums that were saved and are being saved for the state thanks to their own most unpaid armed forces in the world. It was incomparably cheaper and more advantageous for the party-state elite to include several higher military ranks in their narrow circle for whom exceptional conditions were created in exchange for obedience than to make expenditures in the social sphere and to create a decent standard of living for the armed forces as a whole. Thus, I will repeat once more: Our state did not bear and does

not bear even one kopek of real expenses for personnel upkeep. Such expenses can only occur in the future and only in the event that the army and the navy engage in their sole direct task—combat readiness, and nothing else.

As, in fact, it is done in the armed forces of states that man them on a professional basis. There no one understands what can connect a fighter pilot to scrap, a marine to a concrete mixer, and a sailor to a stinking vegetable storehouse, where you will perish without a gas mask. No one there understands how it is possible to demand a professional response from cadre personnel of the army and navy, if their social problems are not resolved and if they are not provided an income on the level of a prosperous middle class.

Only we understand this.

Or—I am already starting to get confused—as before, do we not understand anything?

Discussion of RPG-16 Assault Grenade Launcher

92UM0109A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 9, Jun 91 p 6

[Article by engineer L. Semenov under the rubric "Weapons of the Nuclear Age": "The RPG-16, an Assault Grenade Launcher"]

[Text] During the execution of a combat mission an airborne assault force can encounter enemy tanks and other armored vehicles at any time. Subunits of "flying infantry" (a squad, a platoon) must clearly have weapons both effective and portable for combatting them. Such weapons also have to be used against enemy soldiers and weapons located in light field fortifications, in urban or rural structures.

The multipurpose RPG-16 rocket-propelled grenade launcher meets these needs entirely.

Perhaps the main distinction between it and the well-known RPG-7 and RPG-7D (VOYENNYE ZNANIYA, No. 12, 1980, and No. 10, 1987) is its "calibered" grenade, which is 58.3 mm in diameter, matching the barrel of the RPG-16. Structurally, it consists of a post-boost vehicle (GCh), a firing mechanism and a rocket engine (RD). The streamlined post-boost vehicle contains a shaped explosive charge. It is detonated by means of a piezo-electric fuse, which is activated this way: The forward part of the grenade contains a piezo-crystal component. An electrical potential difference develops when the surface is strained, the electrical pulse produced is fed to a detonator behind a bursting charge. The front part of the fuse is capped for safety during transport.

The grenade's rocket engine is tube-shaped with a powder charge inside and a nozzle at the end. The nozzle has a sort of "skirt" with eight tangential openings (bored at an angle), six folding stabilizing fins (vanes) and two tracers. The powder charge in the rocket engine is ignited by a delayed-action igniter. For use in combat a propellant charge (transported separately) is attached to the grenade. Together, they comprise a PG-16V round. The grenade itself weighs 1.65 kg and is 685 mm long; a round weighs 2.05 kg and is 980 mm long.

The RPG-16 is actually a launcher for the grenade described above. The launcher guide is the barrel, which consists of a tube, a chamber and a nozzle. The barrel is sectional. The tube is the separate front part, the chamber and nozzle the rear part, which are connected with a moveable sleeve. A power-driven sight is mounted on the top of the tube, the trigger assembly is on the bottom, and a telescopic sight is mounted on a special leaf on the left side. The chamber where the propellant charge ignition takes place, is covered with plastic plates which protect the operator against burns. There is a contact locking device at the top rear of the cavity to hold the round in place and provide contact between the electric primer and the grenade launcher's electrical circuit. The jet nozzle and the mouth are screwed onto the chamber.

The RPG-16's trigger assembly contains a pulse generator consisting of a magnetic stator-coil and armature. It develops an electrical pulse which is fed to the electric primer of the propellant charge. It looks approximately like this. When the trigger is pulled the spring-opposed push rod sends the armature sharply along the stator-coil, there is a disturbance of the magnetic field, and an electrical current is generated by electromagnetic induction. The pulse is fed to the electric primer through a single-wire circuit (the barrel itself is the second conductor). The push rod is cocked with a special lever. There is also a thumb-lock safety catch which locks the trigger.

The electrical primer ignites the propellant charge. A portion of the combustion gas forces the grenade from the barrel with an initial velocity of 250 m/s. Gas flowing through the tangential openings "twirl" it on its axis, which increases the accuracy of the round. Some of the gas exits through the tube nozzle, which dampens the recoil. The stabilizer vanes open, and the delay fuse begins to burn. The rocket engine's powder charge is ignited after the delay fuse burns up, and its thrust increases the grenade's velocity to 475 m/s.

Upon striking the target the piezo-element is deformed, the electrical pulse activates the detonator, causing the bursting charge to explode. If for any reason (a miss, a failure in the circuit) the fuse is not activated, the grenade self-destructs 4-6 seconds after firing.

A PGO-16 telescopic sight with 2.7-fold magnification (field of vision 13 degrees; weight 577 g) ensures firing accuracy. The reticle makes it possible to fire at ranges of 300, 500 and 700 meters with adjustments for lateral target movement. With the range scale it is possible to determine the distance to targets around 2.7 mm tall (the average height of modern tanks and many other armored vehicles). A power-driven sight is also used. It consists of a folding foresight and a folding back-sight leaf with back-sight slide (with fixed positions for firing at ranges of 200, 400, 500, 600, 700 and 800 mm).

The armed RPG-16 with telescopic sight weighs 9.6 kg and is 1,104 mm long. A folding bipod weighing 700 g can be attached to the tube. The launcher has an aimed firing range of up to 800 m and point-blank range of 520 m at targets 2 m high. The dismantled grenade launcher is only 645 mm long.

In airborne operations the dismantled grenade launcher and the basic ammunition load are packed in cloth jackets, which are carried by the crew. The weapon is assembled on the ground, a special belt with covers is attached to it for carrying, the latter for covering the front and breech faces.

The RPG-16 crew consists of the grenade thrower and an assistant. The former conducts sighted fire from the fire position, while the latter assembles and feeds him rounds, and provides cover with an assault rifle. A

well-coordinated crew can fire 5-6 aimed rounds per minute.

A basic ammunition load (five rounds) is carried by the crew. The grenade thrower carries one in the RPG-16 barrel and two in a pouch; the assistant carries two in a pouch. Naturally, five grenades will not last long in a prolonged or intense battle, and the subunits therefore

try to have a transported supply of rounds. If the assault group does not have vehicles, the airborne troops themselves carry it.

The RPG-16 is a fairly powerful and maneuverable weapon. Operating right in the subunit battle orders, the grenade throwers can provide rapid and effective fire support for them both in an offensive and in a defense.

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Pacific Fleet's Khvatov Interviewed

92UM0115A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 9, Sep 91 (Signed to press 04 Oct 91)
pp 3-5

Interview with Pacific Ocean Fleet Commander Admiral Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Khvatov by Captain 2nd Rank A. Andrushchenko: "At The Union's Most Remote Harbor: Pacific Ocean Fleet Commander Admiral G. Khvatov Answers MORSKOY SBORNIK's Questions"]

[Text]

[Andrushchenko] Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, 46 years have passed since the war with Japan ended. It is no secret that the Pacific Ocean Fleet has built up its might during the postwar decades. Ultimately it has increased so much that, according to some foreign observers, it has begun to constitute a direct threat to security in the Asian-Pacific Ocean Region [ATR]. Do you agree with this assertion?

[Khvatov] In my opinion, there are two aspects to this problem: the political and the military-strategic.

In the political aspect, the Soviet leadership has always proceeded based on the principle of reliable protection of its own territories and not from expansionist aspirations. The calculations of the entire military structural development, and specifically the fleet's structural development in the East, were based on this. Imagine that the military leadership is convinced—in the event of war, a gap will open on a certain line. Is the desire to close it really not natural? Does this policy really not respond to the interests of the Soviet people? I dare say that we have never threatened anyone in our plans and moreover in our actions during the entire history of Pacific Ocean Fleet structural development. We only made up for what we were defending. And we have finally achieved a situation when we can talk about parity. But for the Pacific Ocean Fleet, this parity signifies only the capability to withstand any aggression from the sea.

The military-strategic aspect proceeds from the political aspect. It is the material derivative policy [materialnaya proizvodnaya politika]. Let us take our doctrine. Today many people have gotten the impression that it has only recently begun to be defensive in nature and that it was offensive in nature prior to this. However, I can say and think with a clear conscience that this is so: the role of aggressor has never been assigned to the navy in any Soviet military theory. Manning, technical equipping of Pacific Ocean seamen, and their combat and tactical training has occurred and is occurring in accordance with this, I would say, moral-political precept.

I think that the answer to this question is contained in the real correlation of forces in the Asian-Pacific Ocean Region. Yes, the number of nuclear submarines is identical, with the exception of USSR and U.S ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific Ocean. However, at the same time, the United States has eight times as many nuclear attack submarines as we do that are equipped with long range cruise missiles.

While considering defensive functions and missions, the Pacific Ocean Fleet has significantly fewer ocean-going ships and there are no aircraft carriers or destroyers. As for aircraft, here the United States has a threefold superiority in the total number of combat aircraft and more than a tenfold advantage in carrier aircraft (Let us add to this a 27-fold superiority in naval infantry and more than a threefold superiority in naval surface ships).

Let us look at the Japanese Self-Defense Forces structural development program for 1991-1995. Twenty three trillion yen has been allocated for it. It is calculated on weapons improvements, including naval. Why is such modernization necessary? A. Sassa, former director of the Security Issues Administration, provided the answer when he noted that Japan must maintain and improve its military potential while using it along with economic and technological superiority as a trump card in negotiations with the USSR on the territorial issue.

You see what kind of "parity" it turns out we have! But the Soviet Union is proceeding to reduce naval weapons even under conditions that are unfavorable for it. Sixteen combatants, including nine major surface combatants and seven submarines, are being withdrawn from the Pacific Ocean Fleet.

This is—reality. It permits every sensible man to judge for himself whether or not the Pacific Ocean Fleet presents a threat to anyone's security.

[Andrushchenko] However, if we return to policy, reality consists of the fact that a peace treaty has not been signed with Japan even now, 46 years later. Is the strategic significance of the four islands so great that they can turn out to be an eternal stumbling block in the development of Soviet-Japanese relations?

[Khvatov] I would not begin to shift the accent toward precisely the strategic significance of the islands you mentioned. Today, they are a part of the sovereign territory of the Soviet Union and it would not be becoming of a great power to sell them at a political auction, no matter what advantages this portends. Thousands of Soviet people, who are working and raising children there and who consider the islands to be their homeland, live on this land....

[Andrushchenko] But nevertheless, I would like to know what the possession of the four southern islands of the Kurile Chain signify from the military point of view....

[Khvatov] There is nothing to hide here. For Pacific Ocean Fleet ships, Soviet jurisdiction over the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, and Habomai signifies a guarantee of free access to the Pacific Ocean and also a significantly greater possibility of concealed or unimpeded maneuver within the confines of the Sea of Okhotsk, and more reliable radar, acoustic, and other monitoring of navigation and the airspace in the proposed theater of military operations. We carry out year-round navigation through one of the ice-free straits. We must not forget that water areas, consisting of territorial waters that are 12 miles wide and a 200-mile economic

zone, about the islands. Add to all of this the island shelf that is rich with resources. The zone is a unique complex of natural, recreational, and other resources, right up to the energy of the rising tides and ocean currents. I think that there is no need to discuss in detail how important it is for military seamen to rely on islands as their departure point that have key significance in the Sea of Okhotsk—Pacific Ocean geographic “bundle.”

[Andrushchenko] Various assessments of the results of the Soviet-Japanese summit talks are being provided in connection with the lack of a solution to the problem. Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, how do you regard it?

[Khvatov] I sense your persistence in the “island” question and understand that we cannot get by without an excursion into history here. We will not deviate too far. Yes, these four islands belonged to Japan until 1945. Indeed, if you glance back several more decades, you can “catch sight of” a Russian flag over them. No one has revamped borders since the Second World War. And this is the essence of the question. All territorial disputes were decided through the force of arms 46 years ago. As the Helsinki Agreement certified—forever. Germany has withdrawn its claims to Poland. We also do not plan to once again transform Kaliningrad into Königsberg. Today a review of borders is simply dangerous. A conflict situation may arise that could get out of the control of states. I would call this the “Karabakh Syndrome,” only on an international scale. We would be making a serious mistake if we agreed to recarve the map in the current situation without asking our own people.

I think that the Soviet delegation to Japan had an extremely complicated mission. And nevertheless, in my opinion, the delegation did quite a bit that was useful. As a result, tension continues to be reduced in the region. Incidentally, 76 percent of Japan's residents, who were recently polled by the ASAHI newspaper, share this opinion. And they also have grounds for this: our country is withdrawing restrictions on visits to the Southern Kuriles by the Japanese and we are proposing reducing the military contingent deployed there. The entire Far East and Siberia can become an arena of cooperation between the two neighboring states. And what can be more significant than the direct contact of the two peoples! Expanding mutually beneficial ties will promote a solution of very complex interstate problems that will be acceptable to both sides.

[Andrushchenko] Obviously, the fleet's missions are also changing as a result of the warming of the political atmosphere. Have you sensed this as the commander and are there changes in the service of ship and unit personnel?

[Khvatov] You have touched on a circle of problems which trouble us most of all. Work continues to optimize (while considering reasonable sufficiency) the approved organizational structure, the analysis of fleet force training, and combat documents that regulate tactics and the combat utilization of weapons and improvement of combat training methods directed at increasing the

quality of personnel training which is especially important as a result of the transition to a 2-year term of service....

There are quite a few complications on this long path, all the more so since people stand behind all of this whom we need to train to skillfully service weapons and combat equipment, unify into single military collectives and, to the maximum extent possible, create favorable social and everyday living conditions in optimally compressed periods of time.

Recently, military reform has been noticeably and increasingly implemented. There is getting to be less bureaucratism, paper-shuffling, and work is more vital and interesting. Quite a few marvelous people who are reliable in every regard serve in the Pacific Ocean Fleet. They comprise the strength and pride of the fleet. They are primarily officers and warrant officers who have seen quite a bit in their time and patriotically-inclined young people. These people, despite the attacks and the attempt to slander the army and navy, are not betraying the interests of the Homeland and will stand in its defense.

[Andrushchenko] Quite recently, we military personnel could not exist without bearing our hatred for our enemies on the tips of our bayonets. Today many of us are being rebuked because we ourselves formed the images of the disgusting monster from allegedly friendly NATO members. Is that so?

[Khvatov] During the Cold War, the image of the enemy was quite real. Did the President of the United States not state his determination to destroy the “Evil Empire,” meaning by this the Soviet Union? Pacific Ocean Fleet members have themselves felt this attitude. Almost every one of our ships is shadowed on the high seas by a “combat escort” under a U.S. or Japanese flag. Frequently this “escort” has violated international regulations for warning about ship collisions while provoking us to adequate actions. Ship captains have been required to have special self-control. A “war of nerves” that was a former part of the psychological warfare announced by us has occurred on the oceans and seas.

Today the situation has changed for the better.

A visit by fleet ships to the United States has occurred under my command. American and Canadian ships have visited Vladivostok. In July, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General C. Powell was in Vladivostok on an official visit within the framework of preparations for the U.S. President's visit to the Soviet Union. A Pacific Ocean Fleet ship exercise occurred in August and foreign observers from the ATR states were invited to attend....

Maybe there is still a long way to go toward total mutual understanding but we nevertheless are regarding each other carefully.

But for now we are performing our duties at the Union's most remote ocean borders as befits Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet seamen: courageously and reliably.

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Need To Rethink Navy Shipbuilding Strategy Examined

92UM0139A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Article by Vice-Admiral Ye. Shitikov, retired: "View of a Problem: Shipbuilding Should Be Carried Out on the Basis of Outlays Society Can Afford"]

[Text] Our country is experiencing tough times, times of political instability and profound economic crisis. Under these conditions, it is difficult to talk about building warships, much less an aircraft carrier fleet. Only a country with a healthy economy can build and develop such a fleet. Our situation is a different story.

Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is something to discuss here. I am convinced that it is inadmissible to totally halt scientific research and design work on the development of aircraft-carrying ships. We need to preserve the intellectual potential that Soviet shipbuilding possesses today and the positions and priorities achieved in this field. The task of strengthening our defense capability has not faded away, nor can it. This is borne out by the recent session of the USSR State Council that confirmed our commitment to the concept of a unified national Armed Forces and the readiness of the sovereign republics to see that the army and navy are supplied with everything they need.

The formation of our country's defensive might took place during years that are today the subject of thorough rethinking. And justifiably so. Military problems have been too great a burden on the shoulders of the country's peoples and have funneled a large portion of state budget resources into military needs, critically weakening the sector of the economy called upon to meet people's vital needs as consumers. The military-industrial complex has grown to incredible proportions, pulverizing billions upon billions of rubles for the arms race and military rivalry with the world's leading powers. Today it is largely clear just what motivated our country's former leaders as they drew our people into a senseless process of squandering the national wealth. Nevertheless, it seems to me, much that was accomplished in the field of defense and state security was truly necessary and important; without these things, the USSR's very existence as a sovereign independent state would hardly have been possible.

We could, of course, take the following path: slash all defense programs to the bone and completely cut off their financing. But even today, when the military danger has significantly receded, one could hardly call such an approach sensible.

The aforementioned fully applies to our shipbuilding programs. They were indeed initiated with great difficulty. The intellect of our scientists, the backbreaking, at times even heart-rending labor of the producers, the enormous outlays of our country's funds and resources, and the blood and sweat of the entire people have been invested in the hardware with which our Navy is

equipped today and in the scientific-intellectual and production and engineering infrastructure that has been created in the interests of implementing shipbuilding programs. To destroy them now, at a time when the world has quite clearly demonstrated no conviction that it is unnecessary to further develop navies or to solve the problem of military confrontation generally, would be contrary to common sense.

Let us recall the price our people paid to carry out the program to build aircraft carriers during the grim years of the Great Patriotic War. At the very height of the war, in January 1943, the Main Navy Staff presented the People's Commissariat for the Shipbuilding Industry with a preliminary operational-tactical assignment for the design of an aircraft carrier. Three versions of the ship were to be studied—with 30, 45, and 60 aircraft aboard. The annual plan for design work that was confirmed by People's Commissar for the Navy N. Kuznetsov and coordinated with Deputy People's Commissar for Shipbuilding A. Redkin called for the drafting of blueprints for such a ship. The preliminary studies were done by a scientific-research division led by L. Gordon and N. Maltsev.

The job of carrying out the project was entrusted to Central Design Bureau No. 4, whose team of designers was led by B. Chilikin. He deemed it necessary to set about the interrelated and simultaneous designing of a battleship, an aircraft carrier, and a cruiser, since, in his view, "the present war has demonstrated the need for close cooperation between the battleship and the aircraft carrier." We will leave aside the intentions of I. Stalin at the time, which motivated him to order the building of an aircraft carrier. The most important point, in my view, was the understanding shared by honest Soviet military leaders, scientists, designers, and producers of the need to bolster the Soviet fleet with ships of this type. These ships, in their view, could substantially cut losses at sea—in particular losses of allied northern convoys that were supplying us with vitally needed cargo for the war.

Unfortunately, the strain of wartime and the lack of an opportunity for a calm and in-depth study of this matter took their toll on the way it was handled. Even before the war, our specialists, in my opinion, made a serious mistake in declining an offer from the American firm Gibbs and Cox. The design of a battleship-aircraft carrier that it intended to build for the Soviet Union was very attractive, and, moreover, the US government, after long hesitation, had nonetheless consented to the building of a ship for the USSR. But our specialists, led by I. Tevosyan and I. Isakov, with only the broad outlines at their disposal, were unable to grasp the ship's advantages. As a result, instead of that ship, the half-finished battleship *Lyuttsov* was bought from Germany.

Meanwhile, a Soviet-made aircraft carrier got off to a bad start as regards the choice of a design bureau during the war years. In September 1943, design work had hardly gotten under way when Central Design Bureau No. 4 was reorganized into the Central Design Bureau

for Standardization and the work on an aircraft carrier was halted. In 1944, the design work was turned over to Central Design Bureau No. 17, which had experience in designing cruisers. The bureau employed the well-known shipbuilders V. Nikitin and V. Ashik, as well as B. Chilikin, who had been transferred there. The preliminary blueprints were completed in November 1944.

But at that point Stalin's arbitrary ways came into play, and he in effect cancelled out the designers' work. At a conference Stalin called to discuss further naval construction, N. Kuznetsov proposed the construction of four large and small aircraft carriers. Stalin ordered the construction of two small ones. But not even the two small ones could be built. As it turned out, Stalin was not satisfied with the defensive missions intended for the aircraft carrier. As he was making big plans during those years to spread Soviet influence around the world, he preferred a fast-moving heavy "pirate cruiser" that could itself dictate the terms of naval warfare and maneuvering.

The Navy leadership, reluctant to give up its hopes of carrying out a program to build an aircraft carrier, continued to emphasize the defensive capabilities of that ship. It cannot be ruled out that the idea of building a light aircraft carrier that N. Kuznetsov and A. Golovko took to Stalin in 1952 again failed to meet with the generalissimo's support for precisely this reason.

Meanwhile, the experience of World War II demonstrated that the defensive capabilities of an aircraft carrier were one of the most important virtues of that ship. Carrying fighters aboard, it was capable of effectively providing cover on the open seas for formations of warships and transport convoys. We, however, lacking any capability to provide aviation cover far from our onshore airfields, lost a large number of ships to bombing and torpedo strikes by enemy aviation and minefields. On the Black Sea, for example, the leader Kharkov and the destroyers Besposhchadnyy and Sposobnyy were lost to strikes from enemy dive bombers in the vicinity of Feodosiya.

The defensive doctrine our country has adopted and the policy of the sovereign republics and the union center offer grounds to say with confidence that unthinking expenditures on defense needs will not continue. Moreover, this would be murderous for our ailing economy. Nevertheless, the logic of concern for our union's defense capability, considering that this task continues to confront our commonwealth of republics, requires that proper attention also be paid to the problem of developing aircraft-carrying ships. Having on hand a stock of completed scientific-technical and design research in this area—this approach, in my view, is completely compatible with both our economic capabilities and the needs of ensuring our defense capability. And I therefore believe that this work should continue on a basis of material outlays that our society can afford.

KGB Report on Security of Nuclear Arms

924P0003A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Oct 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Sergey Parkhomenko with an explanation by Vladimir Rubanov: "Control of the 'Nuclear Button' Is Slipping Away From the Union"]

[Text] This is said in a secret document "accidentally" distributed at an open meeting of deputies in the Kremlin. Accidentally?

"The country is rapidly going the way of Yugoslavia, repeating almost step for step the events that occurred there six months to a year ago..." This is a quotation not from a routine newspaper editorial and not from the words of a speaker at a mass meeting in Manezh Square. This quotation has been drawn from an official document, whose authorship originates in an authoritative and highly professional service of the USSR Committee for State Security. This quotation is a fragment of a political bombshell of colossal power which exploded last Tuesday in the Kremlin.

It is very hard correlating what happened with the very modest proportions of the event whose organizers involuntarily, as they would have people believe, set in motion the infernal machine. Approximately 100 deputies of the federal and republic level representing Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Moldova, Turkmenia and Tajikistan were gathered in the meeting hall of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The task facing the meeting of deputies was quite local: formulating in preliminary, purely advisory form the procedure of preparation for the opening of the session of the Union parliament formed in accordance with the new—"transitional"—plan. The brief discussion culminated in the adoption of a purely secondary document: a telegram to the chairmen of the republic supreme soviets proposing that they send to Moscow within two days' time their empowered representatives endowed with official mandates. They would draw up the provisional standing orders and the agenda and, incidentally, conclusively agree the date of the opening of the session if the days remaining until 8 October proved insufficient for them.

As far as the discussion was concerned, interest—highly specific, for that matter—was evoked only by a series of speeches of Union deputies immediately and pitilessly named in the lobbies "debris of the shipwreck." Approximately a dozen recent members of the USSR Supreme Soviet (and in a number of cases, members of its Presidium also) subjected to criticism which was equally exasperated and unintelligible the procedure of the formation of the Russian deputation in the "renewed" parliament. Yuriy Andreyev, a representative of the commission which had drawn up the preliminary lists of this deputation, assessed what was happening with the utmost candor: "The doubts as to the legitimacy of the new Supreme Soviet are more often than not concealing unhappiness with one's own nonelection...."

For this debate, which was of an entirely anecdotal—and certainly belated—nature, was developing at a moment when the deputies already had at hand the package of papers which had been distributed by an action committee and which was destined for a long time to disturb the small group of journalists present. Journalists precisely, inasmuch as the members of parliament themselves could not, it seemed, manage to find the time to look into the stack of papers which they had received prior to the start of the meeting.

And to no purpose. The headings of documents required if only a cursory glance for one to feel, if not excitement, curiosity, at a minimum: "Army-91: Principles of Military Reform in the USSR," "Military Budget Situation," "Reform of the Country's Security System," "The Problem of the Organization of Republic Armed Formations as a Result of the Political Disintegration of the USSR," "Creation of a Military-Political Alliance of States Which Were Former Members of the Soviet Union (Per the NATO Type)," "States' Succession and Urgently Needed International Actions," "The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in the Light of the Political Disintegration of the USSR," "Certain Aspects of the Military Activity of the Republics Under International Law," "Collective Security Treaty"....

It was obvious at first glance that these drafts, studies and pieces of information belonged to working documents of the Commission for Reform of the Security System headed by Academician Yuriy Ryzhov. We would note right away that the mere fact of their distribution at a purely "procedural" meeting is hard to explain politically. This was clearly not the time or place for them.

It was most likely simply a question of a number of active participants on the action committee—Vladimir Stadnik, who chaired the meeting of deputies, included—working with ardent enthusiasm on the "Ryzhov Commission" and being impatient, evidently, to demonstrate to their colleagues the results of their impetuous and fruitful activity. And, in addition, when so many tempting vacancies have opened up in the leadership of the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet, the gravitation toward such self-publicity is, generally, understandable...

But no such "quotidien considerations" can explain the appearance of the document which crowned the sensational package—the document entitled "Threats to Security and the Need for the Republics' Joint Actions." The information, signed "USSR KGB," makes an analysis of the political situation in the country which has taken shape since the smashing of the August rebellion. Adducing the parallel with Yugoslavia which is known to the readers, the authors of the information enumerate "factors of the increased threats to the security" of the USSR.

They distinguish in the "domestic sphere" of political life the following factors, in particular:

"...1. Despite the ongoing personnel shuffles in the top echelons, the highest positions in the localities are, as before, occupied by many functionaries who supported the Emergency Committee....

"2. Under the conditions of the concentration of the armed forces under the control of the Ministry of Defense the political leadership is not as yet obtaining objective and full information on the situation in the Army.... A no less dangerous situation is taking shape in the armed forces today than before the coup.

"There are indications of a lessening of control over the USSR's nuclear complex also. Many military facilities, strategic included, are not fully manned.

"3. There is disturbing evidence of the formation of a social environment for the appearance and rapid development of movements and political forces of a populist and even fascist persuasion.... At the same time, on the other hand, the process of the formation of political parties and the consolidation of movements of a liberal and reformist orientation is moving extremely slowly.

"4. The weakening of the mechanisms of power and the loss of the authority of the law is leading to an escalation of crime and terrorism, that of a transnational nature included. The country is being pulled into a network of international organized crime and drug trafficking....

"5. The process of disintegration of the structures of control of the economy, the ongoing slump in production...are being made worse by the crisis state of the credit and finance system, the depletion of gold and currency reserves, the upsetting of the balance of payments, given the large external debt of the former Union....

"The disintegration of the central structures of administration could lead to a weakening of the control of security in the nuclear power sphere.

"6. An explosive situation persists also in military industry, part of whose leadership was a principal driving force of the coup...."

The section ends with the strictly worded conclusion:

"The ongoing crisis in the domestic sphere could lead to anarchy and either to the return to the political arena of the forces which backed the coup or to the establishment in the republics of nationalist regimes of a populist, semi-fascist type."

The document goes on to talk about the "foreign policy aspect of the disintegration of the USSR":

"...1. The states which are taking shape could find themselves in international political isolation, if not hostile encirclement. The entire system of international security would be detonated....

"2. The question of strategic and other nuclear weapons is seen as one of the most important since the prospect of a loss of central control over these weapons is emerging as entirely realistic.

"3. Considerable problems will arise also in the sphere of conventional arms...if the newly formed states located in the European part of the USSR conceive a desire to have their own national guards or other types of armed formations, the limitations which have been established could thereby come to be exceeded....

"6. An exacerbation of the situation with the West could lead not only to military-political but also foreign policy isolation. This process is already developing today in practice, but for economic reasons as yet.... The disintegration of the economic space and political instability will palpably weaken in the West the positions of those who intended investing capital in our economy...."

We ascertained from the members of the "Ryzhov Commission" present at the meeting that the signature "USSR KGB" on the document was, at least, inaccurate. Neither the USSR KGB Board nor its chairman, Vadim Bakatin, had had anything to do with the compilation of the information and, possibly, were not even familiar with its content. The true authorship belongs to a group of experts from the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute, the USSR Academy of Sciences Europe Institute and the USSR KGB Analysis Directorate headed by Colonel Vladimir Rubanov which had worked together with the Commission for Reform of the Security System.

The information had been prepared approximately a week ago and had been sent to the "Ryzhov Commission" in strict confidence. The duplication of the text in a quantity of almost 200 copies and the distribution of an essentially secret document in a general package at an open parliamentary meeting are considered by these experts to be a stupid mistake and accident. Even "Stadnik's joke," perhaps.

Yet it is no joking matter. One does not need to have a lurid imagination to see to what extent the appearance of such an analysis could alarm the USSR's Western partners which are today with difficulty feeling their way toward new principles of relations with the state formations which are taking shape within the boundaries of the Union. One could be almost certain that the reaction to virtually official acknowledgments that Moscow had lost control over the military-industrial complex, the command staff of the armed forces and—no more, no less—over the Soviet "nuclear button" would be extremely painful and fraught with general panic in both political and business circles of the developed countries. The imaginary authorship of the USSR KGB (entirely?) could make a strong impression here: It imparts to the well-known "alarmist" assessments an entirely different status...

The situation is further complicated by the fact that the document darted out of the safes just a few days after the U.S. President had put forward unprecedented initiatives in the sphere of disarmament signifying—according to competent assessments—nothing other than a renunciation of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Yet the Kremlin's official response to George

Bush's statement remains extremely vapid: the top military circles are, as usual, remaining silent, and Mikhail Gorbachev's intentionally laconic observations on this score force us to suspect the Soviet leadership of confusion.

Let us be candid: We cannot, in any event, as of the present moment be certain that the business concerning the "Threats to Security..." information is not a provocation. A truly skillful and jesuitically cruel provocation, what is more.

If, however, it is really a question of the airiness, negligence or maladroitness of enthusiastic deputies, we have to affirm that commonplace dilettantes have once again come to be in dangerous proximity to power in the country.

Vladimir Rubanov Explanation a Day Later

Vladimir Rubanov, chief of the USSR KGB Analysis Directorate, commented yesterday at the request of the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent on the situation which had taken shape following the meeting in the Kremlin.

Vladimir Rubanov declared that the signature "USSR KGB" on the analysis "Threats to Security and the Need for the Republics' Joint Actions" was under no circumstances legitimate. The document was prepared by a group of experts from academy institutes brought in by the Committee for State Security and Yuriy Ryzhov's parliamentary commission. Only the final section of the

text, which sets forth the general concept of an inter-republic collective security treaty, may be attributed to direct authorship of the Analysis Directorate. The formulation and signing of such a treaty, in Rubanov's opinion, could be republics' necessary and natural reaction in response to the growth of political tension in the country. "Our position," he continued, "is that of specialists who would like primarily to warn the leaders of the republics against unprofessional decisions and point out to them the existing danger of involuntarily disrupting the terms of international law and finding themselves in isolation, to which lack of due consideration of the evolved legal circumstances could lead."

The high-ranking leader of the USSR KGB confirmed also that the document had been made public solely because of a "tragic and annoying" misunderstanding which had occurred in the USSR Supreme Soviet administrative system, but "this misunderstanding itself could now be used by certain forces to strengthen their political positions which have been shaken of late and to undermine the authority of professional analysts."

The confidential nature of the report was connected primarily with the fact that "this text was essentially a shaping block"—an intermediate, incomplete and unedited version "used to produce a concept of a collective security treaty." And this alone explains the presence therein of a number of "unduly emotional" passages and interpretations akin to the parallel with the Yugoslavia situation. "You cannot," Rubanov concluded his statement, "pull a half-done loaf from the oven and take umbrage at the fact that it is insufficiently baked. And this document was not even a loaf, merely dough...."

Alternative Service Viewed In Context Of Reforms
92UM0070A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Oct 91 First edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel K. Stbolygin: "Military Reform—Viewing a Problem: What Can We Expect from Alternative Service?"]

[Text] Belorussian Military District—One indication of a state governed by the rule of law is the existence in it of a system of alternative service. For a long time we did without such a system and to a certain extent because of this we gained notoriety as an uncivilized country. Today an active search is under way for forms and models of such service suitable for our country. I too want to continue the discussion begun by the article "Alternative Service?" that appeared in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for October 12, 1991, and to call readers' attention to my view of the problem under discussion.

One of the models being proposed for analysis is the model of alternative service now in effect in a number of Western countries, such as Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland. Another is the model of alternative service that was in effect in our state in the early years of Soviet rule. For brevity's sake, the first model can tentatively be called the "Western" model, and the second the "Soviet" model. What are their basic differences?

The Western model is distinguished first of all by a broader spectrum of convictions of conscience owing to which alternative service may be substituted for military service. For example, in Germany, where the practice of alternative service dates back to 1961, Germans can decline to serve in the Bundeswehr on religious, philosophical, ethical, and other grounds. In order for an objecting conscript to exercise the right to perform alternative service, the "objector" presents the reasons for his refusal before a special body. In the event his reasons are found to be valid, this body takes the final decision on substituting alternative service for military service. In Germany, this body is the federal department for alternative service, in Austria, the commission on alternative service. The probability that the request of a conscript who is unwilling to take up arms will be granted is very high in the Western countries. According to German statistics, 90 percent of all "objectors" are given the right to perform alternative service. In other words, almost every conscript who is unwilling to perform military service is allowed to substitute civilian duty for it. Alternative service in most of the aforementioned Western countries is characterized by a longer period than that required by military service. This difference is three months in Germany, 12 months in France.

In our country, alternative service legally existed from 1918 through 1939. In reality, however, it existed for a significantly shorter period, since religious convictions, much less religious convictions that reject the armed defense of the socialist fatherland, were not compatible with our ideology. The fundamental difference between

the Soviet model of alternative service and the Western model consisted in that a person could be exempted from military obligation only on religious grounds. Furthermore, beginning in 1923 the number of religious sects whose members had the right to alternative service was strictly limited. The Soviet model was also distinguished by the fact that the final decision on the need and possibility of substituting alternative service for military service was taken by a people's court, and the term of service did not exceed that of military service.

The Soviet model, then, envisioned a narrower range of applicants for alternative service. In addition, the process of verifying the motivations of "objectors" was a much more rigorous and comprehensive one. The right of substitution was granted only to those who could present the court with not only a well-reasoned statement of objection, but also compelling evidence that his religious convictions were incompatible with bearing and using arms. There are no precise figures on the ratio of total "objectors" to the number who were granted the right to perform alternative service in our country. However, one can say with certainty that the percentage was lower than that in Western countries today. At the same time, the Soviet government's decision to exempt some conscripts from military service was a very progressive step. The foreign press wrote with admiration at the time of the great humanism of Soviet rule.

Since then, many Western countries have taken several steps forward in matters of alternative service, as a result of which the Western model of such service arose. We, by contrast, after having taken a step forward in this direction in 1919 and moving ahead of the West, then took exactly the same step backward. It would seem that today, at a time when democratic changes are gaining momentum in our country, the possibility has arisen of again taking a step forward in ensuring citizens' genuine freedom of conscience, including through the legalization of alternative service. But in this regard, it seems to me that we need to consider the following: What are the potential consequences of legalizing, say, its Western model in the near future?

In my view, these consequences could be as follows: First, the manpower shortage that the Armed Forces are experiencing would increase. The work load on those who nevertheless do perform regular compulsory service will increase accordingly. Second, a number of ministries, departments, and executive bodies at the local level will seek to use persons performing alternative service to solve their own problems. Third, the need and importance of providing for the armed defense of our motherland will be eroded in the eyes of young people. Let me cite a few facts. During the first three years of World War II, the czarist authorities in Russia convicted 837 members of religious sects on charges of refusing to bear arms. After the Soviet government legalized exemption from compulsory military duty on religious grounds, up to 40,000 cases of refusals to perform military service on religious grounds were registered during an approximately three-year period (mostly during the Civil War

years). In other words, under relatively equal conditions of military service, the introduction of alternative service was followed by an increase in members of a number of religious sects who were unwilling to go into the army of approximately 40 times!

Even today, in Latvia, for example, prior to the adoption of its declaration of independence, there were 86 persons who refused to serve in the Soviet Army for reasons of conscience. But after Latvia adopted a law on alternative service in early 1991, the number of persons performing alternative service rose to almost 8,770! The number of "objectors" increased 100 times! One can hardly attribute this figure solely to an unwillingness to serve in the Soviet Army, which had been declared a foreign army in Latvia, as the "objectors" included even sons of Soviet servicemen.

Incidentally, the problem of growing numbers of "objectors" is also urgent in several Western countries. There were 340 persons performing alternative service in Germany in 1961. Today they number 74,000. The increase in the number of youths who want to perform alternative service is obvious—a number that has increased by more than 200 times in the 30 years of its existence.

The facts indicate, then, that the introduction of the Western alternative service model in our country would most likely lead to a very rapid increase in the number of persons performing alternative service. Moreover, this increase will mostly consist not of conscripts who are genuinely forbidden to bear arms for reasons of conscience, but by those who, exploiting such convictions, are unwilling to serve in the army for reasons of another sort (fear of hazing and military discipline, separation from home, and fear of the rigors and hardships of military service and the hope that they will be absent from alternative service). Will the Armed Forces (united forces, joint forces, or even republic forces) be able to manage without a sizable segment of new recruits who opt for alternative service?

I foresee that not all will agree with my prediction, as they will take the view that by introducing rigid criteria, we will be able to prevent a sizable increase in the number of conscripts performing alternative service. But let us consider this question: On the basis of what criteria will the decision be made as to the validity of the declaration of one or another "objector"? What criteria will make it possible to prove the existence and authenticity of a given conscientious objection? And what do we do about pacifist, ethical, and other reasons of conscience? After all, even if we succeed in finding experts on these convictions, they will be forced all the same to essentially use only the word of the objector himself as the basis for their decision. I think this is precisely why in the West too, virtually all who request the right to alternative service are granted it. Thus, attempts to use the formulation of some sort of criteria to hold down the anticipated increase in numbers of persons performing alternative service and to verify the sincerity of their reasons of conscience could prove to be merely an illusion.

As for efforts by a number of ministries and departments, union and republic alike, and executive bodies to use people performing alternative service as a way of solving their own problems, here it is appropriate to draw an analogy with the notorious "construction battalions" of various ministries and departments—which still exist, despite all efforts to the contrary. The practice and consequences of their use have been and are being sufficiently discussed in the periodical press. With the introduction of alternative service, these construction units will be replaced—or perhaps supplemented—by teams of alternative service workers. But the problems will be the same—maximum use of these units for the heaviest, most unskilled jobs, instead of keeping such work to a minimum, mechanizing manual labor, and creating in our country the new jobs it so badly needs at a time of unemployment. To this we must add the possibility that local executive bodies, should they be given the right to take the decision on allowing conscripts to perform alternative service, will, under the weight of unfilled low-prestige jobs, most likely be interested in increasing the number of persons performing alternative service than reducing it. In other words, local and departmental interests could prevail over the interests of the state as a whole.

And finally as regards this aspect of the problem: the influence of alternative service, and its Western model in particular, on the readiness of young people to ensure the armed defense of their fatherland. Allow me to cite certain historical parallels here too. When the decree of January 4, 1919, on exemption from military service on religious grounds took effect, the number of religious sects that included in their teachings a prohibition against the use of arms by their members began to grow. Propaganda against the use of violence to oppose evil intensified accordingly. It is clear that today too, the introduction of a law on alternative service along Western lines would lead to the appearance and increase in the number of various organizations professing and actively propagandizing a negative attitude toward all instances of bearing and using arms. As a result, we would end up with a sizable number of young men who reject the need to provide for the armed defense of the fatherland. And this need, as we know, has by no means faded away.

What is the solution? The fundamental solution lies in reconciling our desire with our current possibilities. And if we cannot introduce the Western model of alternative service at this time, the Soviet model—alternative service solely on religious grounds—is quite acceptable and possible, it seems to me, at the level of the Union as a whole and any of the sovereign republics. In this event, we will rely on our own experience. Most importantly, exemption from military service on religious grounds in the Union as a whole is requested by about 600 conscripts each year. Of course, this figure too will increase following the adoption of a law on alternative service. But it will be far less than if we were to legalize alternative service for all reasons of conscience (the Western model).

The introduction of alternative service solely on religious grounds obviously will not rid us of attempts by some conscripts to evade military service by hiding behind false religious convictions. However, the likelihood of determining whether a conscript has genuine religious convictions that are incompatible with military service would nevertheless appear greater than in the case, say, of a pacifist conscript, if only because there is experience in making such expert determinations from the early years of Soviet rule. It is of no less importance that the introduction of the Soviet model of alternative service would be a kind of experiment that would allow us to refine in practice a mechanism for implementing a future law on alternative service for all reasons of conscience. In the final analysis, such a gradual approach to the introduction of the Western model of alternative service would enable us to avoid doing harm to both the Armed Forces and the state as a whole. And we needn't be so afraid of trailing behind other countries in the area of alternative service. After all, there are other countries besides the USSR where refusal to perform military service for reasons of conscience is punishable by deprivation of freedom.

Report On Planned Military Media Reform

92UM0068A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Oct 91 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Article by TASS Correspondent R. Zadunayskiy: "On Reforming Military Mass Media"]

[Text] Moscow, October 24—The former leaders of the USSR Armed Forces did not acknowledge the press as the "fourth estate" and assigned a secondary, strictly monitored role even to newspapers and journals founded by the USSR Ministry of Defense. To prevent this situation from recurring in the future, the Defense Ministry commission on abolishing military-political agencies has devoted much attention to drawing up proposals on creating an effective structure of army and navy mass media. At a session today the commission approved a concept submitted by a working group for modernizing military mass media.

According to the concept, military mass media in their previous form will not be able to function effectively under a market economy since obsolete work patterns predominate. Most importantly, the USSR Law "On the Press and Other Mass Media" is not being implemented in the army and navy: Editorial staffs, lacking bank accounts, will not be able to carry out production and economic activities on the basis of economic independence and economic accountability or to provide incentives for creative work by journalists. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that editorial staffs of registered publications are able to exercise all the rights granted by the law (the status of juridical person, the right to act as cofounder of a publication, a financial account, the carrying out of financial-economic activities, and so forth) and to repeal or amend orders and directives of the USSR Defense Minister that limit the professional independence of editorial staffs and their rights in

deciding organizational and staff matters and in carrying on financial-economic activity. All expenditures for military mass media are to be allocated under a Defense Ministry budgetary line-item (during the transition period, editorial staffs are to be financed on the basis of a USSR Defense Ministry estimate with fixed distribution of profits made by creative collectives from advertising and commercial activities; subsequently, profitable publications are to be shifted to economic accountability and self-financing). In addition, it is necessary to equip military mass media editorial staffs with modern editing and publishing facilities, which will make it possible to fundamentally alter the journalists' working conditions, to accelerate the process of putting out publications, and to determine the optimal size of editorial staffs.

On this basis, the commission proposes that the publication of mass publications (the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and the journal SOVETSKIY VOIN) be continued. The expediency of the operation of other military publications (SYN OTECHESTVA and journals of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, the branches of the USSR Armed Forces, and the main and central directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense), their conversion, the termination of their publication, or the opening of new newspapers and journals is to be decided on the basis of the results of 1992 subscriptions, with due regard for expert appraisals and the material and financial situation of the founder.

A viable system of military mass media has to have access to current information. Therefore, it is proposed to create, on a cofounded basis, a military news agency known as VOYENINFORM for the distribution within the country and abroad of printed, computer-transmitted, televised, radiocast, and photo information on military subjects. The technical and creative facilities of the joint military-political editorial staff of TASS and of the joint editorial staff for military-political issues of IAN and INTERVOYENINFORM, under the USSR Defense Ministry Information Directorate, are to serve as the basis for the news agency's establishment.

The army and navy will not be able to march in step with the times without an integrated system of Armed Forces television and radio broadcasting. Therefore, it is proposed to set up an audiovisual system to include the central television and radio studio of the Defense Ministry (constituted jointly of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company's Department of Military Editors and Consultants, which is the artistic/literary section, and the Television and Radio Broadcasting Department, which is the technical section), the Navy television center, the television centers of military districts, groups of forces, and fleets, the television centers and radio facilities of military educational institutions, military units, and ships, and also the press service network of the Armed Forces.

The commission approved a proposal to the effect that training of personnel for military mass media can be carried out by the journalism department of the USSR

Defense Ministry Humanities Academy, as well as by civilian higher educational institutions on a contractual basis.

As Mikhail Nenashev, head of the commission's group for reforming information services in the USSR Armed Forces, reported, these proposals were discussed both in the RSFSR Ministry of Information and with editorial collective officials. A great many letters were received from military journalists with specific proposals. The basic thrust of all the proposals was that the military mass media will not acquire real independence without a shift to economic accountability. Proposals have already been drawn up with regard to the organization of production and economic activities by military mass media for the issuance of a corresponding directive by the USSR Defense Minister. But these proposals have met with objections from the USSR Defense Ministry Central Finance Directorate. In addition, M. Nenashev pointed out that in the commission's view, the new system of military mass media will require renewal of their leadership, the promotion of young and energetic journalists, and reorganization of the USSR Defense Ministry Information Directorate.

Report On 'Military-Industrial Investment Company'

92UM0094A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
01 Nov 91 First edition p 4

[Article by M. Rebrov: "What Does the Abbreviation VPIK Stand for?"]

[Text] Military-Industrial Investment Company [VPIK], the new joint stock company, widely declared itself for the first time on-board the snow-white liner Lev Tolstoy which, having left the capital's North River port, nearly noiselessly glided along the cold autumn water. The first questions which "were hurled" at Directors Council Chairman S. Petrov, Chief Director V. Doguzhiyev, and Directors Council Members V. Verezhnyy, Yu. Matsak, and V. Surikov sounded like this: "The new company—is it a receiver of the already famous VPK [Military-Industrial Complex]?", "Is this an attempt to preserve the military-industrial complex under a new sign-board?", and "What are the company's goals and tasks?"

The press conference organizers responded with a categorical "no" to the first two questions. The conversation proceeded in a more detailed and specific manner about

the joint stock company's goals and tasks. We all know that the country's military expenditures are formed from assets that are expended for the maintenance of the army and navy, the purchase of weapons and military equipment, and also for NIOKR [Scientific-research and experimental-design work]. Today we talk a lot about the reduction of these billions, with reasonable sufficiency, and the reduction may primarily affect the "second item." However, the realities are such that the reduction of purchases "will hit" defense enterprises and that enormous army of workers, engineers, and designers who are employed in this sector. The new company intends to invest its resources in highly profitable defense and civilian enterprises, projects, and scientific-technical programs to increase the goods mass in the market, about which we talk so much today—some with hope and some with alarm. However both these and the others in the depth of their souls understand that we do not have another way out of this crisis.

The defense sector also produces an enormous volume of civilian products. Televisions and telephones, household appliances and instruments, bicycles and cars, and many other things, more than 52 percent of total production, are produced by its enterprises.

The frank conversation at the presentation of the new VPIK Joint Stock Company touched upon many problems—organizational, structural, and financial—the primary of which is—how to rationally utilize the sector's intellectual potential (yes, and its space industry, too), its technology, know-how, etc., with maximum effectiveness to produce consumer goods and equipment for the light, food, medical, and other industries. It is not a question of increasing the output of "pots" but of a search for really "wise and rational solutions."

Military-Industrial Exchange, Russian National Commercial Bank, TsNII [Central Scientific Research Institute] Machine Building, The Machine Building Plant imeni M.V. Khrunichev, "Impuls" NPO [Scientific Production Association], the Military Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, Taganskiy Aviation Scientific-Technical Complex imeni G.M. Beryiev, Geosoft Soviet-Austrian Joint Venture, and other organizations and enterprises are among the company's founders.

Military-Industrial Investment Company is a credit-financing institution in the form of an open joint-stock company with an announced charter fund of one billion rubles. Anyone can acquire stock.

Reserve Officers To Receive Business Training

92UM0093A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Nov 91 First edition p 2

[Interview with "Rossiya" Association Chairman V. Korchagin and Russian Commercial Academy Rector N. Popov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel N. Poroskov: "From Officers into Businessmen: Why Not Try?"]

[Text] Our newspaper has already reported on RSFSR President B.N. Yeltsin's decision to create the All-Russian Reserve Officers Retraining Center. Not only state structures but also certain independent, private organizations are concerned about the fates of yesterday's military personnel. For example, "Rossiya" Association is organizing one week courses for beginning businessman, among whom the organizers hope will also be reserve officers. Our correspondent's conversation with "Rossiya" Association Chairman V. Korchagin and Russian Commercial Academy Rector N. Popov was about goals and course structure.

[Poroskov] First of all, if you can, please say a few words about "Rossiya" Association.

[Korchagin] Essentially, the Association is an all-union organization of cooperatives. Furthermore, it consists of both state and small enterprises. The Association was established in 1988, is a juridical person, has independent balance, current, and other accounts in banks and operates based on total cost accounting.

Knowing about the negative attitude that a large number of our fellow citizens have toward cooperatives, I will attempt to challenge the bias directed toward us through the example of our practice.

An intelligent man and inventor could not implement his idea for a long time—to develop a small brick-producing plant. One of our enterprises took the idea for realization and it is now flourishing. And this is not the only case.

[Poroskov] Why are successful cooperators creating competitors for themselves?

[Popov] We are setting the revival of the Russian nation as our goal. One of the elements of this process—is the revival of the economy through national cadres. Today the best part of our people's gene fund is in the army. These are educated, sober-thinking, disciplined, and punctual people. But the Armed Forces are being reduced and people are at times being left with nothing to do. And we want to help them.

[Poroskov] For example, it is difficult for me to imagine yesterday's company-grade officer, or say, a radar complex engineer, in the role of a businessman....

[Korchagin] An officer should not be afraid of that. For example, today, what is a small commercial bank? There are more than 15,000 of them in the United States. They are, as a rule, family banks consisting of several people,

enterprises—for financing farmers and small production. Yesterday's officer has to primarily become involved with organizational work and he will assign an experienced bookkeeper to perform accounting operations.

Now, take conversion. Why, say, are people, who at times hardly understand them, involved with the sales and reworking of military non-disposables, equipment, materials, and components of those same missiles that have been destroyed? There are also small enterprises where a military engineering school diploma is entirely acceptable, at publishing houses—military-political....

We must not forget: Today the person who has banks, exchanges, etc., also manages the economy and, consequently, controls policy. While preparing former officers for this sphere, we are impeding the penetration into it of destructive, predatory elements for whom the word Rodina [Homeland] is an empty sound.

[Poroskov] But nevertheless it is hard to believe that you will be able to train a businessman in a week. You can even be suspected of adventurism and the desire to extract dividends in the currently fashionable campaign.

[Korchagin] Tell me, why would we, without exaggeration, a well-to-do organization, heap abuse upon ourselves—for courses for which we are charging a purely symbolic tuition. Yes, the set of documentation alone that is needed to organize one's own business and which we give to each of our graduates costs more.

It would distress me if such suspicions arise. Have we really all so "compromised" ourselves that we see only naked pragmatism and we totally exclude concern about the future of the Fatherland and about our dear ones? In Russia, philanthropy and patronage of the arts were always an honor.

Today I know that there are already quite a few discharged officers among businessmen. Many of them are acting blindly. And if they attain results, then through what efforts and nerves and how many obstacles have they overcome along the way!

I can list a dozen other workers who are at the head of small enterprises. In contrast to officers, they do not have a higher education but they are doing business.

Of course, we are not providing fundamental knowledge. The compressed time periods have been caused by the shortage of business people. Certainly not all of our graduates will immediately start their own businesses. Those who feel a taste and ability for commerce will continue their educations. So the courses—are a sort of a litmus test—we need to give people the opportunity to test themselves.

[Poroskov] What disciplines will the students study?

[Popov] The fundamentals of market economics, marketing, bookkeeping and accounting, the legal foundations of business, finance, and organization of a small business. We will offer students these specializations:

Banking, insurance, trade, engineering, publishing.... The student will select just precisely what he will study.

[Poroskov] I am curious, specifically what can yesterday's military personnel become after having taken the courses?

[Popov] Having obtained the minimum required knowledge depending on their specialization, our graduates will be able to work for insurance companies, exchanges, or trading houses, small enterprises, publishing houses, and private newspapers.

[Korchagin] I would like to be more specific: we are preparing people who plan to organize precisely their own business. The courses are the first step on the path to commerce, a sort of impetus or impulse. The studies will have a practical direction, without excessive theorizing or abstractions: how to open an account at the bank, how to register an enterprise, and how to set up press production. We will teach them how to orient themselves to definitions: balance, calculation, credit, payment authorization, and so forth.

[Poroskov] Do you intend to issue any sort of document on completing the courses?

[Korchagin] Yes, we will issue a certificate. Those people who have completed the courses will be afforded the opportunity to join the Association of Russian Businessmen in the future—to receive assistance (credit, materials) to organize their own businesses and further cooperation.

Holders of our diplomas have the right to enter the Russian Commercial Academy correspondence department without competing. The course length is two years.

[Popov] There are no "pure" theoreticians among our teachers—only business people. A student can already during his studies or immediately after them submit a request to organize a cooperative, insurance company,

private newspaper, or small enterprise to the appropriate state organs.... Maybe, territorially, at the military garrison where the released officer has an apartment.

[Korchagin] We will teach our students, as they say, to make money. I will point out—not from nothing. I am even certain that some will become millionaires with time. Incidentally, we also invite you. Maybe, later you will complain that, while associating with businessmen, you preferred a bird in the hand to two in the bush.

[Poroskov] So, what does one need to do to take the courses?

[Korchagin] One of the primary conditions—is a higher education, Party membership does not play a role. To enroll in the courses, you need to submit an application to the rector of the Russian Commercial Academy indicating your last name, first name, patronymic, age, nationality, education, work place (or unemployed), mailing address, and telephone number. The request should also indicate the time period (week) when it will be convenient for you to come to Moscow for the courses and also the date you send the tuition payment.

We request that applications be sent via registered mail to the following address: P.O. Box 7, Moscow, 127247. Send the tuition payment, 100 rubles, to "Rossiya" Association to: "Rossiya" Association, Account No. 466901 at First Investment Commercial Bank, Moscow, MFO 201274.

In our reply to the application received, we will tell you the day, hour, and location of the classes, and the address and telephone number of the cooperative hotel. Expenses for residing at the hotel and for food are not included in the tuition payment. Come to Moscow for the courses only upon receipt of a written invitation and during the time periods indicated in it.

Come. Those who come will master the road.

Fall 1956 Events in Hungary Outlined

92UM0104A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Nov 91 First edition p 3

[Article by V. Fomin, military historian: "Budapest: Fall of '56"]

[Text] At this time 35 years ago tragic events unfolded in Hungary, into which Soviet forces were drawn. They were initiated by shots fired near the Hungarian Radio building during the evening of 23 October. The leaders of the Hungarian People's Republic at that time refused to broadcast the 14-point demands made by demonstrators who had taken to the streets. They included a protest against the nation's growing democratization, the impetus for which was provided by the exposure of the "Stalin cult" in the Soviet Union. Budapest residents demanded an end to the lawlessness, restoration of law and order and social justice, improvement of the people's standard of living and an end to the long presence of Soviet troops on Hungarian territory. Unable to count on its own forces, the Hungarian government appealed to Moscow for military assistance....

Today, at the legal level in the Hungarian Republic that period is officially proclaimed a "revolution and a liberation struggle," although many Hungarians do not agree with this assessment. There are also no doubt among us here those who disagree. The historical assessment, however—whether it was a "revolution," a "popular uprising" or something else—was made by the Hungarians themselves. It is our duty, though, to acknowledge unequivocally that the Soviet Union's intervention in the Hungarian events of 1956 was contrary to international law and therefore deserves unconditional condemnation, and it was recently given that by the President of the USSR.

The following comments by V. Fomin, currently military historian and former officer with the Soviet Army's Special Corps, do not claim to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 1956 events, but they do comprise an important component without which the picture of those events would be incomplete.

Following the Conversation With Andropov

We received the order to bring in troops from Defense Minister G. Zhukov during the evening of 28 October. It occurred approximately 2 hours after a telephone conversation between Gen P. Lyashchenko, corps commander, and Yu. Andropov. The ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary conveyed a request from the Hungarian government for assistance in maintaining order in Budapest. The corps commander replied that he would not "move a single soldier one step" without an order from Moscow. Col V. Fikus, chief of the corps political section and present during that conversation, told me about it.

Vladimir Maksimovich expressed the hope, albeit it slight, that such an order would not come. And not simply because we had other missions. Nothing good

could come of intervention by foreign troops. In addition, according to a report from Gen Mikes, commander of a nearby Hungarian rifle corps, one of his regiments had already been dispatched to Budapest. Unfortunately, however, NATO's hopes that there would be no order to put Soviet troops into Budapest proved unjustified....

Between 11:00 and 12:00, Moscow time, a column of Gaziks from the corps staff's operations group set out from Szekesfehervar for Budapest.

The Order Was Not to Open Fire First

Upon arriving in Budapest we moved into one floor of the building housing the General Staff of the Hungarian People's Army. We learned that the Hungarian police had essentially stopped performing their job. Receiving no orders from higher up, the Hungarian People's Army was in a crisis. The mechanized regiment sent to Budapest by Mikes had no ammunition, and the internal and state security forces could not cope with their duties. The streets were taken over by armed groups, dominated, unfortunately, by national extremists.

Not just activists of Hungary's ruling party, but also state security workers and Soviet servicemen became the targets of their terrorist activities. Ordered not to open fire first and amiably inclined toward the local population, they were frequent victims of shots fired from ambush, grenades tossed from armored personnel carriers or Molotov cocktails. Just in the area of the Ministry of Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic, where our operations group was located, 189 of our soldiers were treated by the medical unit between 24 and 30 October, 90 of whom died of serious wounds (compared with 40 Hungarian servicemen treated, one of whom died of his wounds).

The first combat subunit to arrive in Budapest—approximately an hour after our arrival—was a motorcycle company from the tank regiment. By then the corps commander had received numerous requests from Hungarian government and party organs to liberate buildings captured by the insurgents, including SZABAD NEP (FREE PEOPLE), Hungarian Radio, and others.

Who Fired Shots Near the Ministry of Defense Building

That morning Litvinov's mechanized regiment arrived from Szekesfehervar. The corps commander ordered it moved to the area of the Ministry of Defense. Returning from a mission in the corps commander's armored vehicle, I came under fire. The automatic round peppered the side of the armored personnel carrier. Shots were fired at an apartment building near the buildings housing the military department. A heavy armored personnel carrier with an antiaircraft machine gun guarding them fired three short rounds at the attackers. A group of officers of the Hungarian People's Army set out to capture the assailants.

Approximately a half-hour later, in one of the ministry basements, I saw the papers of the detainees. There were about 30 of them, most of them youth below the age of 20, and many teenagers. I was able to converse with two of them, 16 year-old workers employed as assistant bricklayers at a construction project. They had been captured with their weapons, whereas the others had succeeded in getting rid of theirs when the group appeared to take them. Both of them were from the country, earned good wages and had no complaints against the authorities.

These youths, of course, were not the determining force in the events, which began as a civil confrontation but rapidly turned into an antigovernment action and developed into open armed confrontation. I also spoke with those who openly expressed blatant hostility toward the existing authorities, particularly the party bosses in the Rakosi-Gero clique. Extremists had the main role not just in whipping up nationalistic hysteria but also in the creation of hotbeds of armed conflict. The most prominent of these were the Corvin Cinema block, which got its name from a theater near the intersection of Yullen [as transliterated] Avenue and Jozsef Boulevard. Its round building was located in a courtyard enclosed by blocks of high-rise apartment buildings. Its proximity with other armed groups operating in the vicinity and its contacts with barracks in which Hungarian construction battalions were housed made the area extremely dangerous militarily.

Hungary's Leaders Alter Their Position: Moscow, "Yes" and "No"

Large losses were suffered precisely here by Gen Obaturov's mechanized division, which arrived in Budapest during the evening of 25 October from our Separate Army in Romania. Somewhat later another division, located until then in the Soviet Union, entered the city to reinforce the corps units. The instability of the situation in Hungary was the signal for our military-political leaders to bring two armies into Hungary from the Carpathian Military District: Gen Mamsurov's combined-arms army and Gen Babadzhanian's tank army. Their mission was to cover the border and prevent aggression from the West, thereby securing the rear of Soviet forces operating in Budapest.

Events in the Hungarian capital developed in such a way, however, that on 28 October the government of Imre Nagy raised the issue of the removal of our troops from the city. Formed on a coalition basis, it had altered its assessment of what was occurring in the city and in the nation as a whole. The Hungarian Workers' Party, by then headed by Janos Kadar, defined the events as a "national-democratic" movement of the popular masses. Moscow's representatives in Budapest at that time supported this decision. Furthermore, the Soviet government announced in a 30 October statement that it was "...prepared to enter into talks with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and the governments of other Warsaw Pact states regarding the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary."

I served as a translator at those talks on 3 November 1956. To my surprise, they were actually held without representatives of the other Warsaw Pact nations. Even their purpose, it was learned later, was defined entirely differently by our leadership. The Soviet and Hungarian delegations held two sessions that day. At the second, which was held late in the evening at our military post near the community of Tekel [as transliterated], the Hungarian delegation was arrested by an operations group of the Soviet KGB headed by Gen Serofim, then its chairman.

The second introduction of troops of the Special Corps into Budapest began with the onset of night on 4 November 1956. It was executed from areas to where its formations and units had been moved on 29-31 October. This decision, it was later learned, was made by N. Khrushchev following consultations with leaders of the communist and workers' parties of the Warsaw Pact nations. Like him, they were frightened by the development of events in Hungary toward the end of October. In the loss of authority by the Hungarian Workers' Party, the proclamation of a multiparty system and the declaration of Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact they saw not only a threat to the "socialist choice" in Hungary but also the beginning of the collapse of the military-political alliance.

The Election of Janos Kadar

Also contributing to this decision, I believe, were the rampaging of extremist elements on the streets of Budapest, the routing of the party gorkom, the barbaric reprisals taken against its defenders, and the arrest of communists and other activists of the existing system. All of this seriously disturbed such leaders of the Hungarian communist movement as Janos Kadar and Ferenc Münnich. During the evening of 3 November they left Budapest and came to our military post at Taposzele Airfield. J. Kadar initiated the establishment of a new government, which supported Khrushchev's decision to destroy the AVO, who were declared to be "counterrevolutionaries."

The order to conduct the operation was received by Gen P. Lyashchenko at Szolnok from Mar I. Konev, commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. The corps was reinforced with artillery and airborne troops for its active combat operations in Budapest. For 7 days, from 4 to 10 November, an artillery cannonade resounded in the city. During this time the hotspots of armed resistance were eliminated, the government of Imre Nagy fell, and Janos Kadar assumed leadership of the nation.

It is my firm conviction, however, that all of this was not worth the blood shed in Hungary at the end of October and the beginning of November 1956. According to Hungarian figures, almost 2,000 people died in Budapest, and more than 19,000 were wounded. Our losses have still not been made public. This remains to be done. And they were considerable. According to my calculations more than 2,000 were killed. The Hungarian events themselves will always be for me, a participant in them, a tragedy of two peoples, both Hungarian and Soviet.

Observations on Declining Threat From NATO

92UM0113A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "NATO—A Union of Sovereign States"]

[Text] The military-political situation in Europe has changed in the most fundamental way, and the role of NATO is changing along with it. The flexible political and military structures of NATO which have taken shape and developed over 40 some years have in no way collapsed, but rather are engaged at present in drawing up a new strategy. The final decisions will be made by 7 November, the beginning of the top-level meeting of NATO member nations. But formulation of a definitive decision depends not only on the nation participants, but on the position of that state formation which, by reason of inertia, is called the USSR.

Accordingly, they are doing everything possible in Brussels to receive and attentively hear out all Soviet delegations which arrive there, insofar as the possible intentions of the former probable, and now potential enemy (still a nuclear superpower, albeit a weakened one) will determine, as was previously the case, NATO's defensive doctrine at the end of the present century and beginning of the next.

The delegation of the Soviet Committee for European Security, headed by chairman V. Zagladin (adviser to President Gorbachev), has not had official status, but all the same included representatives of the General Staff, the Russian Committee on Defense, the Union and Russian ministries of internal affairs, as well as certain other fairly authoritative organizations. Meeting with the delegation during a short (8-12 October) visit were the first deputy general secretary of NATO, deputies of the NATO general secretary on political and scientific issues, and "other responsible officials" of the North Atlantic alliance.

The leaders of the North Atlantic alliance, representatives of the NATO member nations, do not today consider the USSR a probable enemy and are no longer afraid of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe. However, the "residual" elements of Soviet military power nonetheless present a basic source of danger in Europe. In NATO and in Europe in general they are impatiently awaiting ratification and entry into force of the Paris agreement on conventional arms in Europe, by which, as is well-known, lower levels of forces and armaments are established from the Atlantic to the Urals. NATO generals are no longer very worried about the armored equipment taken last summer by the Soviet Union beyond the Urals and into Central Asia: "If you continue to keep it under open skies, as is presently the case, then in a year or two we will not even consider it in evaluating the global military balance."

But the delay in ratifying the Paris agreements elicits a certain irritation. NATO would not want to disarm unilaterally, without ratification. But in the USSR there

is no way they can convene a new Supreme Soviet; additionally, it is unclear as to how to distribute the allocated quota of armament among the new independent states. In general the Western powers would like to be doing business with a one-and-only, fairly predictable partner in the East.

In NATO, meanwhile, plans are already coordinated to dismantle the central, most powerful grouping—Holland, Belgium, and Canada are moving their entire contingents home. France's army is leaving (with the exception of the experimental French-German brigade). It is planned to leave one British division (of four in the present Rhine Army); the Americans will leave one corps of their present three in Germany. The Bundeswehr is also reducing its strength.

Major-General Arno Shaeffer (FRG) gave assurances that units would leave together with their heavy weapons—the European countries do not have the money to maintain an "extra" collection of tanks and artillery. But the Americans might leave a certain portion of heavy weaponry (at present they have "dual"-based divisions whose weapons are stored in Germany). In this regard, the levels of arms permitted by the Paris treaty not only will not be exceeded, on the contrary, they will never even be approached in practically every category—there is not enough money.

Under these circumstances, the single possibility for creating a reliable defense is to impart a high degree of mobility and combat readiness to the relatively few remaining regular force contingents. It will then be possible to rapidly deploy troops from one NATO flank to another, thus covering a sizable territory with small amounts of forces. But a mobile defense can easily shift to an equally swift mobile offense—differences in general between "defense" and "offense" in the operations of air-mobile rapid-reaction forces are usually somewhat provisional in nature.

NATO leaders have tried to do everything possible to dispel the suspicions of Soviet specialists, but a certain overabundance of argument has led to many considerations coming somewhat into confrontation with one another. It has been declared that, in order for any multinational NATO forces (including the "rapid reaction corps") to be sent outside the confines of "NATO's zone of responsibility," the consent of all participating countries is necessary, a highly unlikely prospect under practically any development of events. In addition, the NATO Supreme Command has no forces whatsoever under its control—they are all subordinate only to the national governments, which themselves decide whom to send where. The idea has been expressed that the multinational composition of the corps and inevitable diversity of armament in this regard will necessarily reduce combat readiness and lead to a situation in which extended combat operations will be impossible.

It follows from this that military operations "outside the NATO zone of responsibility" may be undertaken by a portion of the NATO membership united in a certain

permanent or temporary alliance. The joint training accomplished over many years within the NATO framework will ensure effective interaction on the battlefield, as was the case during the war with Iraq. Indeed, it was proven there, incidentally, in the Arabian desert, that multinational forces armed with superior weapons have an enviable degree of combat capability. Reports have appeared in recent days that France and Germany are proposing to augment the role and significance of the experimental French-German brigade. It has been proposed that this brigade could become the nucleus of a new "European" army.

There is no serious basis at present, of course, to suspect the NATO bloc (or certain bloc members) of any serious aggressive intentions whatsoever. But circumstances can change with time, all the more so since the old balance of power in Europe, crowned in its time by the Helsinki agreement, remains only on paper.

The situation may become especially dangerous when both the USSR (Russia) and the NATO countries complete the military reforms which have begun and create similar armed forces.

The massive, not highly mobile, armies which have so long defined the military balance in Europe, will disappear. Universal military obligation will become unnecessary (it will be difficult in wars of the 21st century to use reservists). But a reduction of forces and armaments will not in itself bring about stability and security. With the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe, contact with the enemy has been lost, and so a military clash between land forces has become impossible. However, air-mobile forces are capable of surmounting the strategic gulf created within hours. Of course, highly mobile units will be relatively small in number and will be unable to carry out prolonged large-scale combat operations, but this too carries the threat of unregulated escalation of conflict. There will be few regular (professional) troops in Europe and it will be difficult to augment their number in the event of possible crisis. This in turn can lead to a situation in which the side suffering defeat is compelled very quickly to utilize nuclear weapons, although in both the USSR and NATO these have been acknowledged to be "a weapon of last resort."

Possible future (as well as many present) complications can most likely be avoided if right now, at the early stages of military reform, success is achieved in arranging for truly close interaction and even technological cooperation between East and West European armed forces. All the more so since both sides have quite a number of common problems.

There has been no effort to hide from the Soviet delegation, in particular, the fact that many influential political forces in the NATO countries would like to attain still greater significant reductions of arms and armed forces. But military specialists are attempting to prove that there exists a certain minimal level of armed forces below which an organized defense becomes impossible.

It must be said that, since 1949, the mechanism for seeking effective compromises has evolved to full sophistication in NATO, which has permitted the establishment of a true, not illusory, "union of sovereign states." The new Soviet republic leaders very likely have something to learn from the European Community, NATO, and other European bureaucratic institutions. Today new state, political, and economic structures in our country are formed largely from the American model, but the European countries are a great deal closer, not only geographically, but in many other ways as well.

Contacts with NATO are becoming increasingly diverse—from 8-18 October a seminar took place in Vienna on matters of strategy, and beginning 21 October attendees from the USSR and other countries of Eastern Europe will take abbreviated courses at the NATO military academy in Rome and the NATO higher military school in Oberammergau (Germany). Professor J. Dyukuen, NATO deputy general secretary for scientific matters, assured this NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that scientists from the USSR have the right beginning in 1991 to participate as equals in the NATO scientific program and, most importantly, to obtain financial support for participation in seminars and scientific schooling conducted under the NATO aegis.

There is every basis to suppose that at the top-level meeting in Rome, the heads of NATO member states will announce the establishment of some kind of permanently functioning council with the participation of the USSR and other East European states.

NATO Council's 'New Strategic Concept' Evaluated

'Turnaround' Seen

92UF0207A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Nov 91
p 4

[Article by PRAVDA Special Correspondents N. Miroshnik and V. Peresada, Rome, November 10, 1991: "The Rome Turnaround: Results of the NATO Council Summit Session"]

[Text] So, the meeting of NATO country leaders in Rome has ended, having marked the North Atlantic Alliance's reaction in response to the unprecedented changes in Europe, especially in its Eastern part. This is precisely how the main results of the session are being assessed in Italy and, judging by press commentaries, in other countries of the world.

This reaction was specifically formulated in the meeting's two main documents. One of them is "The New Strategic Concept of the Alliance." It actually marks the rejection of the former confrontational approaches. The cardinal provision of this document is the recognition of the fact that the "threat from the East" no longer exists. This conclusion determines everything else and the political and military sections of the alliance's current strategy is structured based on it. NATO did not consider it necessary to correct its main political goal, which

it proclaimed many years ago—establishment of a just and durable peaceful order in Europe. It sounds quite reassuring and that is why it has remained unchanged. Just like the intention to “insure the freedom and security of alliance member-countries through a combination of political and military means.”

The essence of the innovation is that henceforth emphasis in this bundle, known as the “Armel Doctrine,” will be placed on the political component. Accordingly, the military portion of the strategy was examined: the security of the NATO countries will be insured at the “minimal level of defense” which entails a significant reduction of NATO troops and weaponry in Europe. In so doing, a completely new factor is being introduced into the “Armel Doctrine”—a policy toward cooperation with the former enemies behind the Iron Curtain.

This policy has been founded in detail and recorded in the separately adopted “Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation.” And it not matter to whom we talked here, we heard one and the same thing: the declaration is the most impressive result of the meeting.

First of all, the document clearly states for the first time that the security of NATO must be viewed in the context of European-wide security. While assigning a significant role to their own structures, at the same time NATO already no longer considers itself as an “alternative to the CSCE process” as it did before. On the contrary a series of specific proposals have been set forth that are directed at the development of this process and at cooperation with it.

Second, and this is the main thing, a series of initiatives have been developed that are directed at the development of relations with the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. The issue has been raised for the first time about institutionalizing these relations. Specifically, they propose creating a North Atlantic Council on Cooperation—an organ of regular political consultations and meetings at the highest political level. They propose founding it already in December 1991 at a special meeting in Brussels with the participation of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union, the countries of Eastern Europe, and the three Baltic states.

At the same time, it is impossible not to see this circumstance. The concept of the “Soviet threat” has been replaced in the NATO lexicon by something else—“risk.” Its geography has also been designated, first of all—Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which is “undergoing a difficult political evolution” and “as before has impressive military potential.”

Due to this circumstance, a special document was adopted “On the Evolution of the Situation in the USSR.” Having expressed in it support for the process of democratization in the Soviet Union and the intention to render practical assistance in overcoming difficulties, the conference at the same time expressed concern about the increase of instability in the USSR. Special alarm is seen with regard to the future of the Soviet nuclear

arsenal and the prospect for its distribution throughout the individual republics. “We appeal to all authorities,” the document states, “to restrain themselves from any steps which would promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons... We welcome the intention of the Soviet leadership to insure responsible and reliable control over these weapons by a single organ of power.”

This document, which appeared at the initiative of the United States, was not approved by all conference participants. It has already become known after completion of the meeting that France refrained from signing it. France did this because, President F. Mitterrand explained at a press conference, the document was “totally unexpected and appeared from nowhere,” and also because NATO “is not a governess of states that are not part of the alliance and does not play the role of missionary.” It is thought here that this position of France’s has been dictated by the fact that, in its assessment, the document’s content goes beyond the framework of NATO’s competence and borders on interference in the internal affairs of third countries.

At the concluding press conference, NATO Secretary General M. Werner attempted to smooth over this difference. Italian Prime Minister G. Andreotti acted in the same way when he said that Paris essentially does not agree with one paragraph of the statement. Information was leaked to the press that it was a question of France’s particular dissatisfaction “with the prescriptions concerning the transition to a market economy.” However, it seems to us that the problem is much broader.

Considering this, we asked M. Werner: “Does NATO have any sort of specific plan in the event of the loss of effective centralized control of nuclear weapons in the USSR?” We saw that he did not particularly like the question. And this is what we heard in response: “I would not like to examine hypothetical situations here. But we have considered it necessary to express our common desire that nuclear weapons in the country that was called the Soviet Union remain under a unified command authority.”

Naturally, NATO’s Rome decisions require comprehensive and thorough analysis. However, their overall positive charge is already obvious right now and also at those times which cause us to be on guard. Much in the development of the situation on the continent and in relations with NATO will also depend on us and on the Eastern European countries. Time will tell how the course toward cooperation that was proclaimed in Rome will be implemented in practice.

Shift Credited to Gorbachev

92UF0207B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Nov 91
p 5

[Article by PRAVDA Special Correspondents N. Miroshnik and V. Peresada, Rome: “Rome 40 Years Later: Is the North Atlantic Alliance Changing?”]

[Text] According to a number of circumstances, the conference of the leaders of the NATO countries that recently occurred in Rome provided journalists with the opportunity "to play with their pens." And many of our nearly 1,500 colleagues who covered its work took advantage of this, naturally, each in his own way. For some the fact that the Eternal City was selected as the site of the meeting served as grounds for discussions on the alliance's "unlimited viability." Others, while reporting that Christopher Columbus Prospect passes by the fashionable Sheraton-Evropa Hotel where the leaders of the 16 states met, occupied themselves with the theme of "the inviolability of Transatlantic solidarity."

In our opinion, the specific feature of the Rome meeting is leading to "tying things up" one more time. Until now, the NATO Summit Council has only gathered once in the Italian capital—exactly 40 years ago. By the way, the "anniversary" time is not so curious as something else: the agendas then and now resemble each other in subject matter but in essence—they are totally opposite.

Having found an old information pamphlet published by the NATO press service, We read: "The session in Rome, November 1951. Based on analysis of the European situation, the alliance's strategy was discussed for the purpose of strengthening its defense capabilities. A directive was issued to deploy NATO's integrated forces in Europe." And here are the lines from the final documents of the current meeting: "Considering the changes that have occurred on the European Continent, a new strategy has been adopted that provides for the lessening of the military accent in NATO activities... The structures and strength of the integrated forces will be substantially reduced."

This parallel seems to be quite substantial to us.

No matter what you say right now about Gorbachev's policies, while bearing in mind the country's domestic problems that have developed, it indisputably provided weighty results in a foreign policy context. And the transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance, this eternal "imperialist bugaboo" and, if we speak seriously, this alliance that feared our military might and therefore rallied Western states—is a graphic example of this. One of us well remembers how in December 1989 then Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze, the first Soviet leader who visited NATO's Brussels headquarters, was asked this question: "What do you feel, being in the den of the enemy?". "That we are no longer enemies," he answered, thus having marked the main shift in our own approach to relations with the West.

Now in Rome NATO's reaction in response to this shift has been indicated.

In our opinion, we can actually consider the new strategic concept that has been approved here as new. In any case, it has been seriously revised. These are the cardinal shifts: recognition of the fact that the West—East confrontation in Europe has ended; intensification of the political aspect in NATO's activities; a shift to insuring the security of alliance countries with fewer military

weapons and its clear involvement in the context of European-wide security; and, a policy toward cooperation with the CSCE process, including disarmament measures.

Finally, one more absolutely new principle—cooperation with its Eastern neighbors—is being added to the bundle of the two long-held NATO principles—defense plus the readiness for a dialogue. A number of specific initiatives has been set forth to establish relations. As a whole, they are directed at imparting a permanent nature to cooperation and to formulate it, one could say, organizationally. With this goal in mind, they propose establishing a North Atlantic Council on Cooperation—an institution of regular political consultations, including annual consultations at the ministerial level. They intend to convene the founding meeting on December 20th in Brussels where the ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR, the Eastern European countries, and the three Baltic states will be invited.

This is a major, and we need to say, worthy initiative. Specifically because it does not contain attempts to divide the "former East" into more or less acceptable partners. It is no secret that recently a number of Eastern European countries have persistently posed the question to the alliance on offering them official security guarantees as a result of the dissolution of the OVD [Warsaw Treaty Organization], right up to acceptance into NATO. The meeting in Rome demonstrated that the alliance does not intend to resort to this, in any case in the foreseeable future.

Not everything is unambiguous. Some provisions of the military section of the new strategy cause a certain guardedness. Although they are no longer talking about the former "threat from the East," its changed conception of "risks" is quite vague in nature. Meanwhile, they propose not only political but also military measures "to prevent crises." NATO troops are being reduced but in so doing they have bet on increasing their mobility.

PRAVDA has already reported that a statement on the development of the situation in the Soviet Union has been adopted in Rome. We want to add several words to that. The concern about the increase of instability in the USSR that has been expressed in it is quite understandable, especially the prospect of the center losing centralized control of nuclear weapons under conditions of the disintegration of the unified state. Opinions concerning our country's domestic political and economic development are also understandable in and of themselves. NATO can certainly have its own point of view. However, all of these opinions sound like "recommendations."

Well, what can we say here? This statement caused an objection even within the alliance itself. As we all know, France refused to sign it. And the West European press frankly writes that essentially this document goes beyond the bounds of NATO's competence and verges on interference in someone else's affairs.

And the last thing. The Rome meeting summed up the definite results of the long-held confrontation of the "Atlanticist" and "Europeanist" trends in NATO. Western Europe, specifically the political alliance created here, officially recognized "its role" in defense matters. This was undoubtedly a compromise in favor of those Western European countries, first of all France, who advocate weakening the U.S.'s dominating influence on its partners.

'Monopoly on Global Security'

92UF0207C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 12 Nov 91 p 5

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Correspondent O. Shevtsov, Rome: "Will NATO Survive Without the Communist Threat? The North Atlantic Alliance Has Adopted a New Strategic Concept"]

[Text] The latest session of the NATO Council in Rome on November 7 and 8 coincided with the 74th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution in Russia which U.S. President Bush did not fail to mention in his speech. The context in which the Western leaders recalled far away 1917 were traditional: the defeat of the ideology of communism and the system of real socialism dictates new rules of the game in the international arena. At the same time, not only the defeated have to change. The victors—the NATO countries—also have to decide how to live in the future without the communist threat that has united them.

So, two primary documents were adopted in Rome that must determine the bloc's future activities under conditions of an actual monopoly on global security. The documents are titled "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" and "The Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation."

Obviously, NATO does not intend to stack arms with the rejection of the doctrine of flexible response. The threat of massive aggression by the Soviet Union does not exist but now the instability that is originating from Eastern Europe and the possibility of the emergence of new regional conflicts in various areas of the world are becoming the primary potential enemy. Hence, the bloc's motto—"Dialogue, Cooperation, and Strategic Defense." The exchange of information, coordinated political activities on conflict prevention, and cooperation with former enemies in the matter of insuring security—these are the means which, in the opinion of the strategists from Brussels, will help to preserve the peace in conditions of changes that are difficult to predict in the former world of socialism. NATO's nuclear weapons, after their significant reduction in the Old World, are shifting to the category of an extreme weapon in the bloc's defense system. As previously, the United States, France, and Great Britain hold the strategic umbrella in their hands.

NATO's new military trump card: the only actually functioning international security system—the multinational rapid deployment forces.

The new architecture of European security now includes a new organ—the North Atlantic Council on Cooperation. It is called upon to coordinate the participation of the Eastern European countries in the military-political and humanitarian spheres of NATO's activities. The 25 European countries will meet in Brussels for the first time in December. However, the expansion of the bloc due to new members from Eastern Europe is recognized as premature as is the expansion of North Atlantic security guarantees to Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic republics. The Eastern European neighbors have been made to understand that NATO is extending a hand of assistance to them to first of all insure its own security and only later to solve their problems, and then only to the extent that it meets NATO's interests.

The heads of the 16 states who gathered in Rome expressed serious concern with regard to the possible division of the USSR's nuclear potential. In its statement on the Soviet Union, NATO unequivocally warned about the threat of this step and also about its own intentions to undertake the most serious measures to prevent it.

Transatlantic solidarity was once again confirmed at the Rome session, indeed, even with the decreased role of the partners across the ocean. An American presence is needed in Europe primarily to prevent the expansion of contradictions between the bloc's European members themselves. Afraid to lose its former alliance, the United States is not concealing its concern with regard to Western Europe's separate steps in the military sphere. Discussion in connection with the well-known German-French plan to create a joint corps which must become the foundation of the European Community's own armed forces in the future were delayed until the next session. For now the United States and the European pro-Atlantic elements have agreed on total compatibility and mutual complementarity with NATO of any new military formations that emerge within the framework of the ZES-ES [Western European Union—European Community]. The Europeans understand that they are incapable of assuming the burden of military expenditures to create parallel troops. Obviously, it is a question of only clarifying rights to the leadership.

French Attitude Noted

92UF0207D Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 12 Nov 91 p 5

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Correspondent N. Dolgoplov, Rome: "Will NATO Survive Without the Communist Threat? The North Atlantic Alliance Has Adopted a New Strategic Concept"]

[Text] Everything in Rome was so good and so touching. U.S. and French Presidents Bush and Mitterrand passed each other so cheerfully in the negotiating hall that the scene reminded me of Bobchinskiy and Dobchinskiy taking leave of each other. But at the last minute when

his turn came to sign the final declaration, Francois Mitterrand refrained from signing. He assumed a special position.

It seems that the paragraph that he did not like was precisely about you and me. It states that the "political changes" in the Soviet Union must be accompanied by a "transition to a market economy" and that in this case the NATO countries "are ready to render assistance." Naturally, like before any other meeting, the texts of the documents have been very painstakingly weighed and coordinated. But on the eve, Mitterrand unexpectedly noted: "Yes—to the Alliance, No—to the Holy Alliance." And then he explained: "The alliance must not be involved with theology or chatter and its role is not to extol the market economy." In short, the French signature did not appear on the document.

According to certain political commentators, by this gesture, the president wanted to show that today's good relations between Paris and Washington also have their limits. Having precisely designated his position, which can be expressed like this: "I oppose any diktat,"—Mitterrand displayed his independence and resoluteness.

Are we grateful to the French president? I do not know. This is a very complex issue. But it turns out that being principled is not a sin.

Role of Special Forces in Gulf War

91SV0095A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 10 Sep 91 p 3

[Article under the rubric "The World in Events": "The War Was Won by the Green Berets: On the Role of Special Forces in Preparing for and Conducting the Military Operations in the Persian Gulf"]

[Text] In one of its latest issues the prestigious American magazine NEWSWEEK published an article on the role of special forces in the war in the Persian Gulf.

We are providing for the readers an abbreviated translation of the article, supplemented with information assembled by translator A. Agureyev on the U.S. special forces.

General Norman Schwarzkopf racked his brain over a problem for which there seemed to be no solution. For several months in a row American spy satellites and reconnaissance aircraft had focused their attention on Iraq but had been unable to find an opening in Saddam Husayn's air defenses. All efforts appeared ineffective. The search for an "air window" through which bombers of the multinational force could penetrate had not been successful. The director of Operation Desert Shield was fully cognizant of the fact that until they found a way to deceive the early-warning radar of Iraq's air defense facilities covering ground targets, all attempts by bombers to penetrate to Baghdad were doomed to failure. Schwarzkopf was afraid that the allies would lose not just scores but hundreds of aircraft during the very first night of the war. And that night was now less than a week away.

Comfortably settled in at one of his command centers, Schwarzkopf listened with alarm to a report from Col George Gray, commander of the Air Force's First Special Operations Wing. Col Gray was presenting his plan to the commander. "If we are unable to find a hole in Baghdad's air defenses and other Iraqi installations, why not try to make one ourselves in the early-warning system?" the colonel asked. To do this it would only be necessary to execute a precisely calculated strike with a few helicopter groups against the radar warning systems and destroy them so as to prevent them from transmitting a single word. Disengaging them—and this would have to be done simultaneously at several sites—would leave the air defense system without eyes and ears.

Schwarzkopf said nothing. Like many professional military men of the old school, he was skeptical about operations by special forces, even about their capabilities. There are only problems with these special operations teams, and if the audacious operations of the "high-spirited guys" and "snake eaters" failed again, it would fall to them, the regular forces, to rescue the supermen. Schwarzkopf remained silent, however, and listened. He simply had no alternative. He then looked the gallant colonel straight in the eyes and asked: "Can you guarantee that the operation will be 100 percent successful?" Col Gray took a deep breath and felt a trickle of cold sweat roll down his back. "Yes, sir," he answered.

This was precisely the situation a few days before the beginning of the air operation against Iraq. Col Gray did indeed complete his commander's mission a full 100 percent successfully. His commandos crossed the Iraqi border in helicopters, hugging the ground, and succeeded in eliminating the early-warning radar, thereby opening up a safe air route to Baghdad for hundreds of aircraft of the multinational force. The bombers dropped their loads and set out on the return trip before the first shots were fired. During this first period, so important to the outcome of the entire campaign, the allies did not lose a single aircraft.

Participants in the war in the Persian Gulf have already repeatedly marched triumphantly along the streets of many American cities. They were greeted with hugs and kisses, as homecoming soldiers near and dear are in every other country. There were no special-operations forces in the parade formation, however. They do not like a lot of idle fuss. They do not want to be likened to the famous Rambo. They prefer to think of themselves as "quiet professionals." Despite the fact that the numerical strength of all the subunits of special-operations forces participating in the war was only 9,400 men out of an allied army of more than a half-million, these "big fellows," NEWSWEEK believes, made an extraordinarily important contribution to the victory.

NEWSWEEK interviewed scores of "supermen" of all ranks, most of whom had returned to their bases without parades or fanfare. This enabled the magazine to conclude that it was the precise and smoothly coordinated

operations of the special forces which did much to ensure certain victory for nations of the multinational force with little bloodshed.

On the surface it seems as though Operation Desert Storm was simply lucky from beginning to end. The first strike was a complete surprise. The allied ground forces passed through the Iraqi minefields virtually unscathed. The Iraqi military were completely taken in by a Marine landing faked by special forces on the Kuwaiti coast. The multinational force succeeded in a surprise but risky flanking maneuver, during which the Iraqis were perfectly capable of executing a perceptible counterattack. And Israel, one of the main factors, was successfully restrained from taking retaliatory steps against Iraq mainly because most of the Scuds launched were destroyed. They were destroyed not just in the air but on the ground as well. And each of these fortuitous coincidence was in great part the work of the special forces.

Who's Who in the Special Forces?

All branches of the U.S. armed forces include special forces: the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines. In the Army they are the Green Berets, who got their name from their headgear, a green beret with a badge of crossed arrows and a knife and with the inscription "Liberate From Oppression"; the Rangers, or Black Berets, an Army group for conducting psychological-warfare operations, a fire-support helicopter formation and certain other subunits. The Army's special units number approximately 30,000 men. They are based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

The Navy's special forces include groups specially trained for operations at sea, in the air and on land. They are also called SEALs. They can be moved on special, high-speed boats and in amphibious vehicles, and can also provide support for landing operations. Scuba divers/saboteurs slip into harbors and plant explosives. When set ashore, they can destroy enemy installations. Around 4,000 men serve in these forces. The SEALs are based at Coronado, California.

The U.S. Air Force also has special-operations subunits. Their main mission is to provide their colleagues with air support. They are also charged with infiltrating enemy lines and landing special groups in enemy territory.

In addition to these subunits, the special-operations forces which took part in operations in the Persian Gulf area included the Joint Services. This group is comprised of a subunit of SEALs and a special Delta detachment for combatting terrorism. This Army subunit is at the present time so secret that practically nothing is published about it. According to NEWSWEEK the Delta Force numbers around 1,300 men. These are real-life, modern ninjas, an elite special subunit of samurai.

How the "Window" Was Opened

Col Gray may have felt 100 percent confident that his boys would succeed in "opening a window" in the air defenses of the Iraqi forces, but Maj Bob Leonik, the

person who would have to execute the mission, was certain only that he would have to sweat blood. To be sure, he would be flying a specially prepared and equipped, \$26 million combat helicopter crammed with modern electronic gear, even a computerized map of the area depicting the flight course, exactly as in a popular children's game, all of which enabled it to fly in the worst possible weather precisely to the target, and a special electronic-warfare black box blinded the enemy's radars and surface-to-air missiles.

Despite this, the assigned mission of flying in total darkness at 150 miles an hour no more than 50 feet in the air, avoiding detection by Iraqi spotters and destroying the target with the first missile at precisely the designated time seemed like a scenario right out of a Hollywood hit movie.

The heat and sand played cruel jokes on many of the electronic instruments. Blowing sand in the desert air complicated the functioning of the engines and made it difficult for the electronic instruments to determine the altitude and flight direction. Some of his men had already been forced to land their aircraft in the desert because they had become disoriented. And then came the following development:

According to intelligence and the calculations of experts, a "window" could be punched in Iraq's air defenses by destroying only two radar stations. This would have to be done simultaneously, however, because they were linked together in a pair, and the destruction of only one of the stations would immediately send the alarm not just to the other but to all of Iraq.

At precisely 02:20 local time on 17 January Leonik's helicopters crossed the Iraqi border. They were divided into two teams, each with two helicopters to lead the way and four Apache assault helicopters with missiles at the ready for the strike.

Leonik could not fly in a straight line. He zigzagged around Bedouin camps to keep them from hearing his helicopters. Leonik strove to hide his own helicopter and the entire group behind large sand dunes, tried to merge with the desert on the enemy's radar screens and, in addition to everything else, his group had to do everything possible and impossible to avoid running into combat observation posts. These could not only scramble their own aircraft but could also shoot down the passing, ground-hugging helicopters with a simple surface-to-air, heat-seeking missile. In the pitch dark the crews had to rely totally on computers and electronic charts and maps.

As they approached the target, they were suddenly spotted by an Iraqi soldier who had for some reason moved away from the radar building. He reacted instantaneously and darted back toward the station, but had no time to do anything. Just a second ahead of the designated time a laser-guided missile from an Apache helicopter smashed the station and the bunker in which the

Iraqi soldier was trying to take shelter. Five seconds later another fireball appeared off to the side. The second station had been destroyed.

At the headquarters of the multinational force Gen Schwarzkopf awaited news of the outcome of the operation. Suddenly, amidst the noise of the airways, he heard the code "California, California" repeated. This meant that the special-operations team had completed its mission.

The Eldorado of Psychological Warfare

Lt Gen Walter Boomer, commander of the U.S. Marines during the operation in the Persian Gulf, could not shake a relentless nightmare: His gallant men were beginning a ground offensive, and their vehicles were running up against Iraqi minefields and bogging down there. He, the commander, could only watch helplessly from the sideline as Iraqi artillery methodically shot up his armored personnel carriers and tanks. It was clearly not possible to throw the vehicles directly onto the minefields and into gunfire. But what could be done? What was the solution? What kind of action was to be taken when the order arrived to begin ground combat operations?

The U.S. Air Force's Eight Special Operations Squadron thought that it could help the general answer this questions. A superbomb, one of the largest and most powerful nonnuclear bombs, known as the BLU-82, could help clear paths through the minefields. It weighs 15,000 pounds and is as large as a fair-sized passenger car. The American military had used such "toys" in Vietnam for the rapid clearing of airstrips in the jungle. However, this was the first time the idea of using the bomb for clearing paths through minefields had occurred to Air Force specialists.

It is thought that the military prefers to fight, not talk, during combat operations. During combat operations in the Persian Gulf psy-ops subunits dropped more than 29 million—no, not kilograms of explosives, but leaflets—over the heads of the Iraqi soldiers calling for them to lay down their weapons and surrender. Along with the leaflets they set up several radio programs reporting information crucial to future defectors. And in fact it was difficult for those Iraqis who wanted to survive to ignore the need to listen to the American programs. After all, on the programs, along with the world-famous BBC and other radio stations, they could also listen to the "Voice of the Gulf." And in this program the Americans included readings from the Koran. The listeners were addressed by fellow countrymen who had already surrendered to the allied forces, telling about their happy and comfortable life in prison. Most important, however, was the fact that the announcer in each program announced in advance the sectors of the front and the units to undergo massive bombing attacks the following day.

"It's a damnably accurate way to get information," is how the scheme with the radio broadcasts was described by one of the leaders of the psy-ops subunits. The prisoners of war admitted that more than three quarters

of them had decided to give up after either reading the leaflets or listening long enough to the radio broadcasts.

The specialists of the Eighth Special Operations Squadron, however, believed their superbomb could play a role not just in the direct clearing of paths in a single minefield, but also by helping scouts to gather critical information and by totally destroying morale in the Iraqi army units.

On 7 February Maj Skip Davenport took his combat cargo aircraft into the air with a superbomb in its belly. A companion bomber took off with him, also loaded with a BLU-82. These two pilots were given the army nickname "Blues Brothers" after a famous American movie in which the role of one of the brothers was played by popular American actor Belushi. The day before the flight by the "Blues Brothers" a different load, propaganda leaflets, had been dropped onto the area to be bombed. "If you have not surrendered tomorrow, we are going to drop the largest nonnuclear bomb ever used onto this area."

The Iraqis who found the courage to fall asleep that night learned the following morning that the allies were not at all inclined to joke around with promises. The explosion of a BLU-82 looked like an atomic bomb detonating. The sound could be heard for scores of miles around in the desert, and a British SAS special subunit on reconnaissance in the Iraqi rear urgently radioed its commanders: "Sir, the bloc nations have just used a nuclear weapon."

The next day following the explosion the Iraqi forces were once again subjected to brainwashing. This time the leaflets read: "The largest nonnuclear bomb in the world was just dropped on you. Several more of these things are on the way." The enemy did not need any more convincing from the multinational force. The day after the bombing an entire Iraqi battalion led by its commander and staff crossed the border and surrendered to the allies. The local intelligence commander was among those surrendering. When he departed to surrender he had happened to grab some maps of the minefields along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. These maps and the testimony of other prisoners were a real bonanza of information for the intelligence subunits.

The Landing Which Did Not Take Place

Before land combat operations began, military experts studied the situation and the possible development of events. They were almost certain that the land war would begin with an allied amphibious landing on the coast. All of the groundwork appeared to have been laid for this. Large naval forces had been assembled near the coast, 17,000 of them Marines armed and ready for combat. In addition, an attack from the sea could be supported not only by aircraft, but also by long-range naval artillery, including missiles. There was no landing, however, but the allies did succeed in fooling the Iraqis into diverting large Iraqi forces away from the sector of the main strike by forces of the multinational coalition.

With the onset of darkness on Saturday, 23 February, a day before that designated for the allied land offensive, a total of only six men from a SEALs team were landed onto the coast by means of high-speed boats. They were landed—easy to say. In fact, however, they had to find their way through mined waters where the slightest mistake would mean immediate death. They had to proceed with extreme caution, for they could be detected not just by sight, but also by sound. When the shoreline appeared on the horizon, the engines were killed and scuba divers leaped over the side. In addition to their usual weapons, each of them carried an impressive amount of explosives plus special buoys. The Iraqis were supposed to take the latter for markers for incoming amphibious vessels and a landing operation. The charges had special detonation devices which were to detonate exactly three hours before the beginning of the 24 February land offensive by the allies. The timing of the explosions was chosen deliberately so as to give the Iraqis time to study the situation and conclude that the allies had begun landing Marines onto the coast. And, what is more important, to give the Iraqi commanders time to move to the “landing” area units removed from those sectors of the front where it was actually planned to make the main strike.

The divers moved slowly toward shore, stopping every 100 feet to examine the beach. Although each of them was armed with a submachine gun and a pistol and had trained in firing at targets on shore, the group could still become easy prey to a single Iraqi submachine-gunner. Everything went well, however. Scanning the beach one last time with a night-vision device and seeing no sign of Iraqi troops either on the beach or further in on shore, which was concealed from the divers by the smoke from burning oil, the SEALs made the decision to go ashore.

Precisely carrying out his assigned mission, each of the scuba divers prepared his charges for detonation and set the timers. The group then disappeared again into the gulf water, where they were picked up by the same boats some time later. The Americans fired large-caliber machine guns from the boats to wake up the Iraqi soldiers sleeping in bunkers on shore. The charges then exploded in succession, one after another.

The Front Behind the Frontline

The Green Berets, an elite American commando sub-unit, had been in the Persian Gulf area since September of the previous year. The commanders had repeatedly “gone to superiors” with proposals for infiltrating special operations teams into Iraq to begin organizing a resistance movement against Saddam Husayn’s regime. According to *NEWSWEEK*, however, it was Schwarzkopf’s opinion that attempts to organize dissidents inside Iraq would simply be a waste of time, and should American soldiers be captured on Iraqi territory this could cause the war to begin, something the White House certainly did not want.

The only Americans permitted to cross the border before combat operations began were CIA agents, most of them

Middle East nationals for whose actions the department at Langley answered. Several CIA agents penetrated into southern and northern Iraq after the air war began to assist pilots of downed aircraft of the multinational force.

Once the war began the Green Berets got the green light to begin their breathtaking operations. Based on intelligence gathered by the CIA, however, it was determined in advance to be a given that the American tanks and trucks would be unable to cross the sands of southern Iraq. Strangely, the American commanders lacked complete, detailed maps of the area. Not only did Green Beret commanders insert into the enemy’s rear area return with soil samples—the ground, incidentally, proved to be totally traversable—they also brought back photographs of the terrain.

One of the main dangers for the allied forces in their ground offensive was the possibility of a sudden, surprise attack by Republican Guards, select units of the Iraqi army. Had the Iraqis succeeded in making such an attack, who can say how or when Desert Storm would have ended. In order to avoid a surprise attack, the Green Berets had infiltrated around two dozen Special Forces teams into the enemy’s rear area prior to the offensive. They watched for enemy movement along routes of a possible enemy maneuver. *NEWSWEEK* describes one of the teams, which consisted of three sergeants and was sent the farthest inside the Iraqi rear area.

“The first night after being helicoptered in, the commandos dug themselves a hide-site in the ground, a real mole hill but camouflaged so that nothing was visible from the outside. (Incidentally, the Green Berets had learned this from Vietnam veterans.) They had practiced their techniques in desert conditions for weeks on end prior to being dropped into the Iraqi army’s rear. Even the ideal camouflage techniques could not withstand the curiosity of an ordinary child, however.

“They were exposed by a small Iraqi girl around 7 years old. She roamed around their shelter for a long time, then suddenly approached and bent down. The Green Berets held their breath as the little girl slowly lifted the lid and looked in amazement at the three grown-up fellows in the strange clothing and camouflage face paint. A few minutes later their shelter was surrounded by hundreds of Iraqi soldiers. The commandos called in aircraft, assumed an all-around defense and opened fire.”

The most impressive adventure of the Green Berets during the war, however, was a real battle fought by eight commandos for 6 hours against 150 Iraqi soldiers. This time the Green Berets and pilots supporting them from the air killed around 130 enemy soldiers in the battle. How could it be more like Hollywood?

We could not tell about all the operations conducted by special units in the Persian Gulf war, of course. Those we could only mention include the operation, extremely important for its political consequences, involving the

destruction of several dozen Scud missiles on the ground. A volley of these could have been decisive in drawing Israel into the war, which would have changed the situation and the disposition of forces. Even NEWSWEEK was probably unable to learn about all of the operations by special forces, but perhaps just the examples cited provide the basis, without claiming to present a thorough analysis, for drawing the main conclusion that the Americans succeeded in all these operations because they were performed by real professionals.

Article Looks at Planning for European Army

92UM0131A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Article by Colonel V. Pechorov, candidate of military sciences: "Why Is A European Army Being Formed"]

[Text] In mid-October of this year France and Germany came out with a joint initiative for further expanding military-political cooperation among the nations of Western Europe. There would appear to be nothing surprising in this, because it has long been known that the two states want to establish a complete alliance of Old World nations. This time, however, the French-German demarche has literally thrown the West's military-political establishment into disarray. What has happened is that the idea of forming a European army, conceived long ago in the bowels of European institutions but, with the tacit consent of the NATO partners not made public, has now acquired the status of an official proposal which can simply not be discounted and certainly not go unnoticed.

Indeed, the "ultra-Atlantists", who advocate the preservation and strengthening of NATO as the West's only military-political structure uniting the West Europeans and the Americans (with the latter playing the dominant role), greeted the Franco-German model with hostility. For example, M. Woerner, the bloc's secretary general, "seriously cautioned" the Europeans against taking steps which could produce a split in the North Atlantic alliance. Washington and its ever-"loyal" London expressed essentially the opinion that this is "at best a useless idea, which would result in a duplication of the North Atlantic alliance," and in the worse case "the first step toward NATO's disintegration." The Americans in fact fear—and not without foundation—that their position in Europe will be weakened if a purely European army is formed. In most European capitals the initiative was received, if not with full approval, at least with understanding.

In an attempt to dampen the wave of criticism from across the ocean and neutralize the negative assessment by the still influential European "Atlantists," however, Paris and Bonn hastened to explain. It is their opinion that the framework of even a renewed NATO strategy will be so narrow it will not be possible to employ the bloc's joint armed forces outside its sphere of responsibility, that is, beyond Europe. Impending threats to the West from the Third World demand a prompt and

effective response not just from the USA but also from a united Europe pursuing its own objectives. Even in Europe, the authors of the initiative believe, there can arise situations like the one in Yugoslavia, which do not fall within the scope of NATO but demand intervention "with more than just appeals."

In addition, this does not rule out the possibility that conflicts could arise in the Soviet Union toward intervention into which the European army could be oriented. In this situation, they claim, only an "entirely European" and—something of considerable importance—already existing, European military-political organization, the West European Union, not constrained by agreements like NATO could take on the job of ensuring security within and outside of Europe. The West European Union, however, which presently consists of 10 members of the European Community, does not have military command elements or its own armed forces. And so, it is planned to place the European army under the authority of precisely this organization, "free" of the American presence, thereby turning the West European Union into the main defense component of the future European political alliance.

Apparently recognizing the uselessness of unrestrained criticism (in the situation of growing West European sentiments on the continent) of the Franco-German model, the proponents of NATO's preservation have altered their tactics in an attempt to find a compromise solution to what is generally acknowledged as an unexpected problem. For this purpose, according to a large number of political figures in the West, the Franco-German initiative and a joint proposal advanced almost simultaneously by Great Britain and Italy for the establishment of a European rapid-deployment force with dual subordination—under the West European Union and NATO—for collective security within the bloc and for conducting operations outside its zone of responsibility could be reduced to a "common denominator." Time will tell whether a compromise solution will be found. In the meantime the French and Germans, resolutely backing their proposal, are already taking steps (at least at the expert level) to form the rudiments of a European army, planning to increase its numerical strength to 100,000 men in the future.

As the first step toward this goal, for example, it is planned to form a joint army corps out of a composite Franco-German brigade formed in 1990. It is planned to base the corps in France, at Strasbourg. The Franco-German brigade, stationed at Böblingen, Germany, and two divisions (a German motorized infantry division and a French armored division both stationed on German territory) will be subordinate to it. In addition, the corps, which numbers from 35,000 to 50,000 men according to various sources, will also include units and subunits under the corps but whose stationing has still not been decided conclusively. The initiators of the establishment of this corps express the hope that units and subunits of the armed forces of other West European states can be added.

In addition to sharp disagreements of a political nature the raising of the issue of forming a composite European corps also illuminated a large number of other attendant but still difficult problems. For example, the German military-political leadership, which has recently demonstrated increasing irritation at the continuing presence of foreign troops in Germany (and these are certainly not Soviet) in exchange for benefits extended to French units stationed on their own territory, might demand concessions from Paris with respect to acquiring weapons and military equipment for the new corps primarily from German companies. Nor can one rule out the possibility that the issue of this operational formation's conducting exercises on French territory will be raised, since public opinion is sharply against the already excessive number of maneuvers conducted on German soil. French parliament members and the military have in turn not been enthusiastic about the news that German military personnel would be stationed in France at a time when the question of removing most of the French troops from German territory and disbanding them has been advanced to the level of practical realization. Even if

these problems are effectively resolved, there will still be difficulties with the integration of the different systems of command and control, communication, troop training and so forth, not to speak of problems involving interaction with NATO staff structures. It is planned to work out many of these problems, both political and technical, in Bonn in mid-November at a meeting between F. Mitterrand and H. Kohl (to which, incidentally, the heads of state and government of all nations of the European Community have been invited); the others, at the regular session of the West European Union on 18 November.

In conclusion I would like to underscore again the fact that the joint proposal advanced by France and Germany is an extraordinary move. Regardless of the form or the implementation periods, it will undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences for the fate of NATO, for West European integration and the role of the USA in Europe. Let us also not forget about the possible "orientation" of the European army toward events in our nation.

Conversion of Naval Shipyards Assessed*92UM0059A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Oct 91 First Edition p 2*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain Third Rank Yu. Gladkevich: "Submarines in Storage, or Who Needs Such Conversion"]

[Text] The arrangement would appear to be simple: Military vessels are removed from the building slips, the keels of civilian vessels are laid, and profits will not be long in coming. After all, a military vessel represents at the very least half a century of continuous expenditures to be made by society. Developing a design costs money, building the vessel costs, and so on. Money is needed for trials, for placing the vessel in service with the Navy, for maintaining a crew, for combat operations, for repairs and modernization, and finally for breaking up the ship. A civilian vessel is different. Money is spent to build it, and then it generates profits.

However, this only seems simple....

F. Ostashevich, chief of the Main Directorate of Economics of the USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, said: "More than 70 percent of our enterprises manufacturing military products have undergone conversion. There are enterprises which are completely discontinuing the building of military vessels—Leninskaya Kuznitsa, the Baltic Shipyard, and some others.... However, they are now finding themselves in a difficult financial situation. This year, because of conversion, our profits will fall short by about 250 million rubles [R] on the whole at all enterprises of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry."

Oleg Pavlovich Yefimov, first deputy chief of the Science and Technology Directorate of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, added to the above: "When we discuss shipbuilding, a sector with a lengthy production cycle, we should be aware that the beginning of conversion cannot but be economically disadvantageous. Changing the production lines of enterprises and retraining personnel call for outlays, and considerable outlays at that...."

The beginning is disadvantageous? This is not all that bad. We will wait for conversion to pick up speed and then we will have profits.

Oleg Pavlovich went on to say: "I am afraid this will be a long wait. The decline in profits is primarily associated with the fact that the enterprises need formidable funding in order to retool for manufacturing civilian products and to mothball existing equipment. It so happens that there is no one to finance this. To be sure, the USSR Ministry of Finance gives something to the sector. However, these are credits from the State Bank, and they meet merely one-tenth of our needs.

"Let us look at instrument-making, a sub-sector of shipbuilding. Incidentally, this has been precisely the area to generate the greatest increment in the output of

consumer goods during the years of conversion. However, orientation toward the manufacture of instruments for military needs was a factor in this case as well. At present, outlays for retrofitting enterprises are needed in order to truly produce consumer goods in this sub-sector on a mass scale. Otherwise, it is impossible to switch from the small serial production of goods to mass production.

"We have meticulously calculated our needs—we need R75 million. Believe me, this is a very modest figure. However, we were not given even that. The enterprises are forced to seek loans. However, loans are given, first, at a high rate of interest, and second, on the basis of recoupment periods. Who can guarantee that recoupment periods will be in line with those on which we agree with the creditors, given the political, economic, and social instability in society?.."

So it appears that the sector has indeed approached a line beyond which conversion may no longer proceed at the expense of internal reserves. Despite the fact that the output of peaceful products, including consumer goods, is increasing in the sector after all—from 38 percent of overall volume of output in 1988 to 51 percent in 1991—outlays for the production of these goods is growing still faster. The enterprises of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry pay more and more for subcontracted products; finding these products is more and more difficult; the overhead is more and more significant.... This is how far it has gone: The Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry was forced to use foreign exchange generated by selling vessels abroad, purchase subcontracted parts abroad, and thus keep some enterprises alive in order to somehow ensure the use of production capacity and prevent stoppages (which could entail irreversible consequences for the sector—the disintegration of its infrastructure, a decline in the intellectual potential of research in the sector, technological losses, and a drain of highly skilled personnel). Nonetheless, the production of consumer goods at a number of enterprises has either been altogether discontinued or slowed down considerably because of the shortage of subcontracted parts. As is known, the self-cost of production increases abruptly when the size of serial production drops. And here you have it—one more reason for the rapid growth of prices for the goods people need so badly in the environment of unrestricted price setting.

Feliks Ivanovich Ostashevich asserted: "Trying to maintain effectiveness in a particular sector when the entire economy is gravely ill is nonsensical. Hopes that our society will be able to solve its problems at the expense of converting military production without spending anything to 'discharge it to reserves' are all the more groundless. Moreover, I am convinced that conversion in the form in which it has been conceived and implemented is altogether doomed to failure and will not accomplish anything for the people."

The logic of Feliks Ivanovich's reasoning is as follows. The conversion of the enterprises of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry and the switch to manufacturing

products for peaceful uses are directly associated with the need of the country's Armed Forces for combat materiel and armament. What are we running into at present? In keeping with the USSR Council of Ministers resolution on conversion, some of the military orders for the enterprises of the sector have been canceled. However...as has already been said, shipbuilding is a sector with a long production cycle. This means that tremendous quantities of aggregates, assemblies, and mechanisms have already been prepared at enterprise warehouses for future surface vessels and submarines. What is to be done about them? In addition, there is unfinished production for which nobody is paying at present. The new budget year is, as they say, now upon us, but the Ministry of Defense still does not have its budget. The enterprises cannot effectively organize preparations for producing civilian output in converted capacity without knowing what should be built for the Navy and in what quantities, and what funding will be allocated to this end....

Is there a way out? The leaders of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry believe that developing and implementing a comprehensive nationwide conversion program is a way out. The view exists that this program has already been implemented for a year now. However, the practice of conversion at the enterprises of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry at the very least calls this view into question.

What should the national conversion program proceed from? First of all, from the defense doctrine of our state. So far, if we may say so, this doctrine has been formulated only in political terms, and its foreign-policy aspect is in the foreground. This doctrine needs to be economically substantiated in order to become the basis for conversion and to begin to work. We need to calculate precisely what armed forces we need in keeping with the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense, what their needs for armaments and combat materiel are going to be, and what segment of our economy should contribute to meeting these needs. Only this approach will promote conversion from the realm of political slogans into an actual pursuit.

Only this approach will make it possible to render conversion profitable because it will ensure a stable financial policy in the sphere of conversion, which is so badly lacking at present. The decisions now being made to abruptly reduce funding for the procurement of armament and combat materiel by the Armed Forces while there are no funds for enterprises to retool the released capacity have already resulted in a huge segment of the enterprises' and the sector's capital resting in warehouses in the form of subcontracted parts which have lost value, or, in other words, being tied up. The danger of society's capital being tied up further persists.

F. Ostashevich said bitterly: "It is particularly distressing that this is happening in a sector which has all the prerequisites for not just entering the world market, but also becoming a leader in that market. We have a

respectable scientific potential, high- technology production, and highly skilled workers and engineers. In the world market, only the Japanese and Korean shipbuilding companies could compete with us. Perhaps not a single other state could challenge us...

"But.... This 'but' has so far become the insurmountable obstacle: Tremendous investments are required. Investors are precisely what is lacking both in our dear Motherland and outside. However, we are vigorously looking for foreign partners which could invest funds in converting our enterprises. The search has met with some success. For example, quite recently we embarked on cooperating with Swiss business circles in the field of credits for changing the production lines of defense enterprises and purchasing subcontracted parts for manufacturing peaceful products at these enterprises.

"We are not severing relations with our old partners, various industries in the sovereign republics. However, the complex and still uncertain political situation in these republics seriously hampers economic relations. For example, an enterprise of ours signed a contract for a barter delivery of subcontracted parts, but Ukrainian customs flashed 'the red light' and forbade the outshipment of the products we needed without a license. Meanwhile, securing a license at present is an extremely onerous undertaking..."

The difficulties Feliks Ivanovich mentioned are far from being isolated cases. They are rooted in the slow pace of resolving the issue of forming a common economic space in our country. Of course, the politicians do not have it easy. This has to do with the fact that there are indeed very many contradictions between the sovereign republics which cannot be resolved overnight. However, it is necessary to look for at least compromise solutions, and soon. Otherwise politics will ultimately finish off the economy and foil all attempts to stabilize it.

In essence, the idea of converting military production is as old as perestroika. However, years have passed but conversion has done little to better the lives of the people and our society in which still more types of goods are discovered to be in short supply. The converted ruble has still failed to become tangible and turn into a full-fledged coin in the national coffers. Could it be so because we neglect the primary rule for any businessman: Funds need to be invested into any promising enterprise before returns are expected?

'Oborona' Director Claims MoD Needs Commodity Exchange

92UM0150A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Nov 91 First edition p 2

[Interview with "Oborona" Brokerage Firm Director Vladimir Andreyevich Morozov by Colonel A. Pimenov: "A Consortium of Military Commodity Exchanges Is Needed"]

[Text] On November 15, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published information about the fact that the Armed Forces

is creating a commercial center—a holding company operating on the principles of cost recovery and self-financing. "Oborona" [Defense] Brokerage Firm Director V. Morozov telephoned the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial offices that very day.

"A commercial center—that's old hat," he said uneasily, "the Ministry of Defense cannot take that path to solve today's problems."

"But which path? Do you know the way?"

"Yes!" And, without hiding his chagrin, he quietly added: "But you will not publish my opinion...."

Our correspondent met with him. We are publishing their conversation.

[Pimenov] Vladimir Andreyevich, first of all several words—about the firm which you head: who founded it and what are its goals and tasks?

[Morozov] The central logistics bureau [kontora] which Colonel I. Solovyev heads is the founder of "Oborona" Brokerage Firm. Life itself compelled us to found this firm. As is clear from its name, the central bureau's task is to supply raw materials and equipment to main directorate enterprises. When Gosplan, Gossnab, and other union structures were functioning, there were no particular problems with this, but right now....

Well, here is a recent example. We are already on the threshold of the new year but it is still unclear how our enterprises will operate in 1992: as of today, we have concluded contracts for only 20 percent of materials with suppliers. Where will we get the remaining 80 percent? On the market, that is, at the commodity exchanges. Therefore a brokerage firm was also required. But it is not capable of solving all the problems of even one main directorate.

[Pimenov] Why?

[Morozov] Because the inter-republic universal commodity exchange, based on which our firm was founded, does not have an adequate quantity of commodities needed by building industry enterprises. And such shortage materials as cement, lumber, bricks, and glass are in general practically unavailable.

[Pimenov] But there are other commodity exchanges at which you can buy and sell any commodities....

[Morozov] There are. For example, Russia Commodity-Raw Materials Exchange and Moscow Commodity Exchange. And just access to them.... Do you know what one brokerage seat costs at their exchange? More than eight million rubles! Does it make sense to give this

money to someone? All the more so that the Ministry of Defense cannot get by with one brokerage seat.

Indeed, there is the Military-Industrial Exchange and the "Konversiya" Exchange but they, frankly speaking, are also experiencing quite a few difficulties. And as a result, it turns out that, while operating in an uncoordinated manner, we are removing the military-industrial complex's resources bit by bit instead of combining efforts. In a word, the Ministry of Defense needs its own exchange organization—a powerful organization with adequate amounts of those resources which the Ministry of Defense and the entire military-industrial complex have at their disposal.

[Pimenov] So, maybe this organization will also become the commercial center of the Armed Forces?

[Morozov] That is just the point—it cannot become the commercial center. A commercial center is not an exchange, this is once again a command-administrative structure, yes and commodities will obviously not be purchased at market prices. Say, 10 tracked primemovers are subject to sale at some garrison. Who will find out about this commodity and how? The buyers in that city and in that oblast where the garrison is located will find out. But how do you report this throughout the country in order to create a buyers' competition? Put announcements in newspapers? And how many of these announcements and advertisements do you need which currently cost quite a lot of money?

I am deeply convinced that today the Ministry of Defense needs its own exchange and, more precisely, a consortium of military exchanges in order to more effectively solve financial-economic problems while the Armed Forces enter the market economy.

[Pimenov] And what is needed to do this?

[Morozov] To begin with, a building and good communications. Such communications under which any garrison and any military unit could efficiently report information to buyers throughout the entire country. Then we can get the real market price for the equipment or property being offered for sale.

The Ministry of Defense is quite capable of creating such a large-scale structure that meets today's needs. I am certain that sooner or later it will be created but it will be too bad if it is done too late. The creation of this structure is most advisable right now, during a period of Armed Forces reductions.

[Pimenov] And the last question, Vladimir Andreyevich, if someone wants to contact your brokerage firm, where can they find you?

[Morozov] We will be happy to have such contacts. Our Moscow telephone number is 593-17-75.

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